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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION, and
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN
LIQUIDATION, and MERWIN
U. STEWART, Liquidator,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
LIQUIDATOR'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

03tfl '66>n
Case No: 0 4 ^ t i ^ 6 « -

I/O

VS.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson
LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS,
CORP., a California corporation, and
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a
California corporation,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest Insurance Company, in Liquidation and Wasatch Crest
Mutual Insurance Company, in Liquidation, by and through Merwin U. Stewart, the

Utah Insurance Commissioner, in his capacity as the court-appointed liquidator
("Liquidator") of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company, in Liquidation and Wasatch Crest
Mutual Insurance Company, in Liquidation, by and through counsel of record, hereby
respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support of the Liquidator's Motion for
Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Utah Insurance Code gives the Liquidator the power to retrieve monies paid
by an insolvent insurance company to any of its affiliates during the five years prior to
the filing of the liquidation petition.

Affiliate transactions are so susceptible to

manipulation and abuse that the Liquidator is statutorily empowered by § 31A-27-322
to recoup those paid monies regardless of any defense asserted by the original
recipient/affiliate.

The Liquidator moves this Court to enter summary judgment

regarding the payments received by Defendants LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. and
LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. as affiliates of Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest Insurance Company
and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company.
II.
1.

MATERIAL FACTS FOR WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS
Plaintiff Wasatch Crest Insurance Company was an insurance company

domiciled in the State of Utah ("WCIC" or "Wasatch Crest Insurance"). Wasatch Crest
Insurance was placed into liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint at ^ 1 and
Answer at ^ 1, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto respectively as
Exhibits "A" and "B".
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2.

Plaintiff Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company was an insurance

company domiciled in the State of Utah ("WCMIC" or "Wasatch Crest Mutual").
Wasatch Crest Mutual was placed into Liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint,
Ex. "A" at U 2 and Answer, Ex. "B" at ^ 2.
3.

Plaintiff

Merwin

U.

Stewart,

Utah

Insurance

Commissioner,

was

appointed by the Third Judicial District Court as the liquidator of WCIC and WCMIC
on July 31, 2003 (the "Liquidator"). The Liquidator has the authority and standing to
bring this action pursuant to § 31A-27-310, Utah Code Ann. The Liquidator is vested
by operation of law with the title to all the property, contracts, and rights of actions of
the insurance company being liquidated, wherever located, as of the date of the filing of
the petition for Liquidation. Pursuant to § 31A-27-314, Utah Code Ann., the Liquidator
may continue to prosecute and institute in the name of the insurer or in the Liquidator's
own name, any suits or other legal proceedings in this state or elsewhere.

See

Liquidation Order, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
4.

Defendant

corporation.

LWP

Claims

Administrators,

Corp.

was

a

California

The name "LWP Claims Administrators, Corp" was changed to LWP

Claims Solutions, Inc. See Complaint, Ex. "A" at K 4 and Answer, Ex. "B" at ^ 4.
5.

Defendant LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. is a California corporation.

See

Utah Department of Commerce print out, attached hereto as Exhibit "D". LWP Claims
Administrators, Corp. and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. are collectively referred to as
"LWP".

Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. was the parent corporation of WCIC. LWP was
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sold to John A. Igoe, the former Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief
Executive Officer of WCIC and LWP. Mr. Igoe was also the Chairman of the Board,
President and Chief Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc., the parent
corporation of WCIC and LWP. LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc.,
WCIC, and WCMIC. See Complaint, Ex. "A" at If 5; see also Wasatch Crest Group,
Inc. Form B 1 , dated April 16, 2001 at p. 5, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "E".
Corporate History of Wasatch Crest Mutual and Wasatch Crest Insurance
Acquisition of FCL
6.

Wasatch Crest Mutual was a mutual insurance company controlled by its

policyholders who annually elected a Board of Directors.

Effective April 15, 1994,

Wasatch Crest Mutual purchased all of the issued and outstanding common stock of
First Continental Life & Accident Insurance Company, a Utah domiciled insurance
company ("FCL").

See Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Co. Form B, dated July 15,

1998, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F"; see also Form
B dated April 16, 2001, Ex. "E".

1

Form B is a standard form used by all state insurance departments. Form B is a report
to the state regulators as to the transactions and interrelationship of the insurance
company and its affiliates which must be filed annually or whenever a material
transaction or change has occurred. All Form B's referenced in this Memorandum were
filed with the Utah Department of Insurance.
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Creation of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company
and Merger with Wasatch Crest Casualty
7.

Effective October 31, 1998, Wasatch Crest Group (the parent company of

WCIC) purchased all of the issued and outstanding common shares of Utah Home Fire
Insurance Company, a Utah domiciled property and casualty company, from Deseret
Management Corporation. Wasatch Crest Group changed the name of Utah Home Fire
Insurance to Wasatch Crest Insurance Company.

Effective December 19, 2000,

Wasatch Crest Casualty Company was merged into Wasatch Crest Insurance with
Wasatch Crest Insurance as the surviving company. See Form B dated April 16, 2001,
Ex. " E " a t p . 14.
Corporate History of LWP
8.

On November 16, 1999, Wasatch Crest Group purchased from LWP

Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. substantially all of the assets, real and
personal

property,

and

business

operations

owned

by

LWP

Commercial

Claims Administrators, Inc. pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement By and Among
Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. and LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., John A.
Igoe and Erica L. Igoe, dated November 16, 1999. Wasatch Crest Group's purchase
was an asset purchase, not a purchase of the stock of LWP Commercial Claims
Administrators, Inc. LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. was a third party
administrator of insurance claims. Concurrent with the purchase of substantially all of
the assets of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., Wasatch Crest Group
created a new corporate entity, (i.e., LWP Claims Administrators, Corp.) that took
possession and title to all of the purchased assets. LWP Claims Administrators, Corp.
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was incorporated in the State of California. The name of LWP Claims Administrators,
Corp. was subsequently changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. LWP is currently a
California corporation with offices in Sacramento, California and Salt Lake City, Utah.
LWP is currently a third-party administrator ("TPA"), which specializes in the
administration of worker's compensation insurance and claims associated with ski
industry workers. See Answer, Ex. "B" at ^ 15 at; see also November 16, 1999, Asset
Purchase Agreement

attached hereto as Exhibit "G" and November

16, 1999

Administrative Services Agreement between LWP Commercial Claims Administrators,
Inc. and LWP Claims Administrators, Corp., a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "H".
Affiliate Transactions
9.

On or about November 16, 1999, LWP entered into an agreement with

WCIC and WCMIC whereby LWP was paid a fixed percentage fee to administer all the
claims throughout the entire duration of the claims.

The fee paid to LWP was

calculated as a percentage of gross written premium received by WCIC or WCMIC. In
addition, LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee savings generated by LWP in
the administration of the claims. LWP's agreement with WCIC and WCMIC was not
reduced to writing or disclosed to the Utah Department of Insurance. See May 21, 2002
Letter from Orrin T. Colby Jr. to Judy Adlam attached hereto as Exhibit "I".
10.

Effective January 1, 2001, WCIC and LWP entered into an Administrative

Agreement whereby LWP administered worker's compensation claims for WCIC on a
"life of claim" basis and was paid fees as described in paragraph 19 of the
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Administrative Agreement.

See Wasatch Crest Group Form B, dated April 30, 2002 at

p. 12, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "J"; see also
January 2001 Administrative Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "K".
11.

LWP presented to WCMIC a proposed Administrative Agreement that was

to be effective January 1, 2001. The terms of the agreement were identical to the
Administrative Agreement entered into between WCIC and LWP as described above in
paragraph 15. See Answer, Ex. "B" at K 18; see also Letter dated May 21, 2002, Ex.

12.

The agreement between LWP and WCMIC was never executed; rather, the

arrangement between WCMIC and LWP continued under the terms of the verbal
agreement entered into in November 1999, whereby LWP would administer worker's
compensation claims for WCMIC on a "life of claim" basis. See Letter dated May 21,
2002, Ex. " P .
13.

Wasatch Crest Group sold LWP back to John Igoe and Erica Igoe

sometime in 2002. John Igoe continued in his capacity as an officer and director of
Wasatch Crest Group after the sale of LWP to John and Erica Igoe. See Term Sheet
attached hereto as Exhibit "L".
14.

From

November

16,

1999

through

July

$6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services.

30,

2003,

WCIC

paid

Of the $6,144,402.68 total,

$4,955,586.10 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while $1,188,816.58 was in
the form of offsets. See Affidavit of Robert Miller, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "M".
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Att->

15.

From November

16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, WCMIC

$534,265.96 to LWP for claims handling services.

paid

Of the $534,265.96 total,

$474,265.96 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while $60,000.00 was in the
form of offsets. See id.
III.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

The Liquidator alleges in the First Claim for Relief of the Complaint that LWP
has violated 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann., which states as follows:
Recoupement from Affiliates
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an insurer
authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver
appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf of the insurer from any
affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of distributions, other than stock
dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time during the five years
preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is
subject to the limitations of Subsections (2) through (6).
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when paid, the
distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not know and could not
reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely affect its solvency.
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is the amount needed,
in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under the receivership, reduced
for each recipient by any amount the recipient has already paid to receivers under
similar laws of other states.
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time the
distributions were paid is liable up to the amount of distributions he received. Any
person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time the distributions were
declared is liable up to the amount of distributions he would have received if they had
been paid immediately. If two or more persons are liable regarding the same
distributions, they are jointly and severally liable.
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all affiliates that
controlled that person at the time the dividend was declared or paid are jointly and
severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the amount recovered from the insolvent
affiliate.
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(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a director under
existing law.
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after the
earlier of:
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under Section 31A27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 31A-27306(2) or the liquidation is terminated under Section 31A-27-339.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322.
A.

LWP was an Affiliate of WCIC and WCMIC.
An affiliate is defined as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under

common control with, another person.

A corporation is an affiliate of another

corporation, regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons
manages the corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(4). As a result, LWP is an
affiliate of WCIC and WCMIC because there is common management and ownership.
John Igoe, the owner and former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of LWP
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., served concurrently as the Acting Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Group, the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Insurance, and the Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of LWP Claims Administrators. In those positions, Mr. Igoe initiated, approved
and carried out affiliate transactions between LWP, WCIC and WCMIC by entering into
Administrative Agreements with both WCIC and WCMIC on behalf of LWP.
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B.

As an Affiliate, LWP Must Disgorge All Funds It Received from WCIC and
WCMIC Since November 16, 1999.
Pursuant to § 31A-27-322, the Liquidator is permitted to recover from any

affiliate any distribution made at any time during the five years preceding the petition
for liquidation. The petition for liquidation was filed on July 31, 2003. LWP became
an affiliate of WCIC and WCMIC on or around November 16, 1999. Consequently, any
payments on or after November 16, 1999 to LWP are recoverable. 2
If a person or entity qualifies as an affiliate, then any distribution to that affiliate
made in the five years prior to the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid.
There are no statutory rights to setoff or other mitigating circumstances. In essence, the
Utah statute subordinates the claims of affiliates to the claims of other creditors and
policyholders against the remaining assets of the liquidation estate. The Utah statute
views an affiliate as an "insider" and relegates any claim of an affiliate to that of a
shareholder who is granted the lowest priority claim against the liquidation estate
assets.
Because of the inherent dangers of self-dealing and overreaching associated with
affiliate transactions, the legislature has determined that insiders/affiliates will recover
only to the extent that all other claimants are paid before an affiliate.

This

interpretation is supported by the language of § 31A-27-322(3), Utah Code Ann., which
limits the amount to be recovered by the liquidator from affiliates to "the amount

2

The statute provides for payments going back five years (July 31, 1998), but since
LWP did not become an affiliate until November 1999, LWP is only responsible for
disgorging payments from November 1999 through July 31, 2003.
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needed, in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under the receivership."
In other words, the Liquidator is prevented from recovering from affiliates anything
more than what is necessary to pay all claimants, which in effect is the total deficiency
incurred by the liquidation estate. The pragmatic effect of the statute is to subordinate
all affiliate payments made within five years of the liquidation order to the claims of all
other creditors and policyholders, and thereby permitting the affiliates to recover on the
same basis as the equity owners.

Because any transaction between an insurance

company and its affiliate is so vulnerable to abuses, the statute sweeps back into the
liquidation estate of the insolvent insurance company any and all payments made by the
insurance company to an affiliate within five years of the insolvency.
Because of the overwhelming threat to the financial stability of an insurance
company posed by affiliate transactions, the recipient of affiliated transaction monies
must repay everything they have received during the five years prior to the filing of the
liquidation petition. Therefore, $6,678,668.64, paid by WCIC and WCMIC to LWP for
claims handling services must be repaid to the Liquidator.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Liquidator moves
this Court to enter an order of summary judgment that the affiliate transactions must be
repaid according to U.C.A. § 31A-27-322.

No material facts are in dispute.

The

evidence is clear that LWP received at least $ 6,678,668.64 from WCIC and WCMIC
from November 1999 through July 31, 2003, and that there was common management
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and ownership between LWP, WCIC, and WCMIC. For these and all other foregoing
reasons, this Court should grant the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

1^-^

day of January 2005.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

TcM
^
'
I / P. Harrington
JnZt01
Jennifer L. Lange
Attorneys for
Wasatch Crest
Insurance
Company, in Liquidation;
Wasatch Crest
Mutual Insurance Company, in Liquidation;
and Merwin U. Stewart
J. Ray Barrios
Liquidation Office General Counsel
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the Liquidator's
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment was sent via U.S.

I/A
first class mail, postage prepaid on the l ^

day of January 2005 to the following:

Edwin C. Barnes
Charles R. Brown
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

3273424 l.DOC
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Tab 2

Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217)
Charles R. Brown (Bar No. 0449)
Jennifer A. James (Bar No. 3914)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
201 South Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-322-2516
Fax:
801-521-6280

/

- -i rAi^TMEK
~.!i/U"iY CLERK

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH CREST INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION, and
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN
LIQUIDATION, and MERWIN U.
STEWART, Liquidator,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND OPPOSITION TO LIQUIDATOR'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-vsLWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS
CORP., a California corporation, and
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a
California corporation,

Civil No. 030915527
Judge Hanson

Defendants.

Defendants LWP Claims Administrators Corp. and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc.,
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) submit this consolidated memorandum of points and
authorities in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to
the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. ("LWPCSI"), formerly LWP Claims Administrators
Corp. ("LWPCAC") (collectively referred to as "LWP") acted as a third-party claims
administrator for two now-insolvent insurance companies, Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company ("WCIC") and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("WCMIC"), and
received fair compensation for its services. Now, the Liquidator of the two insolvent
Wasatch Crest companies asks the Court to order LWP to return the compensation paid
under the authority of the recoupment provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322.
That section allows the liquidator of insolvent insurance companies to recover
"distributions" if such "distributions" were made to affiliates that had control over the
insurer at the time the distributions were made. The legislative history of Section 322,
as well as its plain language, establishes that the recoverable payments are excessive
distributions made in the form of dividends to the parent of an insurer. The statute does
not, and was never intended to, apply to payments made for services rendered to the
insurer.
The Liquidator has not even attempted to meet its statutory burden of
demonstrating that LWP was ever in control of either WCIC or WCMIC, nor has it
demonstrated that LWP ever received any distributions in the nature of dividends from
the two insurers. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that payments to LWP
were contemporaneously made in fair consideration for services provided by LWP to
WCIC and WCMIC. The undisputed evidence also shows that, at most, (1) LWP was a

-ii-

sister subsidiary of WCIC when some of the payments were made to LWP by WCIC,
and (2) LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC when payments were made to LWP by
WCMIC. The Liquidator presents no facts demonstrating that LWP was an affiliate that
controlled the insurers at the time LWP received payments, and undisputed facts
confirm that LWP was not in control of the insurers.
By bringing a complaint for recoupment under § 31A-27-322, and making a
summary judgment motion under these undisputed facts, the Liquidator has either
misunderstood or grossly misapplied the statute. Its motion must therefore be denied.
For the same reasons, LWP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and this action
should be dismissed with prejudice.
LWP'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

WCIC was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. See

Memorandum in Support of Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Liquidator's
Memorandum") at ^ 1, attached as Exhibit 1. WCIC was placed in liquidation by the
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003. Id.
2.

WCMIC was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. See

Liquidator's Memorandum at % 2, Exhibit 1. WCMIC was placed in to liquidation by the
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003 .Id.
3.

LWPCAC was a corporation organized under California law in 1999. In the

third quarter of 2002, LWPCAC's name changed to LWPCSI. See Complaint at If 3,
attached as Exhibit 2, and Answer at H 4 attached as Exhibit 3.

-iii-
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4.

LWPCSI is a California corporation, originally incorporated as LWPCAC.

Its name changed to LWPCSI in the third quarter of 2002. See Exhibit 2 at U 4 and
Exhibit 3 at 1| 4.
History of WCIC and WCMIC
5.

WCMIC was a mutual insurance company which purchased all of the

common stock of First Continental Life and Accident Insurance Company ("FCL")
effective April 15, 1994. See Form B, Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Co., dated
July 15, 1998, at p. 2, Item 1(b), attached as Exhibit 4.
6.

Effective January 1, 1997, WCMIC purchased all of the common stock of

Transunion Casualty Company ("Transunion"). On January 1, 1998, Transunion
purchased Wasatch Fire Insurance Company. Effective March 25, 1998, Transunion
was renamed Wasatch Crest Casualty Insurance Company ("WCCIC"). Immediately
thereafter, Wasatch Fire Insurance Company merged into WCCIC, with WCCIC as the
surviving corporation. See Exhibit 4 at pp. 6-7, Item (1).
7.

On June 30, 1998, WCMIC exchanged all of the common stock of FCL

and WCCIC for shares of the newly incorporated Wasatch Crest Group ("WCG"). In
exchange for the stock of FCL and WCCIC, WCMIC received 1 million Class A common
shares of WCG (100% of the Class A shares) and 5.3 million Class C common shares
(100% of the Class C shares) of WCG. WCMIC also received 4.4 million shares of
Class B-1 common stock, which it sold to investors. An additional 6.4 million shares of
Class B-1 common stock and 3.9 million shares of Class B-2 common stock were also
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purchased by the investors. After these transactions, WCG Investment Group
("Wasatch Investment"). L P . owned 5.8 million shares of Class B-1 common stock,
Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation ("Swiss Re") owned 3.9 million shares of Class
B-2 common stock, and Chase Capital Partners ("Chase") owned 5.0 million shares of
Class B-1 common stock. See Wasatch Crest Group, Form B, Insurance Holding
Company System Registration Statement, at pp. 14-15, Item 5(1 )(e), attached as
Exhibit 5.
8.

Effective October 3 1 , 1998, WCG purchased all of the common stock of

Utah Home Fire Insurance Company and changed the latter company's name to WCIC.
/cf.atp. 14, Item 5(1 )(d).
9.

Effective December 19, 2000, WCCIC merged into WCIC with WCIC as

the survivor. Id. at p. 15, Item 5(1 )(f).
10.

Effective December 2000, WCG's capital was restructured pursuant to a

Form A Application approved by the Utah Insurance Commissioner by order dated
November 27, 2000. As part of the restructuring, WCMIC relinquished its shares in
WCG and WCG Investment received 89% of the voting shares of WCG with the
remaining 1 1 % of the voting shares held by Swiss Re. Id. at p. 15, Item 5(1 )(e). See
Exhibit 6 at If 14; Exhibit 7 at H 14.
Acquisition of LWP Commercial Claims
Administrators, Inc.'s Assets by WCG.
11.

On November 16, 1999, WCG purchased substantially all of the assets

and business operations of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, lnc."(LWP
-v-

Commercial"), a California company which acted as a third party insurance claim
administrator and was owned by John and Erica Igoe. See Asset Purchase Agreement,
attached as Exhibit 8. At that time, WCG formed a new corporate entity, LWPCAC.
The assets purchased from LWP Commercial were transferred to LWPCAC. See
Exhibit 2 at K15 and Exhibit 3 at 1J15.
The Relationship of LWPCAC to WCIC and WCMIC
12.

Shortly after the asset purchase and formation of LWPCAC, John Igoe

became President and COO of WCG and its subsidiaries, WCIC and FCL. John Igoe
was also CEO of LWPCAC, the third subsidiary of WCG. Igoe, however, was never an
officer or director of WCMIC. See Affidavit of John Igoe, attached as Exhibit 6, at 1f 5
and Affidavit of Dennis Larson, attached as Exhibit 7, at 1j 5.
13.

At the time of the asset purchase, an Administrative Services Agreement,,

dated November 16, 1999 (attached as Exhibit 9) was entered into between LWP
Commercial, the selling entity owned by John and Erica Igoe, and LWPCAC, the
subsidiary formed by WCG to hold the assets transferred by LWP Commercial. WCIC
and WCMIC were not parties to the agreement. The agreement provided that LWP
Commercial continue to employ its former employees and that LWPCAC would
compensate LWP Commercial "on a cost basis" by reimbursing LWP Commercial for all
reasonable costs associated therewith. See Exhibit 9 at p.3. The agreement was
intended to facilitate the transition of business operations pending the transfer of LWP
Commercial's employees on January 1, 2000. For this reason, the agreement
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terminated on December 31, 1999. See Exhibit 9 at p. 4, Exhibit 6 at fl 8; Exhibit 7 at

1J8.
14.

Around June 2000, LWPCAC began providing workers compensation

claims handling services to WCIC. Prior to that time, Employees of WCG provided
these services. After June 2000, these employees were placed under the direction of
LWPCAC. LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the cost of personnel provided by WCG to
LWPCAC. In return for providing claims services, LWPCAC received a percentage of
the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the medical cost savings realized
by WCIC due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. From June 2000 until January 1, 2001,
the claims handling services were provided pursuant to an oral agreement between
LWPCAC and WCIC. See Exhibit 6 at 1f 9; Exhibit 7 at If 9.
15.

This oral agreement for claims handling services was formalized in a

written agreement between WCIC and LWPCAC which was effective as of January 1,
2001. The terms of the written agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier
oral agreement. See, Administrative Agreement, attached as Exhibit 10. The terms of
the agreement are standard commercial terms similar to the terms of agreements
entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance companies. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 10; Exhibit
7 at 1| 10.
16.

A similar oral agreement for claims handling services was in effect

between WCMIC and LWPCAC. Although a written agreement was drafted to formalize
the oral agreement, this agreement was never signed by WCMIC and the two
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companies continued to operate under the terms of the oral agreement. See Exhibit 6 at
fl 11; Exhibit 7 at fl 11.
17.

On April 28, 1998 WCG entered into a Managing General Agency

Agreement with North American Specialty Insurance Company ("NAS"), a wholly owned
subsidiary of Swiss Re ("NAS Agreement"). Under the terms of the agreement, WCG
was granted the right to underwrite and issue policies on behalf of NAS, subject to
certain guidelines and review procedures by NAS. The agreement also provided for
WCG to handle all claims arising out of NAS policies written under the agreement.
WCIC was not a party to this agreement. See Exhibit 6 at TJ12.
18.

Beginning June 2000, WCG assigned its responsibilities under the NAS

Agreement to LWPCAC. From that time forward, LWPCAC handled claims arising out
of the NAS policies for WCG, and received compensation from WCG for these services.
WCIC, which was not a party to the NAS Agreement, did not provide compensation to
LWPCAC for claims handling services under the NAS Agreement. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 13.
19.

At no time during its relationship with WCG did LWP receive any dividend

or other distributions, whether in cash, property or other assets, from WCG, WCIC, FCL
or WCMIC other than payments made in the ordinary course of business in accordance
with the various service agreements, written and oral, in effect during the period. See
Exhibit 6 at H 25; Exhibit 7 at U 17.
20.

LWP did not own, direct, or control the business or operations of WCG,

WCIC, FCL or WCMIC. Exhibit 6 at fl 16.
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21.

On November 6, 2001, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive

Officer of WCG, WCIC, and FCL was placed on indefinite leave of absence. At the
same time John Igoe was appointed to serve as Acting Chairman of the Board and CEO
of the companies pending an internal investigation by special outside counsel of the
activities of former officers and directors. See Exhibit 6 at fl 15; Exhibit 7 at 1} 13.
The Sale Of LWPCAC to John Igoe and Judy Adlam
22.

On May 8, 2002, John Igoe and Judy Adlam purchased the stock of

LWPCAC from WCG for $2,000,000 in cash, an assumption of liabilities of
approximately $1.8 million and a contingency payment (made in 2003) of $175,000.
See Stock Purchase Agreement and Mandatory Share Redemption Agreement,
attached as Exhibit 11. John Igoe did not represent WCG in the negotiations of the
transaction, which was made effective as of January 1, 2002. The Board of Directors
retained Hales and Company independently to advise them as to the fairness of the
transaction. See Exhibit 6 at U 17; Exhibit 7 at fl 14.
23.

Pursuant to the agreement for purchase of the stock of LWPCAC by Igoe

and Adlam, Igoe agreed to resign as an officer and director of all Wasatch Crest
companies. See Exhibit 6 at fl 18; Exhibit 7 at ^ 15. Igoe resigned these positions on
the day of closing, May 8, 2002. See Resignations of John Igoe, attached as Exhibit 12.
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Payments to LWPCAC by Wasatch Crest Companies
24.

From June 2000 when LWPCAC first started providing claims handling

services for WCIC and WCMIC until January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWPCAC to Igoe
and Adlam was effective, LWPCAC received payments of $5,142,263 under the terms
of its agreements with WCIC, WCMIC, and WCG. See Exhibit 6 at fl 20.
25.

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, $3,001,503 was paid as

compensation for claims handling services provided to WCG in connection with the NAS
Agreement.
26.

See Exhibit 6 at fl 2 1 .
Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, $1,328,110 was paid as

compensation for claims handling services provided to WCIC under the terms of the oral
and written administrative agreements. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 22.
27.

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC, $$812,650 was paid as

compensation for claims handling services provided to WCMIC under the terms of the
oral agreement described. See Exhibit 6 at If 23.
LWPCSI Continues to Provide Claims Handling Services
After Insolvency of WCIC and WCMIC
28.

After WCIC and WCMIC were placed into liquidation on July 31, 2001,

LWPCAC, and subsequently LWPCSI, continued to provide claims handling services to
WCIC and WCMIC at the request of the Utah Guaranty Association ("UGA"), in
accordance with the terms of the written Administrative Agreement (Exhibit 10) with
WCIC and the oral agreement with WCMIC. See Exhibit 6 at ^[24; Exhibit 7 at If 16.
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RESPONSE TO LIQUIDATOR'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

In response to paragraph 1, LWP admits that WCIC was an insurance

company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the Third
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003.
2.

In response to paragraph 2, LWP admits that WCMIC was an insurance

company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the Third
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003.
3.

In response to paragraph 3, LWP admits that Melvin U. Stewart was

appointed by the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah as the liquidator
of WCIC and WCMIC on July 3 1 , 2003. The remaining assertions in paragraph 3 are
legal conclusions rather than material facts.
4.

In response to paragraph 4, LWP admits LWPCAC was a California

corporation whose name was changed to LWPCSI.
5.

In response to paragraph 5, LWP admits LWPCSI is a California

corporation whose name was changed from LWPCAC. LWP further admits that WCG
was the parent corporation of WCIC.
LWP disputes that it was sold to only John Igoe when, in fact, it was sold
effective January 1, 2002, to John Igoe and Judy Adlam. See Exhibit 11. LWP also
disputes that Igoe was the Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive
Officer of WCIC and WCG. He became Acting Chairman of the Board of Directors and
Chief Executive Officer of WCG and WCIC in November of 2001, but resigned from
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those positions and all other positions with Wasatch Crest companies as of May 8, 2002,
the date of closing of the sale of LWP by WCG to Igoe and Adlam. See Exhibit 6 at fl 17;
Exhibit 9 at U 15. LWP admits that in approximately January 2000, Igoe became
president of WCG, but he resigned from this position on May 8, 2002. Id.
LWP admits (1) Igoe was the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of LWP, and (2) WCG was the parent of WCIC from October 1998 until 2002
when Igoe resigned his positions with WCG and WCIC. LWP admits that it was a
subsidiary of WCG and a sister subsidiary of WCIC from November 16,1998 through
December 31, 2001, and could therefore be considered an affiliate of WCG and WCIC
between those dates. LWP denies that it was an affiliate of WCG and WCIC after
January 1, 2002, the effective date of the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam. See Exhibit 6
at If 17; Exhibit 7 at If 14. LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC after November 27, 2000
when WCMIC's interest in WCG, the parent of LWP, was relinquished. Exhibit 5 at p. 14,
Item 5(1 )(e).
Corporate History of Wasatch Crest Mutual and Wasatch Crest
Insurance Acquisition of FCL
6.

In response to paragraph 6, LWP admits that WCMIC was a mutual

insurance company controlled by its shareholders and that WCMIC purchased all of the
stock of FCL effective April 15, 1994.
Creation of WCIC and Merger with WCCIC
7.

In response to paragraph 7, LWP admits effective October 31, 1998, WCG

purchased all of the common stock of Utah Home Fire Insurance Company and changed
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the latter company's name to WCIC. LWP also admits, effective December 19, 2000,
WCCIC merged into WCIC with WCIC as the survivor.
Corporate History of LWP
8.

In regard to Paragraph 8, LWP admits, on November 16, 1999, WCG

purchased substantially all of the assets and business operations of LWP Commercial
Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), a company which acted as a third party
insurance claim administrator, from John and Erica Igoe. LWP also admits that WCG
formed a new corporate entity, LWPCAC, at that time and the assets purchased from
LWP Commercial were transferred to LWPCAC.
LWP further admits that LWPCAC was incorporated in California and
changed its name to LWPCSI. LWPCSI has offices in Sacramento, California and Salt
Lake City and is a third-party administrator specializing in the administration of worker's
compensation insurance and claims.
Affiliate Transactions
9.

In regard to Paragraph 9, LWP disputes that (1) LWP entered into an

agreement on about November 16, 1999 with WCIC and WCMIC providing for payment
of a fixed percentage fee to administer all claims throughout the entire duration of the
claims, (2) the fee paid to LWP was a percentage of gross premiums received by WCIC
and WCMIC, and (3) LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee savings generated
by LWP. The Administrative Services Agreement, Exhibit 9, dated November 16, 1999
was an agreement between LWP Commercial, the selling entity owned by John and
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Erica Igoe, and LWPCAC, the subsidiary formed by WCG to hold the assets transferred
by LWP Commercial. WCIC and WCMIC were not parties to the agreement. Moreover,
the agreement did not provide for payment of a percentage of premiums or medical cost
savings to LWP. It instead provided that LWPCAC would compensate LWP Commercial
"on a cost basis" by reimbursing LWP Commercial for all reasonable costs. See Exhibit
11 at p. 3. The agreement was intended to facilitate the transition of business operations
pending the transfer of LWP Commercial's employees on January 1, 2000. For this
reason, the agreement terminated on December 31, 1999. See Exhibit 6 at U 8.
10.

In regard to paragraph 10, LWP disputes that WCIC entered into an

Administrative Agreement effective January 1, 2001. In June 2000, LWPCAC began
providing workers compensation claims handling services to WCIC pursuant to an oral
agreement. Employees of WCG provided these services under the direction of
LWPCAC, and LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the personnel services provided by WCG
to LWPCAC. In return for providing these services, LWPCAC received a percentage of
the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the medical cost savings realized by
WCG due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. See Exhibit 6 at If 9.
This oral agreement was formalized in a written agreement between WCIC
and LWPCAC which was effective as of January 1, 2001. The terms of the written
agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier oral agreement. See Exhibit 10;
Exhibit 6 at ^ 10; Exhibit 7 at Tf 10. The terms of the agreement are standard commercial
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terms similar to the terms of agreements entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance
companies. See Exhibit 6 at U 10.
11.

In regard to paragraph 11, LWP admits that it presented a proposed

Administrative Agreement to WCMIC, which was to be effective January 1, 2001 and had
the same terms as the administrative agreement between LWPCAC and WCIC.
12.

In regard to paragraph 12, LWP admits that the written agreement between

LWP and WCMIC was never signed by WCMIC and that the two companies continued to
operate under the oral agreement. The oral agreement, however, was not entered into
in November 1999. The oral agreement was reached in June 2000 when LWP began
providing claims handling services to WCMIC. See Exhibit 6 at fl 11.
13.

In regard to paragraph 13, LWP denies that WCG sold LWP back to John

and Erica Igoe sometime in 2002. LWP was, instead, sold to Igoe and Adlam effective
January 1, 2002. See Exhibit 11. The sale closed on May 8, 2002. Id. LWP also
disputes that John Igoe continued in his capacity as an officer and director of WCG. At
the time the sale was closed, Igoe resigned his positions as an officer and director of
WCG and all other Wasatch Crest companies. See Exhibit 12.
14.

In regard to paragraph 14, LWP disputes that WCIC paid $6,144,402.68 to

LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, of
which amount $4,955,486.10 was in the form of checks or wire transfers and
$1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000, when LWP first began
providing claims handling services to WCIC, until January 1, 2002, when the sale of LWP
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to Igoe and Adlam became effective, WCIC paid $1,338,110 to LWP for claims handling
services. See Exhibit 6 at U 22.
15.

In regard to paragraph 15, LWP disputes that WCMIC paid $534,295.96 to

LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, of
which amount $534,265.96 was in the form of checks or wire transfers and $60,000 was
in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000, when LWP first began providing claims
handling services to WCMIC, until January 1, 2002, when the sale of LWP to Igoe and
Adlam became effective, WCMIC paid $812,650 to LWP for claims handling services.
See Exhibit 6 at U 23. None of this amount was paid to LWP before November 27, 2000,
the date WCMIC relinquished its interest in WCG and ceased to be a part of the WCG
group. See Schedule prepared as exhibit to Affidavit of Robert C. Miller, filed as Exhibit
M to Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as Exhibit 13.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is intended to "expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials
where no triable issue of fact is disclosed." Natl Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Bayour Country
Club, 403 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah 1965). It is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (c). A Court should grant summary judgment when the undisputed
facts are such that "there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could
prevail." Frisbee v. K&K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). Plaintiff has
not met that burden, but Defendant LWP has.
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ARGUMENT
LWP's cross-motion for summary judgment should be granted and the
Liquidator's motion for summary judgment be denied because (1) undisputed material
evidence shows that payments to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC were not "distributions"
subject to recoupment under Utah Code Ann. 31A-27-322; and (2) LWP was never an
affiliate in control of the insurer as required for recoupment of "distributions" under Utah
Code Ann. § 31 A-27-322. In addition, even if the payments in question could somehow
be termed "distributions," the Liquidator is not entitled to summary jujdgment because
there are disputed issues of material fact concerning payments to LWP.
Chapter 27 of the Utah Insurance Code, titled "Insurers Rehabilitation and
Liquidation Act," governs the liquidation of Utah Insurance Companies. The Liquidator of
WCIC and WCMIC brought its complaint against LWP and its motion for summary
judgment under Section 322 of Chapter 27 which gives the receiver of an insurer the
right to seek recoupment of "distributions" to affiliates that control the insurer when the
distributions are made within the five years before the date of liquidation. As the
legislative history of Section 322 clearly demonstrates, the Liquidator, however, either
completely misunderstands or has misapplied the provisions of Section 322 by seeking
to recoup fair consideration paid for services rendered rather than "distributions", a term
which, as used in Section 322, is synonymous with "dividend," from an entity which did
not receive dividends and which never controlled the insurers.
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1.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322 and its Legislative History

Section 322 specifically provides:
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an
insurer authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this chapter,
the receiver appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf of
the insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of
distributions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital
stock, made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for
liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is subject to the
limitations of Subsections (2) through (6).
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when paid, the
distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not know
and could not reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely
affect its solvency.
(Emphasis added.) This section was enacted in 1986 as part of a complete revision of
the Utah Insurance Code which began in 1981. For a five year period, the Insurance
Law Revision Committee, created by the Utah State Legislature, met to redraft the
insurance code.
Records relating to the intent of the drafters are maintained in the Utah State
Archives and include a March 25, 1983 draft with extensive drafters' comments.1 The
language of Section 322, first added in this draft, provided "Recoupment from affiliates.
A rehabilitator, liquidator, or conservator may recover on behalf of the insurer excessive

The March 1983 draft was identified by drafter Dane Leavitt as one of the documents with the
most probative value to the research of legislative history As Mr Leavitt noted in his transmittal letter to
the Utah State Archives, "To the extent that the resulting provisions were not substantially changed. ., the
drafter's comments [on the above mentioned draft] will be potentially helpful in understanding the drafter's
(if not the legislature's) intent" See Series 25134, Insurance Law Revision Committee, Administrative
Records, 1981-1985, attached as Exhibit 14
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distributions paid to affiliates, pursuant to section 96-17-6.5."2 See, State of Utah Draft
Insurance Code, March 25, 1983, § 96-45-55, attached as Exhibit 15. Section 96-17-6.5
provides:
(1) Right of receiver to recover dividends paid. If an order for the
liquidation, rehabilitation or conservation of an insurer authorized to do
business in Utah is entered..., the receiver has a right to recover on behalf
of the insurer the amount of distributions other than stock dividends paid by
the insurer on its capital stock at any time during the five years preceding
the petition forjiquidation, rehabilitation or conservation, subject to the
limitations of subsections (2) to (4).
(2) Dividend payments recoverable. No dividend is recoverable if the
recipient shows that when paid the distribution was lawful and reasonable,
and that the insurer did not know and could not reasonably have known
that the distribution might adversely affect its solvency.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
The comments to the two draft sections relating to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322
make it clear that the section was added to remedy a potential abuse of insurance
company holding systems: "[the section] provides the necessary power to recover
distributions to affiliates under a holding company system." Comment to § 96-45-55,
Exhibit 15. The recoupment from affiliates provision was intended to remedy the
problems occurring when parent companies took large surpluses as dividends from
cash-rich insurers and the insurers were later rendered insolvent. This provision allows
the liquidator to recoup the excessive dividend to the controlling parent. Comment to
§96-17-6.5. Id.

The August 24, 1984 Draft of the liquidation and rehabilitation section of the Utah Insurance
Code, attached as Exhibit 16, shows that Utah Code Ann. § 96-45-55 was renumbered 31A-26-322. The
Chapter number was subsequently changed from Chapter 26 to Chapter 27.
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Section 322 as enacted in 1986 makes it even more clear the section's application
is limited to situations where dividends are paid to a parent company. In subsection one,
the relevant payments to affiliates controlling the insurer are referred to as "distributions."
In subsection two, the payments are called "dividends." The drafts of these sections and
the comments to the draft demonstrate that the term "distribution" is used
interchangeably with the term "dividend." Further, Section 322 as enacted by the
legislature allows recoupment from "affiliates that control the insurer," thereby
establishing that recoupment is limited to the situation where a parent in a holding
company system takes funds from an insurer by dividend. The definition of distribution
given elsewhere in the Utah Code supports the conclusion that a distribution does not
include payment for services. In the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 16-10a-101 etseq., for example, the term "distribution" is defined as "a direct or
indirect transfer of money or other property...in respect of any of its shares. A
distribution may be in the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend, a purchase,
redemption, or other acquisition of shares, distribution of indebtedness or otherwise."
Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-102(13). LWP received no such dividends or distributions.
2.

LWP was never an affiliate that controlled WCIC or WCMIC

The Liquidator argues, incorrectly and without support, that Section 322
recoupment applies to all affiliates of an insurer, when, in fact, it can only apply to
affiliates that control the insurer. The point is logical - it is only those with control who
can direct dividends. The Liquidator completely ignores the fact thai LWP was not in
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control of WCIC or WCMIC; instead, the Liquidator asks the Court to assume that
recoupment is appropriate merely because at certain times, John Igoe was individually
an officer and director of LWP, WCIC, and WCG.
Igoe's position with LWP, WCIC and WCG, however, is alone insufficient to
establish that LWP was an affiliate of WCIC or WCMIC. First, Igoe held no management
position with WCMIC, much less a position which could result in WCMIC being an
affiliate of LWP. Second, the Liquidator fails to establish that Igoe's individual
responsibilities with LWP and WCIC actually resulted in WCIC being an affiliate of LWP.
Such status may arise where "[a] corporation is an affiliate of another corporation,
regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons manages the
corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-301(5). Here, the Liquidator has not even tried
to show that "the same group or persons" manages LWP and WCIC, but instead
presumes control based on Igoe's individual positions at times with the two corporations.
The Insurance Code, however, does not allow such presumptions: "there is no
presumption an individual holding an official position with another person controls that
person solely by reason of the position." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(27)(a).
(Emphasis added.)
The undisputed facts show that LWP and WCIC were sister subsidiaries of WCG
from November 16, 1999 until January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWP by WCG to Igoe
and Adlam was effective. As such, LWP and WCIC may have been affiliates prior to the
effective date of the sale of LWP, but LWP was never an affiliate that controlled the
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insurer, WCIC. Section 322's recoupment provisions, therefore, could not apply to any
payments from WCIC to LWP, even if the Liquidator had established that such payments
had been dividends rather than payments for services rendered.
The undisputed facts also establish that LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC
during the time period when WCMIC made payments for services to LWP. In November
1999, when LWP Commercial's assets were acquired by LWPCAC, WCMIC owned a
portion of the stock of WCG, which in turn owned the stock of LWPCAC. However,
effective November 27, 2000, WCMIC relinquished all of its stock in WCG and could not
thereafter be considered to be an affiliate of LWP under any interpretation of the term.
The schedule submitted as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Robert C. Miller filed in support of
the Liquidators Motion for Summary Judgment shows no payments from WCMIC to LWP
before December 31, 2000. See Exhibit 13. Further, at no time was LWP ever an
affiliate in control of WCMIC.
3.

Payments to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC were not distributions

Additional undisputed facts establish that the payments to LWP from WCIC and
WCMIC were fair consideration for services contemporaneously rendered to WCIC and
WCMIC, not excessive dividends from an insurer to a parent. The services were
provided pursuant to administrative agreements standard in the industry. The fairness of
this arrangement is further confirmed by the fact that UGA engaged and continues to
engage LWP to provide claims handling services to WCIC and WCMIC under terms and
conditions similar to those of the contracts in effect prior to the liquidation proceedings.

4.

Disputed issues concerning payments

Even if payments to LWP were found to be distributions to an affiliate that
controlled the insurer, summary judgment in the Liquidator's favor should not be granted.
There is an issue of disputed material fact concerning the source of payments to LWP
and the relationship of the companies when the payments were made. The Liquidator
contends WCIC paid LWP $6,144,402.68 and WCMIC paid LWP $534,295.96 prior to
liquidation. LWP disputes this amount, reporting that LWP received a total of
$5,142,263 from Wasatch Crest companies during the time period LWP was owned by
WCG. After the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam effective January 1, 2002, ownership of
LWP was totally different from the ownership of WCIC and WCMIC and after May 8,
2002, Igoe no longer held a position WCIC. LWP could not possibly be considered an
affiliate of WCIC or WCMIC after May 8, 2002, and payments after that date could not be
subject to recoupment, regardless of the issue of control. In addition, after
November 27, 1999, when WCMIC relinquished its stock in WCG, WCMIC no longer had
even an indirect interest in LWP and could not be LWP's affiliate.
The Liquidator also misstates, or ignores, the source of payments to LWP. The
Affidavits presented by LWP confirm that $3,001,503 of the amount in question was paid
to LWP for services rendered under the NAS Agreement, not as a result of services
provided to WCIC or WCMIC. Those amounts also could not be subject to recoupment
as payments by the insurer.
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5.

Payments Do Not Meet Test for Recovery

Even if the payments to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC were termed distributions
(which they are not), they would not be recoverable under Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-27-322(2) which provides that" ..no dividend is recoverable if the recipient
shows that when paid the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did
not know and could not reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely
affect its solvency." Throughout the period from June 2000 until year end 2002, both
WCIC and WCMIC met all the solvency requirements of the Utah Department of
Insurance as evidenced by their quarterly financial filings as required under the Utah
Insurance Code. Subsequent to the acquisition of LWP by Igoe and Adlam both entities
were declared insolvent by the Utah Department of Insurance. This action was taken by
the Utah Department of Insurance on July 31, 2003 over eighteen months after the
effective date of the sale and fifteen months after the closing date of the sale. Therefore,
there is no evidence that insurer knew or should reasonably have know that the
distributions, if made"...might adversely affect its solvency." Furthermore, as amply
demonstrated, the payments were made for services rendered in accordance with
standard commercial terms and were therefore "...lawful and reasonable." Even if the
distributions were deemed to be "dividends" within the meaning of the Insurance Code,
they do not meet the test for recovery under Section 322.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted, finding in LWP's favor on the Liquidator's claims and dismissing such claims
with prejudice. On the same grounds, the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment
should be denied.
Dated this 17th day of February 2005.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

EDWIN C. BARNES
CHARLES R. BROWN
JENNIFER A. JAMES
Attorneys for Defendants
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Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to
Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
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John P. Harrington
Jennifer L. Lange
Holland & Hart LLP
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Ray Barrios, Jr.
Liquidation Office General Counsel
215 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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I, John Igoe, having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

l a m a resident of the State of California, am over the age of eighteen and

am competent to make this affidavit.

7CP^>

2.

On September 1, 1998, my wife, Erica Igoe, and I purchased the assets of

a company providing third-party claims handling and other administrative services from
Acordia Corporation. These assets were transferred to a California corporation, LWP
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), owned by my wife and
me.
3.

On November 16, 1999, substantially all of the assets and business

operations of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), were
purchased by Wasatch Crest Group ("WCG"), a Utah corporation. See Asset Purchase
Agreement, attached as Exhibit A. At that time, WCG formed a new corporate entity,
LWP Claims Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC") as a wholly owned subsidiary and
transferred the assets purchased from LWP Commercial to LWPCAC.
4.

As consideration for substantially all the assets of LWP Commercial, my

wife and I received $325,000 in cash and $700,000 in promissory notes. See Exhibit A
at pp. 7-8, Art. 3.1. We were supposed to be issued 800,000 shares of Class B
common stock of WCG on the third anniversary of the asset sale, but these shares
were never issued. Id. at Art. 3.2.
5.

Shortly after the asset purchase and formation of LWPCAC, I became

President and Chief Operations Officer of WCG and its subsidiaries, Wasatch Crest
Insurance Company ("WCIC") and First Continental Life and Accident Insurance
Company ("FCL"). I also became CEO of LWPCAC.
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6.

I have never been an officer or director of Wasatch Crest Mutual

Insurance Company ("WCMIC"), a Utah insurance company which held a significant
portion of the shares of WCG from June 30, 1998 until November 27, 2000.
7.

I have never controlled WCG, WCMIC, FCL, or WCIC. I have never held

any stock of those corporations. I was one of at least five directors of WCG at certain
times, but I did not control the board, which was under the control of an investor group.
At no time did LWP ever control WCG, WCMIC, FCL or WCIC.
8.

To facilitate the transfer of the business operations of LWP Commercial to

LWPCAC in November 1999, the former corporation agreed to continue to employ its
former employees and supervise their work under the terms of an administrative
services agreement from November 16, 1999 through December 31, 1999 when LWP
Commercial's employees were to become employees of WCG. See Administrative
Services Agreement, effective November 16, 1999, attached as Exhibit B. In return for
providing these services, LWPCAC paid LWP Commercial for the costs of rendering
the services. Id. at p. 3. The Administrative Services Agreement expired on December
31, 1999. Id, at p. 4.
9.

Around June 2000, LWPCAC began providing workers compensation

claims handling services to WCIC. Employees of WCG provided these services under
the direction of LWPCAC, and LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the personnel services
provided by WCG to LWPCAC. In return for providing these services, LWPCAC
received a percentage of the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the
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medical cost savings realized by WCIC due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. From
June 2000 until January 1, 2001, the claims handling services were provided pursuant
to an oral agreement between LWPCAC and WCIC.
10.

This oral agreement was formalized in a written agreement between

WCIC and LWPCAC effective as of January 1, 2001. The terms of the written
agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier oral agreement. See,
Administrative Agreement, attached as Exhibit C. The terms of the agreement are
standard commercial terms similar to the terms of agreements entered into by
LWPCAC with other insurance companies.
11.

A similar oral agreement for claims handling services was in effect

between WCMIC and LWPCAC. Although a written agreement was drafted to formalize
the oral agreement, this agreement was never signed by WCMIC and the two
companies continued to operate under the terms of the oral agreement.
12.

On April 1, 1998, prior to formation of LWPCAC, WCG entered into a

Managing General Agency Agreement with North American Specialty Insurance
Company ("NAS"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Swiss Reinsurance America
Corporation ("Swiss Re") (the "NAS Agreement"). Under the terms of the agreement,
WCG was granted the right to underwrite and issue policies on behalf of NAS, subject
to certain guidelines and review procedures by NAS. The agreement also provided for
WCG to handle all claims arising out of NAS policies written under the agreement.
WCIC was not a party to this agreement.
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13.

Beginning June 2000, LWPCAC handled claims arising out of the NAS

policies for WCG, and received compensation from WCG or these services. WCIC,
which was not a party to the NAS agreement, did not provide compensation to
LWPCAC for claims handling services under the NAS agreement.
14.

Effective December 2000, WCG's capital was restructured pursuant to a

Form A Application approved by the Utah Insurance Commissioner by order dated
November 27, 2000. As part of the restructuring, WCMIC relinquished its shares in
WCG, and WCG Investment received 89% of the voting shares of WCG, with the
remaining 11 % of the voting shares held by Swiss Re.
15.

On November 6, 2001, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive

Officer of WCG, WCIC, and FCL was placed on indefinite leave of absence. At the
same time I was appointed to serve as Acting Chairman of the Board and CEO of the
companies pending an internal investigation by special outside counsel of the activities
of former officers and directors. My service in these positions was an accommodation
to the investor group which controlled WCG, but did not give me control of WCG,
WCIC, or FCL.
16.

LWP did not own, direct, or control the business or operations of WCG,

WCIC, FCL or WCMIC.
17.

On May 8, 2002, Judy Adlam and I purchased the stock of LWPCAC from

WCG for $2,000,000 in cash, assumption of liabilities of approximately $1.8 million and
a contingency payment (made in 2003) of $175,000. I did not represent WCG in the
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negotiations leading up to that transaction, which was made effective as of January 1,
2002. The Board of Directors of WCG retained Hales and Company to advise them as
to the fairness of the transaction.
18.

Pursuant to the agreement for purchase of the stock of LWPCAC from

WCG, I agreed to resign as an officer and director of all Wasatch Crest companies. See
Stock Purchase Agreement and Mandatory Share Redemption Agreement, attached as
Exhibit D. I resigned those positions as of the day of closing, May 8, 2002. See
Resignations, attached as Exhibit E.
19.

In the third quarter of 2002, the name of LWPCAC was changed to LWP

Claims Solutions, Inc. ("LWPCSI").
20.

I have carefully examined the books and records of LWPCAC, including

its financial records. The books and records show that, from June 2000, when
LWPCAC first started providing claims handling services for WCIC and WCMIC, until
January 1, 2002, when the sale of LWPCAC by WCG was effective, LWPCAC
received payments of $5,142,263 for services performed under the terms of its
agreements with WCIC, WCMIC, NAS and WCG.
21.

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC for services, $3,001,503 was

paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCG in connection with
the NAS agreement described in ffi[ 12 & 13, above.
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22.

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC for services, $1,328,110 was

paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCIC under the terms
of the oral and written administrative agreements described in ffij 9 & 10, above.
23.

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC for services, $812,650 was paid

as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCMIC under the terms of
the oral agreement described in 1} 11, above.
24.

After WCIC and WCMIC were placed into liquidation on July 31, 2003,

LWPCSI continued to provide claims handling services to WCIC and WCMIC at the
specific request of the Utah Property and Casualty Guaranty Association ("UGA"), in
accordance with the terms of the written Administrative Agreement (Exhibit C) with
WCIC and the oral agreement with WCMIC.
25.

At no time during its relationship with WCG did LWP receive any dividend

or other distributions, whether in cash, property or other assets, from WCG, WCIC, FCL
or WCMIC other than payments made in the ordinary course of business in accordance
with the various service agreements, written and oral, in effect during the period.
Dated this/vfra-day of February 2005.

)HN IpOE
/
Subscribed and sworn to before m e i : h i s / ^ ^ d a v of February 2005.

NOfABY PUBLIC

NOTARY PUBLIC
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Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest Insurance Company, in Liquidation ("Insurance Co."),
and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("Mutual"), in Liquidation, and D. Kent
Michie, Liquidator (the "Liquidator"), by and through counsel, submit this opposition to
Defendants LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. and LWP Claims Solutions, Inc.'s
(collectively "LWP") Motion for Summary Judgment.

In addition, the Liquidator

submits his Reply Memorandum in Support of Insurance Co. and Mutual's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant LWP advances two arguments in opposition to the Liquidator's
Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of LWP's own Motion for Summary
Judgment: (1) the approximate $6 million payments made by WCIC and WCMIC to
LWP were not "dividends", and therefore were not subject to the Recoupment from
Affiliates statute (Sec. 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann.); and (2) LWP was never an
affiliate in control of WCIC and/or WCMIC. See LWP's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Liquidator's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("LWP Memo.") already on file with Court at p. 1. Both arguments are based
on misinterpretations of the pertinent statutes and erroneous conclusions based on a
faulty and incomplete reading of the legislative history. Affiliate transactions are so
susceptible to manipulation and abuse that the Liquidator is statutorily empowered by §
31A-27-322 to recoup those paid monies regardless of any defense asserted by the
original recipient/affiliate.
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In addition, LWP makes three secondary arguments: (1) the payments were for
contemporaneously rendered services; (2) the source of the payments to LWP was not
always Insurance Co. and Mutual; and (3) dividends are not recoverable if LWP can
show that the dividend was lawful and reasonable, and Insurance Co. and Mutual did
not know that the dividends would adversely affect the solvency of Insurance Co. and
Mutual. The three secondary arguments are, quite simply, irrelevant and immaterial to
whether the Liquidator can recoup distributions made to affiliates by an insurance
company.
II.

LIQUIDATOR'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS WITH
RESPECT TO THE LIQUIDATOR'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a]
memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted." LWP failed to
follow this procedural rule governing summary judgment motions resulting in confusion
as to what facts LWP admits or denies. First, LWP did not restate each of the
Liquidator's facts with which LWP disagrees. Second, LWP included a response to all
of the Liquidator's separately numbered facts, regardless of whether they admitted or
denied the fact. Thirdly, in certain instances, it is difficult to determine if LWP is truly
disputing a fact asserted by the Liquidator or whether they are making some kind of
inconsequential distinction. LWP's failure to follow the procedural rules has made the
Liquidator's task much more difficult in extrapolating what is disputed. Therefore, the
Liquidator sets forth here (1) a verbatim restatement of the Liquidator's original
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undisputed fact; (2) a verbatim restatement of LWP's response; and (3) an attempt to
discern whether LWP admitted or denied the Liquidator's statement of fact, and if
denied, a response to that denial. Inasmuch as LWP failed to comply with Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Liquidator's statements are deemed admitted.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 1:

Plaintiff

Wasatch

Crest

Insurance

Company was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. Wasatch Crest
Insurance was placed into liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint at ^ 1 and
Answer at f 1, true and correct copies of which are attached to the Liquidator's
Memorandum in Support of it Motion for Summary Judgment ("Liquidator's Memo.")
respectively as Exhibits "A" and "B".
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 1, LWP admits that WCIC was an
insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003.
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's first
statement.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 2:

Plaintiff

Wasatch

Crest

Mutual

Insurance Company was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah. Wasatch
Crest Mutual was placed into Liquidation by the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 31, 2003. See Complaint, Ex. "A"
at K 2 and Answer, Ex. U B" at U 2.
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LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 2, LWP admits that WCMIC was an
insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah and was placed in liquidation by the
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah on July 31, 2003.
Liquidator's Reply:

LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's

second statement.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 3:

Plaintiff

Merwin

U.

Stewart,

Utah

Insurance Commissioner, was appointed by the Third Judicial District Court as the
liquidator of Insurance Co. and Mutual on July 31, 2003 (the "Liquidator").

The

Liquidator has the authority and standing to bring this action pursuant to § 31A-27-310,
Utah Code Ann. The Liquidator is vested by operation of law with the title to all the
property, contracts, and rights of actions of the insurance company being liquidated,
wherever located, as of the date of the filing of the petition for Liquidation. Pursuant to
§ 31A-27-314, Utah Code Ann., the Liquidator may continue to prosecute and institute
in the name of the insurer or in the Liquidator's own name, any suits or other legal
proceedings in this state or elsewhere. See Liquidation Order, a true and correct copy
of which is attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "C".
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 3, LWP admits that Melvin [sic] U.
Stewart was appointed by the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah as
the liquidator of WCIC and WCMIC on July 31, 2003. The remaining assertions in
paragraph 3 are legal conclusions rather than material facts.
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits only certain portions of this statement.

The

Liquidator asserts that the Utah Insurance Code speaks for itself and that the Liquidator
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has the authority and standing to bring this action, that the Liquidator is vested by
operation of law with the title to all the property, contracts, and rights of actions of the
insurance company being liquidated, and that the Liquidator may prosecute and institute
in the name of the insurer or in the Liquidator's own name any suits or other legal
proceedings in this state or elsewhere.
Liquidators Statement of Fact No. 4: Defendant LWP Claims Administrators,
Corp. was a California corporation. The name "LWP Claims Administrators, Corp" was
changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. See Complaint, Ex. "A" at | 4 and Answer, Ex.
"B" at K 4.
LWP's Response:

In response to paragraph 4, LWP admits LWPCAC was a

California corporation whose name was changed to LWPCSI.
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's fourth
statement.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 5:

Defendant LWP Claims Solutions, Inc.

is a California corporation. See Utah Department of Commerce print out, attached to
the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "D". LWP Claims Administrators, Corp. and LWP
Claims Solutions, Inc. are collectively referred to as "LWP". Wasatch Crest Group,
Inc. was the parent corporation of WCIC. LWP was sold to John A. Igoe, the former
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of Insurance Co. and
LWP. Mr. Igoe was also the Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc., the parent corporation of Insurance Co. and LWP.
LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch Crest Group, Inc., Insurance Co., and Mutual. See
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Complaint, Ex. "A" at ^ 5; see also Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. Form B 1 , dated April 16,
2001 at p. 5, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as
Exhibit "E".
LWP's Response:

In response to paragraph 5, LWP admits LWPCSI is a

California corporation whose name was changed from LWPCAC. LWP further admits
that WCG was the parent corporation of WCIC.
LWP disputes that it was sold to only John Igoe when, in fact, it was sold
effective January 1, 2002, to John Igoe and Judy Adlam.

See Exhibit 11 to LWP's

Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. LWP also disputes that
Igoe was the Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of WCIC
and WCG. He became Acting Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive
Officer of WCG and WCIC in November of 2001, but resigned from those positions and
all other positions with Wasatch Crest companies as of May 8, 2002, the date of closing
of the sale of LWP by WCG to Igoe and Adlam. See Ex. 6 at U 17; Ex. 9 at f 15. LWP
admits that in approximately January 2000, Igoe became president of WCG, but he
resigned from this position on May 8,2002. Id.
LWP admits (1) Igoe was the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of LWP, and (2) WCG was the parent of WCIC from October 1998 until 2002 when
Igoe resigned his positions with WCG and WCIC. LWP admits that it was a subsidiary
1

Form B is a standard form used by all state insurance departments. Form B is a sworn
statement to the state regulators as to the transactions and interrelationship of the
insurance company and its affiliates which must be filed annually or whenever a
material transaction or change has occurred. All Form B's referenced in this
Memorandum were filed with the Utah Department of Insurance.
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of WCG and a sister subsidiary of WCIC from November 16, 1998 through December
31, 2001, and could therefore be considered an affiliate of WCG and WCIC between
those dates. LWP denies that it was an affiliate of WCG and WCIC after January 1,
2002, the effective date of the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam. See Ex. 6 at \\1\ Ex. 7
at 1(14. LWP was not an affiliate of WCMIC after November 27, 2000 when WCMIC's
interest in WCG, the parent of LWP, was relinquished. Exhibit 5 at p. 14, Item 5(1 )(e).
Liquidator's Reply:

LWP admits certain portions of this statement. LWP

disputes to whom LWP was sold in 2002, which is completely irrelevant to the issues in
this motion. However, the Liquidator does not dispute that LWP was sold to John Igoe
and Judy Adlam. The Liquidator does, however dispute the date of the sale.

LWP

states that the sale was effective as of January 1, 2002. This is simply not true. LWP
was sold to John A. Igoe and Judy Adlam on May 8, 2002. See Ex. 11 of LWP's Memo.
(Stock Purchase Agreement, dated May 8, 2002). 2 The Liquidator disputes, therefore,
LWP's contention that LWP could be considered an affiliate of Group and Insurance
Co. from November 16, 1998 through only December 31, 2001. The date on the Stock
Purchase Agreement is May 8, 2002. LWP, therefore, was an affiliate from November
16, 1999 through May 8, 2002. The issue of when John Igoe resigned his positions is
irrelevant, and the Liquidator contends that the documents speak for themselves. The
Liquidator also disputes LWP's assertion that it was not an affiliate of Mutual after
2

The LWP Administrative Services Agreement that was executed at the closing of the
Stock Purchase Agreement was effective as of May 8, 2002, it was not backdated to
January 1, 2002. This agreement, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B", was between
Group and LWP. It outlined LWP's continued involvement with claims administration
even though WCG was divesting itself of its interest in LWP as of May 8, 2002.
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November 27, 2000. The Liquidator contends that LWP was an affiliate of Mutual until
at least the spring of 2002. See id. at f 16.
Corporate History of Wasatch Crest Mutual and Wasatch Crest Insurance
Acquisition of FCL
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 6:

Wasatch Crest Mutual was a mutual

insurance company controlled by its policyholders who annually elected a Board of
Directors. Effective April 15, 1994, Wasatch Crest Mutual purchased all of the issued
and outstanding common stock of First Continental Life & Accident Insurance
Company, a Utah domiciled insurance company ("FCL"). See Wasatch Crest Mutual
Insurance Co. Form B, dated July 15, 1998, a true and correct copy of which is attached
to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "F"; see also Form B dated April 16, 2001, Ex.
"E".
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 6, LWP admits that WCMIC was a
mutual insurance company controlled by its shareholders and that WCMIC purchased
all of the stock of FCL effective April 15, 1994.
Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's sixth
statement.
Creation of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company
and Merger with Wasatch Crest Casualty
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 7:

Effective October 31, 1998, Wasatch

Crest Group (the parent company of WCIC) purchased all of the issued and outstanding
common shares of Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, a Utah domiciled property and
casualty company, from Deseret Management Corporation.
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Wasatch Crest Group

changed the name of Utah Home Fire Insurance to Wasatch Crest Insurance Company.
Effective December 19, 2000, Wasatch Crest Casualty Company was merged into
Wasatch Crest Insurance with Wasatch Crest Insurance as the surviving company. See
Form B dated April 16, 2001, Ex. "E" at p. 14.
LWP's Response: In response to paragraph 7, LWP admits effective October 31,
1998, WCG purchased all of the common stock of Utah Home Fire Insurance Company
and changed the latter company's name to WCIC.

LWP also admits, effective

December 19, 2000, WCCIC merged into WCIC with WCIC as the survivor.
Liquidator's Reply:

LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's

seventh statement.
Corporate History of LWP
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 8:

On November 16, 1999, Wasatch Crest

Group purchased from LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., substantially all
of the assets, real and personal property, and business operations owned by LWP
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement By
and Among Wasatch Crest Group, Inc. and LWP Commercial Claims Administrators,
Inc., John A. Igoe and Erica L. Igoe, dated November 16, 1999. Wasatch Crest Group's
purchase was an asset purchase, not a purchase of the stock of LWP Commercial Claims
Administrators, Inc. LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. was a third party
administrator of insurance claims. Concurrent with the purchase of substantially all of
the assets of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc., Wasatch Crest Group
created a new corporate entity, (i.e., LWP Claims Administrators, Corp.) that took
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possession and title to all of the purchased assets. LWP Claims Administrators, Corp.
was incorporated in the State of California. The name of LWP Claims Administrators,
Corp. was subsequently changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. LWP is currently a
California corporation with offices in Sacramento, California and Salt Lake City, Utah.
LWP is currently a third-party administrator ("TPA"), which specializes in the
administration of worker's compensation insurance and claims associated with ski
industry workers. See Answer, Ex. "B" at Tf 15 at; see also November 16, 1999, Asset
Purchase Agreement attached to the Memo, in Support as Exhibit "G" and November
16, 1999 Administrative Services Agreement between LWP Commercial Claims
Administrators, Inc. and LWP Claims Administrators, Corp., a true and correct copy of
which is attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "H".
LWP's Response:

In regard to paragraph 8, LWP admits, on November 16,

1999, WCG purchased substantially all of the assets and business operations of LWP
Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial"), a company which acted
as a third party insurance claim administrator, from John and Erica Igoe. LWP also
admits that WCG formed a new corporate entity, LWPCAC, at that time and the assets
purchased from LWP Commercial were transferred to LWPCAC.
LWP further admits that LWPCAC was incorporated in California and changed
its name to LWPCSI.

LWPCSI has offices in Sacramento, California and Salt Lake

City and is a third-party administrator specializing in the administration of worker's
compensation insurance claims.
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Liquidator's Reply: LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's eighth
statement.
Affiliate Transactions
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 9:

On or about November 16, 1999, LWP

entered into an agreement with WCIC and WCMIC whereby LWP was paid a fixed
percentage fee to administer all the claims throughout the entire duration of the claims.
The fee paid to LWP was calculated as a percentage of gross written premium received
by WCIC or WCMIC.

In addition, LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee

savings generated by LWP in the administration of the claims. LWP's agreement with
WCIC and WCMIC was not reduced to writing or disclosed to the Utah Department of
Insurance. See May 21, 2002 Letter from Orrin T. Colby Jr. to Judy Adlam attached to
the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "I".
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 9, LWP disputes that (1) LWP entered
into an agreement on about November 16, 1999 with WCIC and WCMIC providing for
payment of a fixed percentage fee to administer all claims throughout the entire
duration of the claims, (2) the fee paid to LWP was a percentage of gross premiums
received by WCIC and WCMIC, and (3) LWP was paid a percentage of all medical fee
savings generated by LWP. The Administrative Services Agreement, Exhibit 9, dated
November 16, 1999 was an agreement between LWP Commercial, the selling entity
owned by John and Erica Igoe, and LWPCAC, the subsidiary formed by WCG to hold
the assets transferred by LWP Commercial. WCIC and WCMIC were not parties to the
agreement. Moreover, the agreement did not provide for payment of a percentage of
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premiums or medical cost savings to LWP. It instead provided that LWPCAC would
compensate LWP Commercial "on a cost basis" by reimbursing LWP Commercial for
all reasonable costs. See Exhibit 11 at p. 3. The agreement was intended to facilitate
the transition of business operations pending the transfer of LWP Commercial's
employees on January 1, 2000. For this reason, the agreement terminated on December
31, 1999. See Ex. 6 at U 8.
Liquidator's Reply: The Administrative Services Agreement was an agreement
between LWP Commercial and LWPCAC. Mutual and Insurance Co. were not parties
to the agreement.

The agreement speaks for itself, and, therefore, any additional

statements set forth by LWP are disputed by the Liquidator to the extent they are not
found in the agreement which is attached to LWP's Memo, as Ex. 1 I.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 10: Effective January 1, 2001, WCIC and
LWP entered into an Administrative Agreement whereby LWP administered worker's
compensation claims for WCIC on a "life of claim" basis and was paid fees as described
in paragraph 19 of the Administrative Agreement.

See Wasatch Crest Group Form B,

dated April 30, 2002 at p. 12, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the
Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "J"; see also January 2001 Administrative Agreement
attached to the Liquidator's Memo as Exhibit "K".
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 10, LWP disputes that WCIC entered
into an Administrative Agreement effective January 1, 2001. In June 2000, LWPCAC
began providing workers compensation claims handling services to WCIC pursuant to
an oral agreement. Employees of WCG provided these services under the direction of
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LWPCAC and LWPCAC reimbursed WCG for the personnel services provided by WCG
to LWPCAC. In return for providing these services, LWPCAC received a percentage of
the premiums earned by WCIC and a percentage of the medical cost savings realized by
WCG due to LWPCAC's handling of claims. See Ex. 6 at U 9.
This oral agreement was formalized in a written agreement between WCIC and
LWPCAC which was effective as of January 1, 2001.

The terms of the written

agreement were the same as the terms of the earlier oral argument. See Ex. 10; Ex. 6 at
^ 10; Ex. 7 at f 10. The terms of the agreement are standard commercial terms similar
to the terms of agreements entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance companies.
See Ex. 6 at K 10.
Liquidator's Reply: LWP disputes that Insurance Co. and LWP entered into a
formal Administrative Agreement on January 1, 2001. The Liquidator affirmatively
alleges that the Wasatch Crest Group Form B statement dated April 30, 2002 which is
attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Ex. J, speaks for itself and that Insurance Co. did
enter into a formal Administrative Agreement with LWP on January 1, 2001. Further,
the Liquidator contends that LWPCAC began providing services pursuant to an oral
agreement at the time of the sale of LWP Commercial to Group, November 16, 1999.

3

In LWP's response to the Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 9, LWP states that the
Administrative Services Agreement terminated on December 31, 1999. In its response
to the Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 10, LWP states that an oral agreement to
provide services was entered in June 2000. What happened between January 1, 2000
and June 2000? The Liquidator contends that there was more than just one "oral
agreement".
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The Agreement speaks for itself and, therefore, any additional statements set forth by
LWP are disputed by the Liquidator to the extent they are not found in the Agreement.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No 11:

LWP presented to WCMIC a proposed

Administrative Agreement that was to be effective January 1, 2001. The terms of the
agreement were identical to the Administrative Agreement entered into between WCIC
and LWP as described above in paragraph 15. See Answer, Ex. " B " at f 18; see also
Letter dated May 21, 2002, Ex. "I", both of which are attached to the Liquidator's
Memo.
LWP's Response:

In regard to paragraph 11, LWP admits that it presented a

proposed Administrative Agreement to WCMIC, which was to be effective January 1,
2001 and had the same terms as the administrative agreement between LWPCAC and
WCIC.
Liquidator's Reply:

LWP admits all statements of fact in the Liquidator's

eleventh statement.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 12: The

agreement

between

LWP

and

WCMIC was never executed; rather, the arrangement between WCMIC and LWP
continued under the terms of the verbal agreement entered into in November 1999,
whereby LWP would administer worker's compensation claims for WCMIC on a "life
of claim" basis. See Letter dated May 21, 2002, Ex. "I" to the Liquidator's Memo.
LWP's Response:

In regard to paragraph 12, LWP admits that the written

agreement between LWP and WCMIC was never signed by WCMIC and that the two
companies continued to operate under the oral agreement.
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The oral agreement,

however, was not entered into in November 1999. The oral agreement was reached in
June 2000 when LWP began providing claims handling services to WCMIC. See Ex. 6
to LWP's Memo, at f 11.
Liquidator's Reply: The Liquidator asserts that the oral agreement was reached
in November 1999 and that LWP began providing claims handling services to Mutual at
that time. See Statement of Fact No. 13 of LWP's Memo, which states that "[a]t the
time of the asset purchase, an Administrative Services Agreement, dated November 16,
1999 [] was entered into between LWP Commercial . . . and LWPCAC."

Although

Mutual was not a party to that agreement, the services were billed to and paid by
Mutual. See Aff. of Robert C. Miller attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Ex. M at f
19.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 13. Wasatch Crest Group sold LWP back to
John Igoe and Erica Igoe sometime in 2002. John Igoe continued in his capacity as an
officer and director of Wasatch Crest Group after the sale of LWP to John and Erica
Igoe. See Term Sheet attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "L".
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 13, LWP denies that WCG sold LWP
back to John and Erica Igoe sometime in 2002. LWP was, instead, sold to Igoe and
Adlam effective January 1, 2002. See Ex. 11. The sale closed on May 8, 2002. Id.
LWP also disputes that John Igoe continued in his capacity as an officer and director of
WCG. At the time the sale was closed, Igoe resigned his positions as an officer and
director of WCG and all other Wasatch Crest companies. See Ex. 12 to LWP's Memo.
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Liquidator's Reply: LWP was sold to John A. Igoe and Judy Adlam effective
May 8, 2002, not January 1, 2002. See Ex. 11 to LWP's Memo. Whether or not John
Igoe remained as an officer and director of Group, Insurance Co., and FCL is irrelevant.
The Liquidator maintains that the documents speak for themselves.
Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 14: From November 16. 1999 through July
30, 2003, WCIC paid $6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services.

Of the

$6,144,402.68 total, $4,955,586.10 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while
$1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. See Aff, of Robert C. Miller, attached to the
Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "M".
LWP's Response:

In regard to paragraph 14, LWP disputes that WCIC paid

$6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through
July 30, 2003, of which amount $4,955,486.10 was in the form of checks or wire
transfers and $1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000 when LWP
first began providing claims handling services to WCIC, until January 1, 2002, when
the sale of LWP to Igoe and Adlam became effective, WCIC paid $1,338,110 to LWP
for claims handling services. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at f 22.
Liquidator's Reply: From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Insurance
Co. paid $6,144,402.68 to LWP for claims handling services, of which $4,955,586.10
was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while $1,188,816.58 was in the form of
offsets. See Affidavit of Robert C. Miller, attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo.
a t ! 18.
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Liquidator's Statement of Fact No. 15: From November 16, 1999 through July
30, 2003, WCMIC paid $534,265.96 to LWP for claims handling services.

Of the

$534,265.96 total, $474,265.96 was in the form of a check or wire transfers, while
$60,000.00 was in the form of offsets. See id.
LWP's Response: In regard to paragraph 15, LWP disputes that WCMIC paid
$534,295.96 to LWP for claims handling services from November 16, 1999 through
July 30, 2000, of which amount $534,265.96 was in the form of checks or wire transfers
and $60,000 was in the form of offsets. From June 30, 2000, when LWP first began
providing claims handling services to WCMIC, Until January 1, 2002, when the sale of
LWP to Igoe and Adlam became effective, WCMIC paid $812,650 to LWP for claims
handling services. See Ex. 6 at \ 23. None of this amount was paid to LWP before
November 27, 2000, the date WCMIC relinquished its interest in WCG and ceased to be
a part of the WCG group. See Schedule prepared as exhibit to Affidavit of Robert C.
Miller, filed as Exhibit M to Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment, attached as
Ex. 13 to LWP's Memo.
Liquidator's Reply:

From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Mutual

paid $534,265.96 to LWP for claims handling services, of which $474,265.96 was in the
form of a check or wire transfer, while $60,000 was in the form of offsets. See Aff. of
Robert C. Miller attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at ^f 19.
III.

STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS WITH RESPECT TO LWP'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Liquidator
asserts that the following statements of material facts made by LWP are disputed.
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 7: On June 30, 1998, WCMIC exchanged all of the
common stock of FCL and WCCIC foi shares of the newly incorporated Wasatch Crest
Group. In exchange for the stock of FCL and WCCIC, WCMIC received 1 million
Class A common shares of WCG (100% of the Class A shares) and 5.3 million Class C
common shares (100% of the Class C shares) of WCG.

WCMIC also received 4.4

million shares of Class B-1 common stock, which it sold to investors. An additional 6.4
million shares of Class B-1 common stock and 3.9 million shares of Class B-2 common
stock were also purchased by the investors. After these transactions, WCG Investment
Group ("Wasatch Investment") L.P. owned 5.8 million shares of Class B-1 common
stock, Swiss Reinsurance America Corporation ("Swiss Re") owned 3.9 million shares
of Class B-2 common stock, and Chase Capital Partners ("Chase'') owned 5.0 million
shares of Class B-1 common stock.

See Wasatch Crest Group, Form B, Insurance

Holding Company System Registration Statement at pp. 14-15, a true and correct copy
of which is attached to LWP's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment as Exhibit 5.
Disputed Facts: After these transactions, Swiss Re owned 5.0 million shares of
Class B-1 common stock and Chase owned 3.9 million shares of Class B-2 common
stock. This appears to have been a clerical error on LWP's part. See id.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 13:

At the time of the asset purchase, an

Administrative Services Agreement dated November 16, 1999 (attached as Exhibit 9)
was entered into between LWP Commercial, the selling entity owned by John and Erica
Igoe, and LWPCAC, the subsidiary formed by WCG to hold the assets transferred by
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LWP Commercial.

WCIC and WCMIC were not parties to the agreement.

The

agreement provided that LWP Commercial continue to employ its former employees
and that LWPCAC would compensate LWP Commercial "on a cost basis" by
reimbursing LWP Commercial for all reasonable costs associated therewith.

See

Exhibit 9 at p. 3. The agreement was intended to facilitate the transition of business
operations pending the transfer of LWP Commercial's employees on January 1, 2000.
For this reason, the agreement terminated on December 31, 1999.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the last full sentence of Fact No. 13
inasmuch as the Liquidator has no knowledge regarding that fact, it appears to be
LWP's opinion that the agreement was intended to facilitate the transition of business
operations, etc., and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes that statement.

Further, the

Liquidator avers that the agreement speaks for itself.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 15: The oral agreement for claims handling services
was formalized in a written agreement between WCIC and LWPCAC which was
effective as of January 1, 2001. The terms of the written agreement were the same as
the terms of the earlier oral agreement.

See Administrative Agreement, attached as

Exhibit 10. The terms of the agreement are standard commercial terms similar to the
terms of agreement entered into by LWPCAC with other insurance companies.

See

Exhibit 6 at \ 10; Exhibit 7 at ^ 10.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the last full sentence of this statement
inasmuch as there is no evidence to prove that the terms of the agreement are standard
commercial terms similar to the terms of agreement entered into by LWPCAC with
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other companies.

This statement contains LWP's opinion, and the Liquidator,

therefore, disputes this statement.

Further, the Liquidator avers that the agreement

speaks for itself.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 17:

On April 28, 1998 WCG entered into a

Managing General Agency Agreement with North American Specialty Insurance
Company ("NAS")5 a wholly owned subsidiary of SwissRe ("NAS Agreement"). Under
the terms of the agreement, WCG was granted the right to underwrite and issue policies
on behalf of NAS, subject to certain guidelines and review procedures by NAS. The
agreement also provided for WCG to handle all claims arising out of NAS policies
written under the agreement. WCIC was not a party to this agreement. See Exhibit 6 at
112.
Disputed Facts: LWP did not attach the NAS Agreement to its memorandum and
provided no basis for this statement of fact. The NAS Agreement speaks for itself, but
without evidence of it, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 18:

Beginning June 2000., WCG assigned its

responsibilities under the NAS Agreement to LWPCAC.

From that time forward,

LWPCAC handled claims arising out of the NAS policies for WCG, and received
compensation from WCG for these services. WCIC, which was not a party to the NAS
Agreement, did not provide compensation to LWPCAC for claims handling services
under the NAS Agreement. See Exhibit 6 at ^ 13.
Disputed Fact:

Inasmuch as LWP did not attach the NAS Agreement to its

memorandum, there is no factual basis for this statement of fact. The Liquidator asserts
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that the NAS Agreement speaks for itself, but without evidence of it, the Liquidator
disputes the entire statement of fact.

The Liquidator specifically disputes that

LWPCAC received compensation under the NAS Agreement from Group.

LWPCAC

billed and received its compensation from Insurance Co. See Aff. of Robert C. Miller
attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at ^ 16-18.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 19: At no time during its relationship with WCG did
LWP receive any dividend or other distributions, whether in cash, property or other
assets, from WCG, WCIC, FCL or WCMIC other than payments made in the ordinary
course of business in accordance with the various service agreements, written and oral,
in effect during the period. See Exhibit 6 to LWP's Memorandum at ^ 25 and Exhibit 7
at 117.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact. LWP did
receive distributions, as that term is interpreted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27322. Pursuant to that statute, the Liquidator is permitted to recover from any affiliate
any distribution made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for
liquidation.

If a person or entity qualifies as an affiliate (as LWP with respect to

Group, Mutual, Insurance Co., and FCL), then any distribution to that affiliate made in
the five years prior to the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid.

The

$6,678,668.64 paid by Insurance Co. to LWP for claims handling services is
unquestionably a distribution. The fact that the distributions were within the ordinary
course of business is irrelevant to whether the distributions are recoverable by the
Liquidator.
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 20: LWP did not own, direct, or control the business
or operations of WCG, WCIC, FCL, or WCMIC. Exhibit 6 to LWP's Memo, at H 16.
Disputed Facts:

The Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact.

In its

Response to Liquidator's Statement of Material Facts, responding to statement of fact
number five, LWP admits that LWP could be considered an affiliate of Group and
Insurance Co. from November 1998 through December 31, 2001. 4

The Liquidator

asserts that LWP is an affiliate of Group and Insurance Co. from November 16, 1999
through at least May 8, 2002. The Liquidator agrees that LWP did not own Group,
Insurance Co., FCL or Mutual, but that LWP was under common control and
management such that it was an affiliate of Insurance Co., Group, Mutual, and FCL as
those terms are defined in the Utah Insurance Code. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex.
A) at Hlf 6-18.
Group acquired LWP Commercial in October 1999, and formed a new corporate
entity, LWP Claims Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC"). John Igoe served as CEO of
LWPCAC from November 1999 to the present, and served as Chairman of the Board
from the point Orrin T. Colby Jr. was relieved of that role. LWPCAC was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Group until it was sold to John A. Igoe and Judy K. Adlam on May
8, 2002. See id. at ^ 8.
At all times between 1999 and July 2003, Group was the parent company of
Insurance Co., FCL, Casualty (until merged) (collectively the "Companies"), and

4

See LWP's Memo, at p. xii.
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LWPCAC, and John Igoe was the COO and President of Group.5 Although Mutual was
never a subsidiary of Group, it was an affiliate of Group between 1999 and the spring of
2002. See id. at f t 6 & 11. In his capacity as CEO, COO, and President of Group, and
CEO of LWPCAC, Mr. Igoe was directly involved in drafting and/or administering a
services agreement whereby LWPCAC provided claims services to the Companies and
Mutual. Mr. Igoe, along with Dennis Larson, had direct input into the scope and nature
of the services that would be performed by LWPCAC, and how much LWPCAC would
be paid for those services. See id. at \ 12. From the time that LWPCAC was formed
until it was sold, LWPCAC was under the common control and management of Group.
Id. at If 13.
Group management, which included John Igoe as President, CEO, and COO,
made management and employee decisions for the Companies, Mutual, and LWPCAC
because Group, Insurance Co., Mutual, FCL, Casualty, and LWPCAC were under
common management and control from 1999 through July 2003 (with the exclusion of
Mutual which ended its relationship with the Wasatch Crest companies in the spring of
2002). See id. at f 14. The management, officers, and directors of Group controlled
each of the Companies, Mutual, and LWPCAC, by virtue of their management and
supervision of the employees, day-to-day business activities, and records keeping. See
id. at \ 15.

During the relevant time period, Group, Insurance Co., Mutual, FCL,

Casualty, and LWPCAC were affiliates with one another. See id. at 16.
5

From 1999 to July 2003, John A. Igoe was the Chief Operating Officer and President
of Group. Prior to November 2001, John Igoe was named Chairman of the Board and
CEO of Group. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at % 6.
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 21: On November 6, 2001, the Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of WCG, WCIC, and FCL was placed on indefinite
leave of absence.

At the same time John Igoe was appointed to serve as Acting

Chairman of the Board and CEO of the companies pending an internal investigation by
special outside counsel of the activities of former officers and directors.
Disputed Facts: This statement is completely irrelevant to the issues set forth in
either the Liquidator's or LWP's Motions.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 22: On May 8, 2002, John Igoe and Judy Adlam
purchased the stock of LWPCAC for $2,000,000 in cash, an assumption of liabilities of
approximately $1.8 million and a contingency payment (made in 2003) of $175,000.
See Stock Purchase Agreement and Mandatory Share Redemption Agreement, attached
as Exhibit 11. John Igoe did not represent WCG in the negotiations of the transaction,
which was made effective as of January 1, 2002. The Board of Directors retained Hales
and Company independently to advise them as to the fairness of the transaction. See
Exhibit 6 at If 17; Exhibit 7 at f 14.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator does not dispute or agree with the details of the
agreement set forth in this statement of fact, but affirmatively alleges that the Stock
Purchase Agreement speaks for itself. The Liquidator contends that the stock purchase
sale took place and was effective as of May 8, 2002, not on January 1, 2002. See Stock
Purchase Agreement attached as Ex. 11 to LWP's Memo. The Liquidator contends that
the details of the sale, with the exception of the date, are completely irrelevant to the
issues set forth in either LWP's Memo, or the Liquidator's Memo.
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 23: Pursuant to the agreement for purchase of the
stock of LWPCAC by Igoe and Adlam, Igoe agreed to resign as an officer and director
of all Wasatch Crest companies. See Exhibit 6 at K 17; Exhibit 7 at f 14.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator does not dispute or agree with the details of the
agreement set forth in this statement of fact, but affirmatively alleges that the Stock
Purchase Agreement speaks for itself. With regard to the purported resignation of John
Igoe, the Liquidator again affirmatively alleges that the agreement and addendums
speak for themselves.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 24: From June 2000 when LWPCAC first started
providing claims handling services for Insurance Co. and WCMIC until January 1,
2002, when the sale of LWPCAC to Igoe and Adlam was effective, LWPCAC received
payments of $5,142,263 under the terms of its agreements with WCIC, WCMIC, and
WCG. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at f 20.
Disputed Facts:

The Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact.

From

November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Insurance Co. paid $6,144,402.68 to LWP
for claims handling services. Of the $6,144,402.68 total, $4,955,586.10 was in the form
of a check or wire transfers, while $1,188,816.58 was in the form of offsets. See Aff. of
Robert Miller attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at If 18.
From November 16, 1999 through July 30, 2003, Mutual paid $534,265.96 to
LWP for claims handling services. Of the $534,265.96 total, $474,265.96 was in the
form of a check or wire transfers, while $60,000 was in the form of offsets. See id. at \
19.
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LWP Statement of Fact No. 23:

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC,

$3,001,503 was paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCG in
connection with the NAS agreement. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at % 21.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator provided its proof of payment to LWP in Robert
C. Miller's affidavit which was attached as Exhibit M to the Liquidator's Memo. LWP
has not substantiated its figures, making it impossible for the Liquidator to verify them,
and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact.

The fact that the

claims handling services may have been provided for the benefit of Group does not take
away from the fact that Insurance Co. paid LWPCAC.

The issue of which affiliate

received the benefit is irrelevant.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 26:

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC,

$1,328,110 was paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCIC
under the terms of the oral and written administrative agreements. See Ex. 6 to LWP's
Memo, at \ 22.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator provided its proof of payment to LWP in Robert
C. Miller's affidavit which was attached as Exhibit M to the Liquidator's Memo. LWP
has not substantiated its figures, making it impossible for the Liquidator to verify them,
and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 27:

Of the $5,142,263 received by LWPCAC,

$812,650 was paid as compensation for claims handling services provided to WCMIC
under the terms of the oral agreement described. See Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at \ 23.
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Disputed Facts: The Liquidator provided its proof of payment to LWP in Robert
C. Miller's affidavit which was attached as Exhibit M to the Liquidator's Memo. LWP
has not substantiated its figures, making it impossible for the Liquidator to verify them,
and, therefore, the Liquidator disputes the entire statement of fact.
LWP Statement of Fact No. 28:

After WCIC and WCMIC were placed into

liquidation on July 31, 2001, LWPCAC, and subsequently LWPCSI, continued to
provide claims handling services to WCIC and WCMIC at the request of the Utah
Guaranty Association

("UGA"), in accordance with the terms of the written

Administrative Agreement (Exhibit 10) with WCIC and the oral agreement with
WCMIC. See Exhibit 6 at f 24; Exhibit 7 at If 16.
Disputed Facts: The Liquidator disputes that Insurance Co. and Mutual were
placed into liquidation on July 31, 2001. Insurance Co. and Mutual were placed into
liquidation on 31, 2003.

This was most likely a clerical error on LWP's part.

The

Liquidator does not dispute or agree with the rest of the statement of fact, but contends
that this statement of fact is completely irrelevant to the issues set forth in either LWP's
Memo, or the Liquidator's Memo.
IV.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

The Liquidator has asked this Court to enforce the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§31A-27-322 as written. That is, any distribution to an affiliate made five years before
the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid. The only exception to that edict is
stock dividends.
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LWP argues that the word "distribution" should be used interchangeably with
the term "dividend".

See LWP Memo, at p. 4.

The reason that LWP wants a

"distribution" to be the equivalent of a "dividend" is because the payments to LWP
were not based on stock ownership but rather on the value of the alleged services
provided by LWP to Companies and Mutual. Therefore, if the money received by LWP
was not a dividend, then the Liquidator cannot recoup those monies. To do that, LWP
embarks on a convoluted journey to transmogrify

the meaning of the word

"distribution".
A.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDICATES THAT THE STATUTE
IS APPLICABLE TO ALL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN THE
COMPANIES, MUTUAL, AND THEIR AFFILIATE LWP, NOT JUST
DIVIDENDS.

LWP asserts that the legislative history of § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann.
supports its theory that the term "distribution" is interchangeable with the term
"dividends". LWP's assertion is wrong and is based on an incomplete reading of the
legislative history LWP cites.
The author of the current Utah Insurance Code was Professor Spencer L.
Kimball, a professor at the University of Utah (a copy of his biography published by the
S. J. Quinney School of Law at the University of Utah is attached hereto as Exhibit
"C").

Professor Kimball was nationally renowned as an insurance law expert.

approximately

1982, Professor

Kimball was commissioned by the Utah

In

State

Legislature to draft Utah's version of the Model Insurance Code. In conjunction with
an advisory committee, Professor Kimball produced a document entitled "State of Utah
Draft Insurance Code" dated March 1983. The original Title 31A, Insurance Code, was
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based on Professor Kimball's Draft Insurance Code and was enacted during the 1985
and 1986 legislative sessions. The instant section on the recoupment from affiliates
was enacted in 1986.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a readable copy of the entire Chapter 96-17
entitled "Insurance Holding Company Systems"6. In the Prefatory Comment, Professor
Kimball states as follows:
There is no room for argument, however, that after formation of a
holding company system there must be serious concern with intergroup
transactions. They are subject to abuse involving vast sums of money, the
improper transfer of which can endanger policyholder and public interest.
This chapter carries concern for such transactions a step farther than does
the Model Act or previous law. See section 96-17-6.5.
From the very beginning of this section, Professor Kimball was very concerned
about transactions by and between an insurance company

and its

affiliates.

Unquestionably, the legislative history indicates an overriding concern with affiliate
transactions because they are prone to being abused.

The drafters'

unqualified

apprehension for affiliate transactions should guide and inform the interpretation of the
mechanics of the statute.
Virtually all of chapter 96-17 of Professor Kimball's Draft Insurance Code was
enacted as Chapter 16 of the current Utah Insurance Code entitled "Insurance Holding
Companies" (§§ 31A-16-101, et seq.).

Section 96-17-6.5 of the Draft Insurance Code

One of the reasons that LWP may have misconstrued the vital concept that
distributions cover more than just dividends is because the copy attached to the LWP
pleading had illegible sections and pages. Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a copy of
the legislative history included in the LWP Memo, as Exhibit 15. On page 14 of
Exhibit 15 is the language that unequivocally shows that the word "distribution" was
intentionally used to cover abuses over and beyond excessive dividends.
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entitled "Liability of Affiliates", however, was transferred from the chapter on
Insurance Holding companies and placed in the section pertaining exclusively to
liquidations, i.e., Chapter 27 (§§ 31A-27-101, et seq.).

Consequently, Section 96-17-

6.5 appears in the Utah Insurance Code as § 31A-27-322.
Professor

Kimball's

comments

on

Section

98-17-6.5

are

dispositive

in

ascertaining the intent of the legislature:
There are other potential abuses, beside excessive dividends, in the
holding company development. They include all of the devices for "milking"
that have been ingeniously exploited in other contexts. They encompass the
full range of less than arm's-length transactions that benefit affiliates at the
expense of the insurer. They permit evasions of insurance laws and
regulations by a parent holding company through payment to insurance agents
and employees, for example, that could not be done by an insurance company
alone.
It is hard to envision a clearer or more poignant description of the abuses that the
statute was intended to address. Not just dividends, but all payments between affiliates
are susceptible to potential abuses.

Therefore, it was necessary to use a broader or

more inclusive term than the word "dividend" - which "distribution" certainly is. In
construing a statute, the court is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. In Re Gonzales, 1 P.3d 1074, 1079 (Utah
2001). Section 31A-27-322 was enacted to address not only excessive dividends, but
also other excessive distribution between an insurance company and its affiliates.
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Contrary to LWP's assertion, the legislative history unequivocally supports the
Liquidator's position, not LWP's .
B.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SEC. 31A-27-322 (RECOUPMENT
FROM AFFILIATES) STATES THAT DISTRIBUTIONS TO
AFFILIATES ARE TO BE REPAID AND THE RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REQUIRE THAT THE TERM
"DISTRIBUTIONS" BE GIVEN EFFECT.

When interpreting a legislative enactment, the plain language of the act
determines its meaning. Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 48 P.3d 888,
894 (Utah 2000); City of Hindale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001).

The plain

language of the statute says that the liquidator may recover "the amount of
distributions" made to affiliates. The next phrase creates an exception to that general
rule: stock dividends are not recoverable. Therefore, "distribution" is the all-inclusive,
7

The Utah appellate courts have no reported cases construing § 31A-27-322, Utah Code
Ann. However, the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake City, State of Utah
(Judge Tyrone E. Medley) has encountered virtually identical arguments asserted by
LWP. In the lawsuit captioned American Western Life Insurance Company in
Liquidation et al v. Leland A. Wolf et al (Case No. 980905251) (the "American
Western Lawsuit"), the Defendants responded to the Liquidator's Motion for Summary
Judgment that only excessive dividends could be recovered by the Liquidator, not the
sales proceeds paid by an insurance company to an affiliate for the purchase of used
furniture and computer equipment from the affiliate (a less than arm's-length
transaction that resulted in a multi-million dollar windfall to the affiliate). In the Order
dated May 22, 2003 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F"), Judge Medley
ruled in Paragraphs 19 and 20 as follows:
19.
The statute [§ 31A-27-322] provides that the liquidator may recover "the
amount of distributions" which is the broad general rule. The next phrase (i.e.,
"stock dividends are not recoverable") creates an exception to that general rule
or a subset of the general class.
20.
The word "dividend" as used in this statute creates a special class of
distributions which the recipient shareholder could demonstrate as fair and
reasonable and therefore not returnable to the liquidation estate. This limitation
on recovery only applies to the subset of dividends; it does not apply to the broad
general category of "distributions".
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general rule, and a subset of that general category is "stock dividends".

The next

section of the statute, Sec. 31A-27-322(2), provides that "no dividend" is recoverable
by the liquidator if the recipient shows that the dividend was fair and reasonable. In the
statute, the Legislature did not use the word "distribution" (the general class), but rather
used the word "dividend" (a subset of the general class). The duty of this Court is to
"construe a statute on the assumption that each term is used advisedly and that the
intent of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure in
which it is placed." Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984), quoted in
Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, et al.9 828 P.2d 507, 514 (Utah 1992). It must be
assumed that the Legislature intended to use the word "dividend" when it used it as a
special sub-class of distributions which the recipient shareholder could demonstrate as
fair and reasonable and therefore not returnable to the liquidation estate. That privilege
was not granted to distributions in general, only the specific subset of dividends.
The rules of statutory construction cited above also serve the objective of the
statute. If the Legislature meant for Sec. 31A-27-322 to apply only to dividends, then
the title and text of the statutory enactment would have used that word.

It did not

because the Legislature wanted the Liquidator to have the power to recoup all
distributions to affiliates, not just dividends.
Dividends are a function of stock ownership.
shareholders.

Affiliates are not necessarily

Therefore, the application of the statute is much broader, rather than

strictly limited to recipients of dividends.

Recipients of dividends are given an

opportunity to prove that the dividend was fair and reasonable. The reason for this is
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clear. There may be individual shareholders who are not control persons and who have
innocently received dividends. In that case, non-control persons are permitted to prove
that the dividend was fair and reasonable. But if the distribution is not a dividend, the
statute's plain language dictates that the distribution must be returned to the Liquidator.
The strong presumption of the statute (i.e., that the recipient's distribution was a result
of overreaching and undue control) dictates that the distribution be returned without
regard to the reasonableness of the transaction.
There is also a strong equitable policy that supports the Liquidator's position.
The objective of the recoupment statute is to draw back into the liquidation estate
monies that will be used to pay policyholders and third party creditors. Rather than
affiliates (which are insiders akin to shareholders) keeping the distribution, the monies
are equitably distributed to policyholders and creditors. It should also be remembered
that the affiliates are not without a remedy or recourse. The affiliates can file a claim
against the liquidation estate and share in the proportionate proceeds which may be paid
to similarly situated creditors.
In conclusion, there is no need to look at the legislative history because the
language of the statute is very straightforward.

There is no uncertainty about the

Liquidator's power to recover distributions to affiliates. Because affiliate transactions
are devoid of the safeguards associated with arm's-length transactions, the Legislature
determined that all distributions must be returned, with the only exception being fair
and reasonable dividends. LWP's argument that "distributions" are the equivalent of
"dividends" fails both on the face of the words used and the legislative history.
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C.

BY ITS OWN ADMISSION, AND PURSUANT TO THE UTAH
INSURANCE CODE, LWPCAC WAS AN AFFILIATE OF
INSURANCE CO.

An affiliate is defined as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with, another person.

A corporation is an affiliate of another

corporation, regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons
manages the corporations."

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(5). 8

The Utah Insurance

Code defines "control," "controlled," and "under common control" as "the direct or
indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of Ihe management and
policies. . ." Id. at (27)(a). In addition to LWP's own admission that it was an affiliate
with Group and Insurance Co., there is irrefutable evidence that Insurance Co. and
LWPCAC were affiliates with one another because "substantially the same group of
natural persons managed" the companies. See LWP's Memo, at p. xii ("LWP admits
that it was a subsidiary of WCG and a sister subsidiary of WCIC from November
16,1998 through December 31, 2001, and could therefore be considered an affiliate of
WCG and WCIC between those dates"); see also Wasatch Group, Inc. Form B, dated
April 16, 2001 attached to the Liquidator's Memo, as Exhibit "E". 9 LWPCAC and
Insurance Co. were both wholly owned subsidiaries of Group. LWPCAC does not and
cannot refute that fact. LWPCAC does not and cannot refute the fact that LWPCAC,
8

See also the Order dated May 22, 2003 (Ex. F) in the American Western Lawsuit at p.
13,1|14.

9

The Liquidator disputes that LWP's affiliate status with Group and Insurance Co.
ended on January 1, 2002 inasmuch as the Stock Purchase Agreement was signed on
May 8, 2002, the affiliation, and common control and management extended at least
until May 8, 2002, regardless of when the Stock Purchase Agreement allegedly became
"effective."
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Insurance Co. and Group were managed by Orrin T. Colby Jr., John A. Igoe, Lewis T.
Stevens, Verl R. Topham, Richard A. Veed, and Mark Finkelstein. See id. at pp. 4-6;
see also Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at f 18. The following organizational chart
was filed with the State of Utah Insurance Department in Group's April 16, 2001 Form
B filing as an exhibit. It shows how Group, LWPCAC, FCL, and Insurance Co. were
organized, with Group as the parent and LWPCAC as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Group.

Wasatch Crest Group, Inc.
a Utah Corporation

I
LWP Claims Administrators Corp.
a California Corporation

First Continental Life &
Accident Insurance Company
a Utah Insurance Company

Wasatch Crest Insurance Company
a Utah Insurance Company

See Exhibit "A" to Wasatch Crest Form B, dated April 16, 2001, a true and correct copy
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "G".
In his affidavit, John Igoe states that "LWP did not own, direct, or control the
business or operations of WCG, WCIC, FCL, or WCMIC." See Aff. of John A. Igoe,
attached as Ex. 6 to LWP's Memo, at f 16. Interestingly, Mr. Igoe does not aver the
reverse of that statement, that Group or Insurance Co. did not own, direct, or control the
business or operations of LWP. In fact, Mr. Igoe cannot make that statement because
his own admissions and the Form B's on file for Group, irrefutably prove that
LWPCAC was a wholly owned subsidiary of Group.
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Although the Liquidator is confident that it can prove that Mutual and LWPCAC
were affiliates, there is contradictory evidence as to control of Mutual such that for
purposes of this Motion, the Liquidator is proceeding with Insurance Co., and leaving
the issue of Mutual's affiliation for trial, effectively making the Liquidator's Motion
one for partial summary judgment.
LWP makes much of John Igoe's personal involvement or. as it alleges, lack
thereof, to suggest that LWPCAC, Insurance Co. and Group were not affiliates.
argument is a red herring.

This

Mr. Igoe's participation in the management of all three

companies, while important, is not relevant in the big picture. Further, LWP's reliance
on the statement from Utah Code Ann. § 31A-l-301(27)(a) that "there is no
presumption an individual holding an official position with another person controls that
person solely by reason of the position" is misplaced in this instance because the
Liquidator does not rely on Mr. Igoe's positions with LWPCAC, Insurance Co. and
Group to establish control and affiliate status. Instead, the Liquidator relies on the
irrefutable evidence that LWPCAC, Insurance Co., FCL, Group, and Casualty (until
merged) were controlled and managed by the same people.

Although interlocking

directorates is not enough, on its own, to establish control, "[s]haring officers between
the parent and the subsidiary or the presence of 'interlocking directorates' are indicative
of common corporate ownership and control." Johnson-Tanner v. First Cash Financial
Serv,

Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 34, 39 (D, D.C. 2003.)10. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

10

See also In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F.Supp. 1006, 1009 (N.D.Ga. 1982)
where the Court stated that "'shared' officers and directors raise a strong inference of
domination by the parent and indicate [] 'common direction and supervision. . .'"
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31 A-1-301(5), common management is sufficient to establish that LWPCAC, Insurance
Co., Group, FCL, and Casualty are affiliates.
Although John Igoe's personal involvement is not relevant to the ultimate issue
of the affiliate status of LWPCAC, Insurance Co., FCL, Group, and Casualty, there is
telling evidence of the interlocking management and control of these companies by
virtue of Mr. Igoe's involvement.

John and Erica Igoe were the owners of LWP

Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP Commercial") in 1999. See Aff. of
Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at \l.

Once he took his place as Chief Operating Officer,

President, and a member of the board of directors of Group, John Igoe negotiated the
sale of LWP Commercial to Group in 1999—working both sides of the deal.11 After
Group acquired LWP Commercial, Group formed a new corporate entity, LWP Claims
Administrators, Corp. ("LWPCAC"), with John Igoe as its CEO from November 1999
to the present and, for a time, Chairman of the Board. See id. at \ 8. LWPCAC was a
wholly owned subsidiary of Group until it was sold on May 8, 2002.12 Id.

In his

capacity as CEO, COO, and President of Group, and as CEO of LWPCAC, John A.
Igoe, along with Dennis T. Larson ("CFO"), made crucial management decisions for
Group, Mutual, Insurance Co., FCL, and Casualty regarding claims handling services.
Mssrs. Igoe and Larson were directly involved in drafting and/or administering a
11

See Aff. of John Igoe attached to LWP's Memo, at \\ 3-5. Sometime prior to
November 2001, John A. Igoe was named Chairman of the Board and CEO of Group.
See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at ^ 8. John Igoe was also the COO and President
of Insurance Co., FCL, and Casualty. Id.
12

From the time that LWPCAC was formed and until it was sold, LWPCAC was under
the common control and management of Group. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby (Ex. A) at f
13.
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services agreement whereby LWPCAC provided claims services to Group, Mutual,
Insurance Co., Casualty, and FCL. Mssrs. Igoe and Larson had direct input into the
scope and nature of the services that would be performed by LWPCAC, and how much
LWPCAC would be paid for those services. Id. at \ 12.
Additional evidence of interlocking corporate structure and management is that
from January 1, 2000 through at least May 8, 2002, Group, FCL, Casualty, LWPCAC,
and Insurance Co. had a common employee base, meaning the Companies and
LWPCAC shared the same employees and management team.

See Aff. of Orrin T.

1 T

Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at f 14.

Group management, which included John A. Igoe

(President, COO, and CEO), Orrin T. Colby Jr., Dennis T. Larson, and others, made
management and employee decisions for Group, FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty,
LWPCAC, and Mutual. Id. Further, the management, officers, and directors of Group
controlled Mutual, Insurance Co., FCL, Casualty, and LWPCAC by virtue of their
management and supervision of the employees, day-to-day business activities, and
records keeping. Id. at If 15.14

From January 1, 2000 through the spring of 2002, Mutual shared employees with
Group, FCL, Insurance Co., LWPCAC, and Casualty. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr.
(Ex. A) at 1f 14.
14

John A. Igoe participated in the management, policymaking, and control of Group,
FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty, LWPCAC, and Mutual. In fact, from 1999 through the
spring of 2002, Group guided many management decisions of Mutual. For example, the
management of reinsurance arrangements and underwriting were performed under the
supervision of John A. Igoe. Similarly, Mr. Igoe supervised the administration of
claims by means of his affiliated corporation, LWPCAC. In addition, Dennis T. Larson,
the Chief Financial Officer, and other employees performing functions for Mutual,
reported to Mr. Igoe. See Aff. of Orrin T. Colby Jr. (Ex. A) at ^ 17.
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Clearly, from 1999 to at least May 8, 2002, Group, FCL, Insurance Co.,
Casualty, and LWPCAC were managed and controlled by substantially the same group
of persons, that is, John A. Igoe, Dennis T. Larson, Orrin T. Colby, Judy Adlam, Lewis
T. Stevens, William J. Worsley, and members of the Board including Richard A. Veed,
Mark Finkelstein, and Verl R. Topham. Id. at f 18.15 Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-1-301(4), LWPCAC, Group, Insurance Co., Casualty, and FCL are
affiliates inasmuch as "substantially the same group of natural persons manage[d] the
corporations." The Form B filings, Mr. Colby's affidavit, and LWP's own admissions
in John Igoe's affidavit and LWP's Memo., clearly confirm that Mr. Igoe and others
managed Group, Insurance Co., Casualty, FCL, and LWPCAC as one company, utilized
the same employees, and entered into agreements with each other on behalf of one
another.
Once affiliate status is proved, the affiliate has no defenses to assert that will
spare the affiliate from disgorging the distributions it received.

As an affiliate of

Insurance Co., LWPCAC must disgorge all funds it received from Insurance Co. since
November 16, 1999.

LWP's attempt to distance itself from Insurance Co. and its

assertion that LWP never received payments from Insurance Co., is belied by the fact
that LWP billed Insurance Co. for claims handling services, and Insurance Co. paid
LWP directly for those services. This evidence is irrefutable. See Aff. of Robert C.
Miller, attached as Ex. M to the Liquidator's Memo, at f^[ 16-19. LWP, therefore, must

The Liquidator firmly believes that at trial it can prove that Mutual was also managed
and controlled by this same group of persons.
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pay Insurance Co. at least $ 5,615,090 which is the amount that Insurance Co. paid to
LWPCAC prior to May 8, 2002.
D.

WHETHER THE PAYMENTS TO LWP WERE FAIR
CONSIDERATION FOR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY RENDERED
SERVICES IS IRRELEVANT.

LWP attempts to interject what appears to be a bankruptcy concept into the
discussion of whether § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann., permits the Liquidator to recover
the payments to an affiliate. This argument is irrelevant and immaterial. LWP asserts
that the payments they received from Insurance Co. and Mutual were for services LWP
contemporaneously rendered to LWP's affiliates. The instant statute makes absolutely
no mention of this alleged exception to the requirement that all payments by an
insurance company to an affiliate within five years of the liquidation petition are to be
paid back.
As Professor Kimball so ably articulated in his discussion of the Recoupment
from Affiliates statute, distributions by insurance companies to affiliates are so suspect
that there are virtually no defenses to the repayment requirement.

Only if the

distributions qualify as dividends can the recipient accept the burden of proving that the
dividend was fair and reasonable and the payor (the insurance company) did not know
that the payment of the dividend would affect the solvency of the insurance company.
Clearly, the distributions to LWP were not predicated on stock ownership and therefore
were not dividends. The inescapable conclusion is that the distribution must be paid
back, regardless of whether the payments were contemporaneous with the services

40

rendered by LWP. The Bankruptcy Code concept of payment of fair consideration for
contemporaneous services is simply irrelevant and immaterial16.
E.

THE ENTITY FOR WHICH LWP RENDERED THE SERVICES IS
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL TO THE FACT THAT LWP
RECEIVED DISTRIBUTIONS FROM INSURANCE CO. AND
MUTUAL. FURTHERMORE LWP HAS OFFERED NO
SUBSTANTIATED EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF MONEY
LWP CLAIMS IT RECEIVED.

LWP claims that the services it rendered were not for Insurance Co. or Mutual,
but rather the services were rendered under the NAS Agreement. That alleged fact is
wholly irrelevant and immaterial to the fact that Insurance Co. and Mutual did in fact
pay LWP over $6 million. Insurance Co. and Mutual paid LWP and that is the only
operative fact that should concern this Court.

It may be difficult for LWP to

comprehend that § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann. concerns itself with only two operative
questions: (1) were distributions made?; and (2) were the distributions made to an
affiliate? Anything else is irrelevant.
The quality of the evidence presented by LWP in attempting to refute the
Liquidator's position should also be noted. In this instance, LWP fails to attach the
agreement pursuant to which the services were rendered. Where is the NAS agreement
that supposedly excuses LWP's repayment of the distributions? This is symptomatic of
the refutation posed by LWP. LWP claims that only $5 million was paid by Insurance
Co. and Mutual. Where is the accounting for that number? How did LWP come up
16

In the American Western case decided by Judge Medley, the recipient of the affiliate
payments made an argument that they should be allowed to keep that part of the
distributions that was not "excessive". After a careful review of the statute and the
underlying policy, Judge Medley ruled that all of the distributions must be repaid,
regardless of whether there was any fair consideration for the payment. See Exhibit F.
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with that number? In contrast, the Liquidator has made available to LWP a detailed
accounting of the distributions made to LWP that is subject to verification. LWP relies
only on the unsubstantiated assertions of John Igoe and Dennis Larson. In a similar
fashion, LWP says that the services agreement with Insurance Co. and Mutual "were
provided pursuant to administrative agreements standard in the industry" LWP Memo.
at p. 6.
attached?

What agreements are they referring to?

Why were similar agreements not

In essence, LWP asks the Court to accept unsubstantiated statements that

should have been included.
F.

THE DISTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED BY LWP WERE NOT
DIVIDENDS AND THEREFORE THE TEST FOR THE RECOVERY
OF DIVIDENDS IS IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL.

In the final section of the LWP Memo., LWP argues that the monies received by
LWP are not recoverable by the Liquidator because the payments were not distributions.
Apparently relying on the faulty premise that distributions are the functional equivalent
of dividends under § 31A-27-322, Utah Code Ann., LWP says that the payments to
LWP do not qualify as recoverable dividends because the insurer (i.e., Insurance Co.
and Mutual) did not know that and could not reasonably have known that the
distribution might adversely affect its solvency.

Again, this is irrelevant and

immaterial. The Liquidator has never claimed that the payments were based on stock
ownership and therefore were dividends. LWP's argument constitutes a classic straw
man polemic: they argue that the payments are something that they are not, and then
proceed to knock down the straw man by showing that its status as a dividend
disqualifies it from being recovered.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Affiliate transactions are so susceptible to manipulation and abuse that the
Liquidator is statutorily empowered by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322 to recoup money
paid to affiliates within five years of liquidation regardless of any defense asserted by
the original recipient/affiliate.

The Liquidator has asked this Court to enforce the

provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322 as written. That is, any distribution to an
affiliate made five years before the filing of the liquidation petition must be repaid.
The only exception to this rule is stock dividends. Distributions and dividends are not
used interchangeably here.

The legislative history indicates that the statute is

applicable to all transactions between Group, Insurance Co., FCL, Mutual, and
LWPCAC, not just dividends.

Therefore, the payments that Insurance Co. made to

LWPCAC for claims handling services are included in the term "distributions" and must
be disgorged.
By its own admission, and pursuant to the Utah Insurance Code, LWPCAC was
an affiliate of Insurance Co. LWP admits in its rendition of the facts that LWPCAC
was an affiliate of Group and Insurance Co.

The Utah Insurance Code defines an

affiliate as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under common control
with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another corporation, regardless of
ownership,

if

corporations."

substantially

the

same group

of natural persons manages

Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l-301 (5).

the

The Liquidator has presented

irrefutable evidence in this memorandum that Group, Insurance Co., and LWPCAC
were managed by "substantially the same group of natural persons."
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LWPCAC is,

therefore, an affiliate of both Group and Insurance Co. As a result, LWPCAC must
disgorge at least $ 5,615,090, which is the amount that Insurance Co. paid to LWPCAC
from November 1999 to May 8, 2002 for claims handling services.
Whether

the

payments

to

LWPCAC

were

fair

consideration

for

contemporaneously rendered services is completely irrelevant. There are no defenses to
disgorgement by affiliates pursuant to the Utah Insurance Code, simply stated, this is
not a bankruptcy. In addition, the entity for which LWPCAC rendered the services is
irrelevant and immaterial to the fact that LWPCAC received distributions from
Insurance Co. and Mutual. Furthermore, LWP has offered no substantiated evidence of
the amount of money LWPCAC claims it received. For these and all other foregoing
reasons, the Liquidator respectfully requests that the Court grant its Motion for
Summary Judgment and deny LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment, at least with
respect to Insurance Co.
DATED this

day of March 2005.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

John F. Harrington
Jennifer L. Lange
Attorneys for the Liquidator

44

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the LIQUIDATOR'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO LWP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LIQUIDATOR'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent via U.S. first class mail, postage
prepaid on the

day of March 2005 to the following:

Edwin C. Barnes
Charles R. Brown
Jennifer A. James
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

i$k%
3353408 2 DOC
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Tab 5

JOHN P. HARRINGTON (A5242)
JENNIFER L. LANGE (A8470)
HOLLAND & HART LLP

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
Telephone: (801) 595-7800
Facsimile: (801)364-9124
J. RAY BARRIOS, JR. (A3915)
LIQUIDATION OFFICE GENERAL COUNSEL

215 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)799-7406
Facsimile: (801)539-5257
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest Insurance Company,
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company, in Liquidation
and Merwin U. Stewart, Liquidator

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION, and
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN
LIQUIDATION, and MERWIN
U. STEWART, Liquidator,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ORRIN T. COLBY JR.

Plaintiffs,

Case No: 030915527

vs.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS,
CORP., a California corporation, and
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a
California corporation,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

!

}
:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

}

I, Orrin T. Colby Jr., having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am a resident of the State of Utah, am over the age of majority and am

competent to make this affidavit.
2.

The facts set forth in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge and

are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Most of this
information is also contained in the Board of Director's minutes, Annual Meeting
minutes, Bylaws, and other relevant documents kept in the ordinary course of business
related to the companies discussed below.

If called to testify as a witness, I would

competently testify as follows:
3.

Prior to 1999, and from 1999 through November 6, 2001, I was a director

and Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Board of Wasatch Crest Group Inc. ("Group").
During the majority of that time, I v/as Chief Executive Officer of Group, Wasatch
Crest Insurance Company ("Insurance Co."), First Continental Life & Accident
Insurance Company ("FCL"), and Wasatch Crest Casualty

Insurance

Company

("Casualty") (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Companies"), until Casualty
was merged into Insurance Co. in or around December 2000.
4.

Prior to 1999, and from 1999 through July 2003, I was the Chairman of

the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company,
("Mutual").
5.

I was removed as Vice Chairman of the Board of Group, Insurance Co.,

and FCL, in or around November 2001. I did, however, remain as Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of Mutual until July 2003.
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6.

From 1999 to July 2003, John A. Igoe was the Chief Operating Officer

("COO") and President of Group. Prior to November 2001, John A. Igoe was named
Chairman of the Board and CEO of Group. In addition, John A. Igoe was a Director of
Insurance Co., FCL, and Casualty (until it merged into Insurance Co.).
7.

John A. Igoe personally represented to me that he and his wife, Erica

Igoe, were the owners of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc. ("LWP
Commerical") in 1999.
8.

In John A. Igoe's capacity as a member of the board of directors of Group,

he negotiated the sale of LWP Commercial to Group.

Group acquired LWP

Commercial in October 1999, and formed a new corporate entity, LWP Claims
Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC").

John A. Igoe has served as CEO of LWPCAC

from November 1999 to the present, and has served as Chairman of the Board from the
point I was relieved of that role. LWPCAC was a wholly owned subsidiary of Group
until it was sold. It is my understanding the LWPCAC was sold to John A. and Erica
Igoe sometime in 2002.
9.

At all times relevant hereto, Dennis T. Larson was the Chief Financial

Officer ("CFO") of the Companies, Mutual, and LWPCAC.
10.

In my capacity as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board and Chief

Executive Officer of the Companies and Mutual, I attended board and management
meetings during that period with John A. Igoe and Dennis T. Larson, CFO, as well as
other members and officers of the Companies, LWPCAC, and Mutual.
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11.

At all times between 1999 and November 2001, Group was the parent

company of Insurance Co., FCL, Casualty (until merged), and LWPCAC.
understanding that this is also true from November 2001 to July 2003.

It is my

Mutual was

never a subsidiary of Group, in that it was a mutual company (i.e., Mutual was owned
by the policyholders, not by shareholders); however, it was an affiliate of Group
between 1999 and the spring of 2002.
12.

In his capacity as CEO, COO, and President of Group, and CEO of

LWPCAC, John A. Igoe, along with Dennis T. Larson, CFO, was directly involved in
drafting and/or administering a services agreement whereby LWPCAC provided claims
services to the Companies and Mutual. Mssrs. Igoe and Larson had direct input into the
scope and nature of the services that would be performed by LWPCAC, and how much
LWPCAC would be paid for those services.
13.

From the time that LWPCAC was formed and until it was sold, LWPCAC

was under the common control and management of Group.
14.

From January 1, 2000 through at least November 2001, the Companies had

a common employee base, meaning that LWPCAC, Group, FCL, Insurance Co., and
Casualty (until merged), shared the same employees and management team. It is my
understanding that this is true through July 2003. From January 1, 2000 through the
spring of 2002, Mutual shared employees with the Companies and LWPCAC. Group
management, which included John A. Igoe as President, CEO, and COO, made
management and employee decisions for Group, FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty (until
merged), LWPCAC, and Mutual.
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15.

I observed that all of the Companies and Mutual were under common

management and control during the periods indicated. The management, officers, and
directors of Group controlled each of the Companies, LWPCAC and Mutual by virtue of
their management and supervision of the employees, day-to-day business activities, and
records keeping for each of the Companies, LWPCAC and Mutual, during the periods
indicated, subject, where appropriate, to approval of various Boards of Directors.
16.

During the relevant time period, the Companies, LWPCAC, and Mutual

were affiliates with one another.
17.

John A. Igoe participated in the management, policymaking, and control

of Group, FCL, Insurance Co., Casualty, LWPCAC, and Mutual, pursuant to his
position at Group.

In fact, from 1999 through the spring of 2002, when Mutual

withdrew from its affiliation with Group, Group guided many management decisions of
Mutual. For example, the management of reinsurance arrangements and underwriting
were performed under the supervision of John A. Igoe. Similarly, the administration of
claims was supervised by John A. Igoe by means of his affiliated
LWPCAC.

corporation,

In addition, Dennis T. Larson, the Chief Financial Officer, and other

employees performing functions for Mutual reported to John A. Igoe.
18.

During the relevant time period, the Companies, LWPCAC, and Mutual

were managed and controlled by substantially the same Group of persons, that is, John
A. Igoe, Dennis T. Larson, myself, Judy Adlam, Lewis T. Stevens, William J. Worsley
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and members of the Board including Richard A. Veed, Mark Finkelstein, and Verl R.
Topham.
DATED this / ^ f ^ T a y of March 2005.

Orrin T./Colb
SUBSCRIBED, ACKNOWLEDGED, AND SWORN TO before me this
day of March 2005.

SONJA H. BURDASH
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE Of HTM
CO EAST SOUTH TQIPIE SUITE 2D00'
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 64111
COMM. EXP. 7/10/2007

3355000 l.DOC
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NOTARY PUBLIC

l &

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the LIQUIDATOR'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO LWP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LIQUIDATOR'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent via U.S. first class mail, postage
prepaid on the _Q/_l__rday of March 2005 to the following:

Edwin C. Barnes
Charles R. Brown
Jennifer A. James
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
201 South Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

3353408 l.DOC
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Prefatory Comment
There is room for argument about the extent to which insurance regulators
should be seriously concerned about the process of acquisition of insurers,
i.e./ the formation of an insurance holding company system. That question has
been resolved here by basically following former law, which was based on the
NAIC Model Act.
There is no room for argument, however, that after formation of a holding
company system there must be serious concern with mtergroup transactions.
They are subject to abuse involving vast sums of money, the inproper transfer
of which can endanger policyholder and public interests. This chapter carries
concern for such transactions a step farther than does the Model Act or
previous law. See section 96-17-6.5.
The Model Act (the former Utah law) has been criticized as excessively
cumbersome and as requiring unnecessary information. In the course of
preparing this draft, a number of files were examined where there had been
acquisitions under the act. No evidence of excessive burdensomeness was founa
in the files examined. The transaction is one of great consequence, and it
should be expected that the acquiring company would have to spend both time
and money making its plans and then making the case for allowing the
transaction. Without extensive information, the commissioner would have to
give approval in the aark.
The draft gives great flexibility to the conmissioner in deciding what
information to ask for and what acquisitions to monitor closely.
The existing holding company statutes have been brought into some question
by the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102
S.Ct. 2629 (1982) holding the general Illinois corporate takeover statute
unconstitutional. An effort has been made in drafting this chapter to avoia
the pitfalls exposed by that case. For example, it is no part of the purpose
of this chapter to give existing management an advantage in the takeover
attempt. Nor does the chapter seek to protect all shareholaers but only, or
at least primarily, Utah shareholaers. In the process others may get some
protection too. In these respects, this chapter is consistent with the
purposes of the Williams Act, as aescribea in Eagar v. Mite Corp. , Id.

Section 96-17-1
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2635-40. It is believed that the chapter is not invalid as the Illinois
Takeover Act was held to be in that case. It is neither an excessive burden
on commerce nor inconsistent with the objectives of the Williams Act.
96-17-1.

Scope and purposes.

(1) Scope. (a) Unless specifically exempted under subsection (b), this
chapter applies to all entities doing an insurance business (as defined in
subsection 96-1-3(24a) in Utah.
(b) (i) The commissioner may exempt any class of insurers from any
provisions of this chapter, when he deems the exemption consistent with the
purposes of this chapter and in the public interest.
(ii) On request of the person required to supply information or perform
an act, the commissioner may exempt that person from any provisions of this
chapter when he deems the exception consistent with the purposes of this
chapter and in the public interest.
(2) The purposes of this chapter include:
(a) To exercise surveillance over the acquisition of a domestic insurer,
to ensure that in the process of making it part of an insurance holding
company system the interests of policyholders, Utah shareholders and the
public are not harmed.
(b) To provide special protection for the policyholders of a life
insurance company that is acquired by another person.
(c) To provide for the regulatory monitoring of those intercorporate
relationships and transactions among affiliates within an insurance holding
company system tnat may affect the solidity of insurers.
(d) To control the payment of dividends that might affect the solidity of
insurers.
(e) To provide in appropriate cases for recoupment of diviaends paid.
Comment
The power to grant exemptions 'under subsection (1) i s a necessary
corollary of the broadly s t a t e d requirements of this chapter. If the
commissioner has unusual powers to acquire information, he should have
adequate power to waive the requirements when he does not need the
information. The usual procedure for establishing an exemption would be a
rule, though an individual insurer or group of insurers could be exempted by
an order. The exemption can be terminated in the same way i t i s created.
Subsection (2) is new. I t is useful to have a statement of purposes to
help in the interpretation of the chapter.
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Section 96-17-2

Definitions.

In this chapter:
(1)

"Security holder" means the holder of any security, including common

or preferred stock, debt obligations, and any other instrument convertible
into or evidencing the right to acquire any of the foregoing.
(2)

"Voting security" includes any security convertible into or

evidencing a right to acquire a voting security.
(3)

"Person" does not include a securities broker performing only the

usual and customary broker's function.
(4)

"Insurer" does not include an unauthorized insurer.
Comment

Most terms that need to be defined are aefined for other purposes as
well. They are in section 96-1-3. These definitions come from former
subsections 31-39-1(4) , (5), (7) and (8).
96-17-3.
(1)

Acquisition of control of or merger with domestic insurer.
Filing requirements.

(a)

No person other than the issuer may in any

manner acquire or seek to acquire any voting security of a domestic insurer
if, after consummation, the person would, directly or indirectly, or could by
exercise of any right, be in control of the insurer, without first filing witn
the commissioner a statement containing the information required by this
section.
(b)

No person may enter into an agreement to merge with or otherwise to

acquire control of a domestic insurer without first filing with the
commissioner a statement containing the information required by this section.
(c)

Unless a domestic insurer is acting under authority of another

provision of the insurance code or an order of the commissioner, it may not
acquire or seek to acquire any of its own voting securities without first
filing with the commissioner a statement containing such portion of the
information required by this section as the commissioner may request.
(d)

The transactions or activities described in subsections (1) (a) , (b)

or (c) may not be consummated unless approved by the commissioner in the
manner prescribed m
(e)

suosection (5) of this section.

At the time the statement is filea witn the commissioner under

suosection (1)(a) or ( D ) , the person snail file tne statement also witn t. e
insurer.

The insurer shall senG an informative ana accurate summary of tne

statement, or tne statement filed under subsection (1) (c) of tnis section, to
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its shareholders within five business days, with information about how a
shareholder may obtain a copy of the full statement at his o\/n expense.
(f)

The distribution of the summary under subsection (1) (d) shall be at

the expense of the person making the statement.

To secure the payment, that

person shall file with the commissioner an acceptable bond or deposit in an
amount the commissioner aetermines.
(g)

For purposes of this section, a domestic insurer includes any other

person controlling a domestic insurer unless that other person is either
directly or through its affiliates primarily engaged m

business other than

the business of insurance.
(2)

Content of statement.

The statement under subsection (1) of this

section shall be made under oath and shall contain the following information:
(a)

If any rule or order under section 96-17-2.5 is relied on, the full

text of the rule or order.
(b)

The name and address of each person by whom or on whose behalf the

merger or other acquisition of control is to be effected ("acquiring party"),
and
(l)

If a natural person, his principal occupation and all offices and

positions held during the past five years, and any conviction of crimes other
than minor traffic violations during the past ten years;
(n)

If not a natural person, the nature of its business operations

during the past five years or for such lesser period as it and its
predecessors have been in existence; an informative description of the
business it and its affiliates intend to do and a list of all its and its
affiliates' directors or executive officers and those who perforin functions
appropriate to such positions.
(in)

For each such additional natural person the information required by

subsection (2)(b)(l) of this section.
(c)

The source, nature and amount of the consiaeration to be used in

effecting the merger or other acquisition of control, a description of any
transaction for obtaining such funds, and the identity of persons furnismng
the funds.

Where the source is a loan maae in tne lender's ordinary course of

ousmess, tne identity of the lencer may, at the commissioner's discretion,
remain confidential on request of the person filing tne statement.
(a)

Fully aucited financial Jnformation as ro tne earnings arc financial

condition of eacn acquiring party for the preceding five fiscal ^ears (or for

^nj-)
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such lesser period as an acquiring party and its preoecessors have been in
existence) , and similar unaudited information as of a date not earlier than 90
days prior to the filing of the statement.
(e)

Any plans each acquiring party or those wno control it may nave to

liquidate the insurer, to sell its assets or merge or consolidate it with any
person, or to make any other material change in its business or corporate
structure or management.
(f)

The number of shares of any security referred to in subsection (1)

which each acquiring party proposes to acquire, and the terms of the
acquisition.
(g)

The amount of each class of any security referred to in suosection

(1) which each acquiring party beneficially owns or of which he has a right to
acquire beneficial ownership.
(h)

A full description of any arrangements in which any acquiring party

is involved with respect to any security referred to in subsection (1) of this
section, including the identity of the persons with whom they were entered
into.
(I)

A description of each purchase oy any acquiring party of any security

referred to in subsection (1) during the twelve calendar months preceding tne
filing, including the dates of purchase, names of the purchasers, and the
consideration.
(j)

A description of any recommendations to purchase any security

referred to in subsection (1) made during the twelve calendar months preceding
the tiling of the statement, by any acquiring party, or by anyone based upon
interviews or at the suggestion of any acquiring party.
(k)

Copies of all offers and agreements to acquire or exchange any

securities referred to in subsection (1) of this section and, if distributed,
of soliciting material used.
(1)

The terms of any agreement, contract or understanding with any

broker-dealer as to solicitation of securities referred to in subsection (1) ,
and the amount of compensation to be paid to such broker-dealers .
(m)

Sucn additional information as the commissioner prescribes by rule as

necessary or appropriate for the protection of policyholders and Utah security
holders of tne insurer and of tne public interest.
(3)

Supplements to information required.

(a)

If the person required to

file tne statement under subsection (1) is a partnersnip, limitec partnership,
syndicate or other group, the commissioner may require that tne information

Section 96-17-3
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called for by subsection (2) be given for each partner, each member of a
syndicate or group, and each person who controls a partner or member. If any
person required to file is a corporation , the commissioner may require that
the information be given for tne corporation, each officer and director of tne
corporation, and each person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than ten percent of the outstanding voting securities of the
corporation.
(b) If any material change occurs in the facts filed under this section,
an amendment setting forth the change1, together with copies of all documents
and other material relevant to tne change, shall be filed with the
commissioner and sent to the insurer within two business days after the person
learns of the change. The insurer shall send the amendment to its
shareholders promptly.
(4) Alternative filing materials. If any transaction under subsection
(1) is proposed to be made pursuant to federal law or another state ! s law
requiring the disclosure of similar information, the person required to file
may use such documents in making the filing.
(5) Approval by commissioner. The commissioner shall approve any merger
or other acquisition of control referred to in subsection (1) unless, after a
hearing, he finds that:
(a) After the change of contro] , the domestic insurer wculd not satisfy
the requirements for the certificate of authority it then has; or
(b) The merger or other acquisition of control would substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in insurance in Utah; or
(c) The financial condition of any acquiring party might jeopardize tne
financial stability of the insurer, or prejudice the interest of its
policyholders or the interests of any Utah security holders who are
unaffiliated with the acquiring party; or
(d) The terms of tne transaction are unfair ana treasonable to Utah
security holders; or
(e) The plans the acquiring party has to liquidate tne insurer, sell its
assets or consolidate or merge it *ath any person, or to make any otner
material cnange in its business or corporate structure or management, are
unfair and unreasonanle to policyholders of tne insurer and net in the public
interest:; or

Draft of March 25, 1983
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The competence, experience and integrity of those persons who would

control the insurer are such that it would not be in the interest of
policyholders of the insurer and of the public to permit the merger or other
acquisition of control.
(6)

Hearing.

The hearing required under subsection (5) shall begin

within twenty-five days and be closed within thirty-five days after the
filing.

The commissioner shall give at least fifteen days' notice thereof to

the filer and to the insurer.

The filer shall give at least seven days notice

of the hearing to any persons aesignated by the commissioner at the time he
gives notice to the filer.

The insurer shall give notice to its security

holders promptly on receipt of the notice.

The commissioner shall make a

final determination within twenty days after the conclusion of the hearing.
Subject to reasonable limitations and restrictions the commissioner imposes to
keep the proceedings manageable and to prevent shareholders from using the
proceedings to gain leverage in negotiations for the sale of their shares, the
filer,

the insurer, persons to whom notice of hearing was sent, and any other

person whose interests may be affected may on written request be given the
right to present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and offer oral
and written arguments and conduct discovery proceedings.

All discovery

proceedings shall be concluded not later than three days prior to the
commencement of the hearing.

If the commissioner denies the right: to

participate in the hearing, he shall state reasons in reasonable detail.
(7)

Violations.

It is a violation of this section:

(a)

To fail to file any statement required to be filed under it; or

(b)

To attempt to effectuate an acquisition of control of, or merger

with, a domestic insurer without the commissioner's approval under this
section.
(8)

Jurisdiction.

The district court for Salt Lake County has

jurisdiction over every person not resident, domiciled, or authorized to do
business in Utah who files or is obligated to file a statement with the
commissioner under this section, and over all actions involving the person
arising out of actions under or violations of this section.

Each person is

deemed to have appointed the commissioner his attorney upon whom may be served
all lawful process under sections 96-2-44 and 96-2-45 in any such action.

Section 96-17-4
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Comment
This section continues, with considerable editorial and substantive
change, former section 31-39-2, which was almost identical with Model Act
section 3. The section places a substantial procedural nurale before persons
seeking to acquire control of a domestic insurer. Because the hurdle is one
requiring considerable effort to surTOunt, it gives tne Utah commissioner
meaningful control over the concentration of business in the state and over
the character and financial backing of those who control domestic insurers.
The provision is complex but seems sound, especially when coupled with the
power in section 96-17-2.5 to waive requirements tnat m a particular
situation serve no purpose justifying tneir cost.
The recent case of Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982) suggests
there may be some danger of invalidation of the law on commerce clause grounds
(or possibly because of conflict with the Williams Act) if the procedure goes
too far in protecting management against takeovers, or non-Utah security
holders against imposition, or conf] icts with federal procedures that might be
applicable. The section has been considerably changed to try to establish a
better balance between management and the acquiring persons that will not
render the process vulnerable. Suggestions for further improvement are
especially welcome.
Subsection (1) (f) provides for tne expenses of mailing. They may be very
burdensome and not very productive. Should the commissioner be given
substantial discretion to give notice by publication to reduce cost?
Subsection (1) (g) is not found in the former Utah act but is in tne Model
Act. It is inserted here for consideration of the commission. It raises
difficult questions, for in some hypothetical (but possible) situations it
could compel the disclosure of an almost infinite amount of information.
Suppose, for example, that a domestic Utah insurer were controlled by anotner
insurer (a nondomestic one) wnich in turn was controlled by another and so on
for several levels, finally ending up with a major national insurer like
Hartford Fire or Travelers. Presumably this provision could be interpreted as
requiring the information specified in the section and the involvement in tne
procedure of all tne corporations back to the Hartford Fire in the one case
(thougn not I.T. & T. because it and its affiliates are primarily engaged in
other businesses than insurance) , and back to Travelers Corporation in the
other. The question to be considered here is whether it is useful for the
statute to reach so far. If not, wnat should the limits oe?
Under subsection (6) , the hearing rules of the department should be
followed if they are reasonably suitable. The standing provision in this
subsection is very generous and in some conceivable situations the hearing
might collapse of its own weight. It could be almost as complicated as the
IBM antitrust case of recent notoriety. The version presented here gives the
commissioner power to confine the hearing somewhat but there is a question
whether the statute should not confine standing much more ana also explicitly
restrict the rights of interested persons to be involved m the actual
proceedings m the hearing.
Subsection (9), dealing with jurisdiction, is shortened by reference to
general provisions in the insurance code.
96-17-d.

Acquisition of aomestic life insurer.

(1) Trust agreement. Before an acquisition or merger of a Gcrrestic l±fe
insurer is approved oy tne commissioner, the commissioner snail require the

Draft of March 25, 1983
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acquiring person or surviving company to execute a written trust agreement
acceptaole to the commissioner unaer which assets approved by the commissioner
in an amount equal to the total policyholder liabilities of the insurer

m

Utah, immediately preceding acquisition or merger, are maintained in trust for
the exclusive benefit of those policyholders.

No reinsurance agreement

covering such liabilities may affect the trust assets without the prior
approval of the commissioner.
(2)

Other applicable provisions.

The trust assets are subject to

chapters 96-20 and 96-23.
(3)

Deposit provisions.

Section 96-2-27.5 does not apply.
Comment

This provision is not in the Model Act but is in former section
31-39-2.5. It was added to tne law in 1977. It eliminates a good deal of
guessing about whether the acquirer of a life insurer will be aole to perform
the assumed obligations. Subsection 96-17-4(2) is completely changed, however.
96-17-5.
(1)

Registration of insurers.
Registration.

(a)

Except under subsection (1) (b) of this section,

every insurer authorized to do business in Utah w m c h is a member of an
insurance holding company system as defined in subsection 96-1-3 (24b) shall
register with the commissioner w i t h m fifteen days after it becomes subject to
registration unless the commissioner for good cause shown extenas tne time for
registration, and then within the extended time.
(b)

Subsection (1)(a) of this section aoes not apply to a foreign insurer

subject to disclosure requirements and standards in the jurisdiction ot its
domicile which are substantially similar to those contained in tnis section.
The commissioner may require such an insurer to furnish a copy of the
registration statement or otner information filea with the insurance
regulatory authority of the domicile.
(2)

Information and form required.

The registration statement shall be

on a form prescribed by the commissioner, wnich shall contain current
information about:
(a)

The capital structure, general financial condition, ownership and

management of the insurer and any person controlling the insurer.
(o)

The identity, nome office aadress and telepnone numDer of everv

memoer of the insurance holding company system.
(c)

The following agreements m

force, relationsmps sucsisting, ara

transactions currently outstanding between tne insurer ana all its affiliates:
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Loans, other investments, or purchases, sales or exchanges of

securities of the affiliates by the msurer or of the insurer by its
affiliates;
(n)

Purchases, sales or exchange of assets;

(m)

Transactions not in the ordinary course of business;

(iv)

Guarantees or undertakings for the benefit of an affiliate whicn

result in contingent exposure of the insurer's assets to liability, other than
insurance contracts entered into in the ordinary course of the insurer's
business;
(v)

All management and service contracts and all cost-snaring

arrangements other than cost allocation arrangements based upon generally
accepted accounting principles; and
(vi)

Reinsurance agreements covering all or substantially all of one or

more lines of insurance of the ceding company.
(d)

Classes of reinsurance transactions specified by the commissioner by

rule.
(e)

Other transactions between registered insurers and any affiliates

that may be included from tune to tune in registration forms adopted or
approved by the commissioner.
(3)

Materiality.

No information need be disclosed on the registration

statement if it is not material for the purposes of this section.

Unless the

commissioner by rule or order provides otherwise, sales, purchases, exchanges,
loans or extensions of credit, or investments, involving one-half of 1% or
less of an insurer's admitted assets as of the 31st day of December next
preceding are not deemed material for purposes of this section.
(4)

Amendments to registration statements.

keep current the information m

Each registered insurer snail

its registration statement by reporting on

forms provided by the commissioner all material changes or additions within
fifteen days after the end of the month in w m c h it learns of eacn change or
addition.
(5)

Termination of registration.

The commissioner shall terminate the

registration of any insurer that demonstrates it is no longer a member of an
insurance holding company system.
(6)

Consolidated filing.

The commissioner may require or allow two or

more affiliated insurers to file a consolidated registration statement or
consolidated amendment reports.
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Disclaimer.
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Any person may file with the commissioner a disclaimer

of affiliation with any other person, fully disclosing all material
relationships and bases for affiliation between the two and the basis for
disclaiming affiliation.

After the filing of the disclaimer, the duty to

register or report under this section arising out of the relationship is in
abeyance until the commissioner disallows the disclaimer.

The commissioner

may disallow the disclaimer only after a hearing under section 96-2-36.
Comment
This section contains most of former section 31-39-3, which was based on
Model Act section 4.
Aside from editorial changes, there are a few substantive changes. In
subsection (2)(d) reinsurance of classes designated by the commissioner is
included as a kind of transaction to be reported. Reinsurance arrangements
are easily subject to abuse, especially within a corporate family.
Subsections (7) and (10) of the former statute are omitted as unnecessary.
96-17-6.
(1)

Standards.
Transactions with affiliates.

Material transactions by registered

insurers with their affiliates are subject to the following standards:
(a)

The terms shall be fair and reasonable.

(b)

The books, accounts and records of each party shall be so maintained

as to disclose clearly and accurately the precise nature and details of the
transactions.
(c)

The insurer's capital and surplus following any dividends or

distributions to shareholder affiliates shall continue to be adequate for its
financial needs.
insurer's

For purposes of this section, in determining whether an

capital and surplus are adequate for its financial needs, section

96-23-11 shall guide the determinations.
(2)

Dividends and other distributions.

(a)

No insurer subject to

registration may pay an extraordinary dividend or make any other extraorainary
distribution to its shareholders until either thirty days after the
commissioner has received notice of the declaration thereof and has not
disapproved the payment or the commissioner has approved it.
(b)

For purposes of this section, an extraordinary dividend or

distribution includes any dividend or distribution of cash or other property,
whose fair market value together with that of other dividends or
distributions, excluding pro rata distributions of any class of the insurer's
own securities, made within the preceding twelve months exceeds the areater of:
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Draft of March 25, 1983

Ten percent of the insurer's capital and surplus as of the

thirty-first day of December next preceding, or
(ii)

If the insurer is a life insurer, the net gain from operations or if

the insurer is not a life insurer, Lhe net income on investment and operations
combined for the twelve month period ending the thirty-first day of the
preceding December.
(c)

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an insurer may declare an

extraordinary dividend or distribution conditioned upon the commissioner's
approval.

The declaration confers no rights on shareholders until the

commissioner has approved the payment or has not disapproved it within the
thirty day period under subsection (3) (a) of this section.
Comment
This section continues former section 31-39-4, which was based upon Model
Act section 5.
The standards for adequacy of capital and surplus are the same as those
for compulsory surplus under section 96-23-11, which is incorporated by
reference.
The permissible maximum non-extraordinary dividend for nonlife companies
of the net investment income, the standard of former subsection 31-39-4(3), is
no longer realistic in a period when very large investment income has to
balance out an underwriting loss of large dimensions. Payment of the net
investment income in some recent years would (for the whole industry) have
amounted to close to 2 0 % of capital and surplus; for some individual insurers
it would undoubtedly have amounted to substantially more. Such a dividend
would be extraordinary. The maximum has therefore been changed to the net
combined income from operations and investment. Even that would be a very
large sum in some years, but it would be much less likely to strip insurers of
needed capital and surplus for at least it would leave the insurer in
approximately the same position (apart from inflation) it occupied in the
prior year. That provides no room for growth unless the insurer was
overcapitalized, which may sometimes be the case.
96-17-6.5.
(1)

Liability of affiliates.

Right of receiver to recover dividends paid.

If an order for the

liquidation, rehabilitation or conservation of an insurer authorized to do
business in Utah is entered under chapter 96-45, the receiver has a right to
recover on behalf of the insurer the amount of distributions other than stock
dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock at any time during the five
years preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation or conservation,
subject to the limitations of subsections (2) to (4).
(2)

Dividend payments recoverable.

No dividend is recoverable if the

recipient shows that when paid the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and
that the insurer did not know and could not reasonably have known that the
distribution might adversely affect its solvency.

900m^
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(3)

Persons liable.

(a)

Affiliates at time of payment.

Section 96-17-6.5
Any person who

was an affiliate of the insurer at the time the distributions were paid is
liable up to the amount of distributions received.
(b)

Affiliates at time of declaration of distribution.

Any person who

was an affiliate of the insurer at the time the distributions were declared is
liable up to the amount of distributions it would have received if it had been
paid.
(c)

Joint and several liability.

If under subsections (3) (a) and (b) two

persons are liable with respect to the same distributions they are jointly and
severally liable.
(4)

Aggregate limitation.

The maximum amount recoverable under this

section is the amount needed in excess of all other available assets to pay
all claims under the receivership, less for each recipient any amount that
recipient has already paid to receivers under similar laws of other states.
(5)

Secondary liability.

If any person liable under subsection (3) is

insolvent, all its affiliates that controlled it at the time the dividend was
declared or paid are jointly and severally liable for any resulting deficiency
in the amount recovered from the insolvent affiliate.
Comment
Under certain circumstances, one purpose of creating an insurance holding
coirpany system, especially on the part of a nomnsurer which acquired an
insurer, was to 'liberate' excess surplus from a cash-rich company. There are
undoubtedly some circumstances in which insurers, especially nonlife insurers,
are overcapitalized and excess surplus can safely be withdrawn from them.
Were it not for the income tax consequences, the excess should be paid out as
dividends to shareholders, who could then reinvest as they saw fit. But
income tax liability leads to an effort to find a productive outlet for the
use of the capital with minimum income tax consequences. Payment to a parent
is one route to such reapplication of the capital.
This section seeks to cure any error of judgment or any venality in
deciding how much surplus can safely be withdrawn from a subsidiary insurer if
the amount withdrawn helps lead to insolvency within a few years. It is
modeled after Wisconsin section 617.23. Section 96-45-55 is its necessary
correlate. Ihe nature of the problem is illustrated by an incident m early
1969.
After being acquired by a nonmsurance holding company, the Great American
Insurance Company, then of New York but now of Ohio, which was then and is now
authorized to do business in Utah, and which had a surplus of over $300
million at year-end 1968, voted a dividend of over $171 million payaole to its
parent holding company. [At year-end 1980, it had surplus of about $385
million].
Immediately after declaration of the dividend, the New York insurance
department launcned an investigation to determine wnat effect so large a
dividend would have on tne financial condition of tne company and on the
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amounts of insurance it would safely be able to write in the future. The New
York Department noted that it did not have authority to disapprove even such a
large dividend. Although the dividend may not have endangered the solidity of
the particular company at all, the fact that such a payment could be made in
the way it was made and without regulatory surveillance even in the
domiciliary state raised issues far transcending the individual case and its
individual merits. It urgently called for the commissioner to have an
opportunity to consider whether the insurer's solidity is endangered. Model
legislation was developed by the NAIC and was widely adopted.
There are other potential abuses, beside excessive dividends, in the
holding company development. They include all of the devices for "milking"
that have been ingeniously exploited in other contexts. They encompass the
full range of less than arm's-length transactions that benefit affiliates at
the expense of the insurer. They permit evasions of insurance laws and
regulations by a parent holding company through payments to insurance agents
and employees, for example, that could not be done by an insurance company
alone.
The statutory provision proposed here is designed to give the commissioner
power to recoup the loss resulting from such abuses in at least some cases.
Conment on Cfrnitted Section
Former section 31-39-5 (based on Model Act section 5) is not continued in
this chapter. All the powers it gives the commissioner are already
incorporated in sections 96-2-25, 96-2-26 and 96-2-27.
96-17-7.

Confidential Treatment.

All information, documents and copies thereof obtained by or disclosed to
the commissioner or any other person in the course of an examination or
investigation made under subsection 96-2-25(1)(b) and all information reported
under sections 96-17-3 and 96-17-5 are confidential under subsection
96-2-28(6) , are not subject to subpoena and may not be made public by the
commissioner or any other person, except to insurance departments of other
states, without the prior written consent of the insurer or the particular
affiliate to which it pertains except that if the commissioner, after a
hearing, determines that the interests of policyholders, Utah shareholders or
the public will be served by the publication of the information he may publish
all or any part thereof in a manner he deems appropriate.
Comment
This section continues former section 31-39-6, which was based on Mcdel
Act section 7.
Comment on Omission
Former section 31-39-7 is omitted as unnecessary.
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96-17-9(1)

S e c t i o n 96-17-9

Renedies.
Voting of securities.

No security which is the subject of any

agreement or arrangement regarding acquisition or which is acquired or to be
acquired in contravention of this chapter or of any rule or order issued
hereunder, may be voted or counted for quorum purposes at any shareholders'
meeting.

Any action of shareholders requiring the affirmative vote of a

specified percentage of shares may be taken as though such securities were not
issued and outstanding.

No action taken at any such meeting is invalidated by

the voting of the securities unless the action would materially affect control
of the insurer or unless a Utah court has so ordered.
(2)

Injunctions.

If an insurer or the commissioner has reason to believe

that any security of the insurer has been or is about to be acquired in
violation of this chapter or of any rule or order issued nereunder, either may
apply to the district court for Salt Lake County or for the county in which
the insurer has its principal place of business to enjoin the transactions or
the voting of any security so acquired, to void any vote of the security
already cast, and for such other equitable relief as the nature of the case
and the interests of the insurer's policyholders, creditors, Utah shareholders
or the public may require.
(3)

Sequestration of voting securities.

In any case where a person has

acquired or is proposing to acquire any voting securities in violation of this
chapter or any rule or order issued hereunder, the district court for Salt
Lake County or for the county in which the insurer has its principal place of
business may, upon the application of the insurer or the commissioner and on
such notice as the court deems appropriate, seize or sequester any voting
securities of the insurer owned directly or indirectly by such person, and
issue such orders as may be appropriate to effectuate the provisions of this
chapter.
(4)

Situs of ownership.

For the purposes of this chapter, the situs of

the ownership of the securities of domestic insurers is deemed to be in Utah.
Comment
This section continues former subsections 31-39-8(2) and (3), wnich were
based on Model Act section 8. Subsection (1) is omit tea as unnecessary.
Comment on emitted Sections
Former sections 31-39-9, 31-39-10, 31-39-11, 31-39-12 ana 31-39-13 are
omitted because tney have alreaay been dealt witn adequately elsewnere in tne
insurance code.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN WESTERN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION and
MERWIN U. STEWART, LIQUIDATOR
Plaintiffs,

LELAND ARNO WOLF, individually; SALLY
RUETENIK WOLF, individually; LISA A.
WOLFKLAIN, individually; LOGAN A.
WOLF, individually; LELAND A. WOLF
ASSOCIATES, INC., a California corporation;
LOUISE WOLF, a/k/a LOUISE WOLF
HANSEN, individually; KEITH HANSEN,
individually; MATTHEW WOLFKLAIN,
individually; CINDY M. WOLF,
Individually; WESTERN HEALTH
NETWORK, INC., a California corporation;
AWL INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a
California corporation; AWL FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., a California corporation;
HEALTH RELIANCE, INC., a Delaware

REVISED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
REGARDING LIQUIDATOR'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION AND AFFIDAVIT OF
LELAND A. WOLF
Case No. 980905251 MI
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

corporation; THE WELLNESS HEALTH
PLAN PROVIDER GROUP, a Nevada
corporation; WOLFPACK INSURANCE
SERVICES, INC., a California corporation;
WOLF/NET, INC., a California corporation,
Defendants.
LELAND A. WOLF; SALLY RUETENIK
WOLF; LOGAN A. WOLF; LOUIS WOLF
HANSEN; LELAND A. WOLF
ASSOCIATES, INC.; HEALTH RELIANCE,
INC.; and THE WELLNESS HEALTH PLAN
PROVIDER GROUP, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
V.

MICHAEL WHEELER and BRUCE
NORIEGA,

j

Third-Party Defendants.

Plaintiffs American Western Life Insurance Company, In Liquidation and Merwin U.
Stewart, the Court-appointed liquidator ("Liquidator") filed the Liquidator's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on or about August 19, 2002. The following pleadings were filed and
considered by the Court in conjunction with the Liquidator's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment:
a.

Liquidator's Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment dated August 16, 2002.
b.

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judgment dated September 13, 2002.
c.

Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated September 11, 2002.
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d.

Liquidator's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment dated December 16, 2002.
e.

Correction to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment dated December 16, 2002.
f.

Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for

Summary Judgment dated January 13, 2003.
g.

Liquidator's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Liquidator's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2003.
Upon receipt of Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment dated September 13, 2002 and the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated
September 11, 2002, the Liquidator filed his Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition and Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated October 8, 2002. The following pleadings
were filed and considered by the Court in conjunction with the Liquidator's Motion to Strike
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf:
a.

Liquidator's Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and

Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated October 8, 2002.
b.

Liquidator's Memorandum in Support of Liquidator's Motion to Strike

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf dated October 8,
2002.
c.

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Affidavit of Leland

A. Wolf dated October 18, 2002.
d.

Defendants' Statement of Disputed Material Facts dated October 18, 2002.
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e.

Defendants' Summary of the Deposition Testimony of Bruce Noriega dated

October 18, 2002.
f.

Defendants' Summary of the Deposition Testimony of Michael Wheeler dated

October 18, 2002.
g.

Liquidator's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of

Leland A. Wolf dated December 16, 2002.
h.

Liquidator's Reply Memorandum in Support of Objections to Affidavit of Leland

A. Wolf dated December 16, 2002.
Oral arguments on the issues raised by the above referenced pleadings were heard by the
Court on January 6, 2003. Plaintiffs American Western Life Insurance Company, in Liquidation,
and Merwin U. Stewart, in his capacity as the Liquidator appointed by this Court were
represented by John P. Harrington and Kristine M. Larsen of Ray, Quianey & Nebeker and J.
Ray Barrios, Jr., General Counsel of the Liquidation Office. Defendants Leland A. Wolf, Sally
R. Wolf, Lisa A. Wolfklain, Logan A. Wolf, Leland A. Wolf & Associates, Inc., Louise Wolf
Keith Hansen, Matthew Wolfklain, Cindy M. Wolf, Western Health Network, Inc, AWL
Insurance Services, Inc., AWL Financial Services, Inc., Health Reliance, Inc., The Wellness
Health Plan Provider Group, Wolfpack Insurance Services, Inc., and Wolf/Net, Inc. (collectively
referred to as the "Wolf Family Defendants") were represented by Edward W. McBride, Jr.
Third-party Defendant Michael C. Wheeler was represented by Darren K Nelson of Parr,
Waddoups, Brown Gee & Loveless. Third-party Defendant Bruce Noriega was represented by
D. Jason Hawkins of Snow Christensen & Martineau. At the conclusion of the hearing on
January 6, 2003, the Court requested the supplemental briefs cited above. The decision of the
Court was announced in open court on January 29, 2003.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

American Western Life Insurance Company ("AWLIC") was an insurance

company organized under the laws of the State of Utah. On or about November 30, 1985,
Leland A. Wolf & Associates, Inc., a California corporation ("LAWA") purchased AWLIC.
Through subsequent reorganizations, LAWA's ownership of AWLIC was converted to Class A
preferred AWLIC stock. Leland A. Wolf and Sally R Wolf, as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship, own 70.76% of the issued and outstanding common shares of AWLIC. Leland A.
Wolf, as an individual, owns 19.88% of the issued and outstanding common shares of AWLIC.
The remaining 9.35% of AWLIC shares were gifted in December of 1995 by Leland A. Wolf
and Sally R. Wolf to each of their children and their respective spouses. See Form B dated
April 21, 1994, Annual Supplement to Insurance Holding Company System Registration
Statement filed with the Insurance Department of the State of Utah and personally signed by
Leland A. Wolf, an individual and the Ultimate Controlling Person of AWLIC ("Form B").
2.

Leland A. Wolf, as an individual, owns 37.2% of LAWA and Sally R. Wolf, wife

of Leland A. Wolf, owns 37.2% of LAWA.

See Form B, Item 2(b)(1).

The remaining

shareholders of LAWA are Wolf family members.
3.

Leland A. Wolf and Sally R. Wolf have been directors and officers of AWLIC

since the purchase of AWLIC by LAWA on November 30, 1985. The first pages of the Annual
Statements of AWLIC to the Utah Department of Insurance for the years 1992, 1993, 1994,
1995, and 1996 indicate that Leland A. Wolf and Sally R. Wolf were officers and directors of
AWLIC. In addition, the first pages of the Quarterly Statement of AWLIC for the quarter ending
March 31, 1997 and June 30, 1997 indicate that Leland A. Wolf and Sally R. Wolf were officers
and directors until the entry of the Liquidation Order on August 28, 1997.
5

Rental Agreement
4.

Effective February 1, 1992, AWLIC entered into a Rental Agreement with

LAWA wherein AWLIC agreed to rent from LAWA "office furniture, fixtures, equipment,
computer components and software systems designed to administer health care plans" (defined in
the Rental Agreement as "Equipment") for a monthly rental fee.
5.

Pursuant to Exhibit B of the Rental Agreement, AWLIC was obligated to pay a

monthly fee of $55,000 to LAWA. The monthly fee was determined exclusively by Leland A.
Wolf. No independent, competitive evaluation of the $55,000 monthly rental fee was obtained.
6.

At the time the Rental Agreement was entered into, a contemporaneous inventory

of Equipment being rented by AWLIC was not established nor maintained by either AWLIC or
LAWA. Neither AWLIC nor LAWA ever had supporting written documentation or a listing of
the precise Equipment that was subject to the Rental Agreement. Without knowing the precise
quantity and quality of the Equipment being rented, it is impossible to determine a fair or
reasonable monthly rental fee.
7.

The Rental Agreement appears to have been approved by the AWLIC Board of

Directors as reflected in the Minutes of the Board of Directors dated January 9, 1992. However,
the AWLIC Board of Directors never actually met at any time. Mr. Bruce Noriega, President of
AWLIC, specifically states that the Board of Directors' meeting of January 9, 1992 never took
place. The minutes of the Board of Directors were created to satisfy the requirements of the
Utah Department of Insurance ("Utah DOI") and falsely represented that an actual meeting
occurred.
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8.

No notice or report, either oral or written, of the AWLIC Board of Directors'

approval of the Rental Agreement was given to the Utah DOI immediately after the AWLIC
Board's approval.
9.

From September of 1992 to the cessation of the Rental Agreement in April of

1995, AWLIC paid LAWA $1,174,489.00. The total amount of monthly rental fees is derived
from the accounts payable ledgers maintained by AWLIC, copies of which have been made
available to the Wolf Family Defendants and their counsel.
Computer Equipment Purchase
10.

On or about January 12, 1996, AWLIC purchased from LAWA various pieces of

used computer equipment in the total amount of $277,888.17. A listing of the used computer
equipment prepared by AWLIC at the time of the purchase contains a legend explaining the price
at which various pieces of used computer equipment were valued for purposes of the sale.
11.

Michael Wheeler and his accounting staff were instructed by Leland A. Wolf to

designate certain LAWA used computer equipment to be valued at approximately $300,000.00.
Michael Wheeler and his accounting staff subsequently calculated certain valuation formulas
(e.g., 1.2 times book value) whereby the value of the used computer equipment would most
closely approximate Leland A. Wolfs desired number.
12.

At the time of the used computer equipment purchase, no efforts were made to

have an appraisal done or to ascertain the fair market value of the used computer equipment.
13.

The minutes of the AWLIC Board of Directors dated July 29, 1996 indicated that

the used computer equipment purchase from LAWA in the amount of $277,888.17 was "ratified"
after the sale was completed and not prior to the purchase as required by §31A-5-414(l)(a), Utah
Code Ann.
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14.

No notice or report, either oral or written, of the AWLIC Board of Directors'

ratification of the used computer equipment purchase was given to the Utah DOI immediately
after the AWLIC Board's ratification or any time subsequent.
Used Furniture Purchase
15.

In May of 1996, AWLIC purchased from LAWA various pieces of used furniture

in the total amount of $471,000.00. A listing of the used furniture was prepared by AWLIC at
the time of the purchase. The used furniture consisted of used Herman Miller modular furniture
that had been previously rented by AWLIC from LAWA.
16.

AWLIC used a 1986 or 1988 listing of retail prices for Herman Miller furniture to

value the used furniture. The value assigned to the used furniture was manipulated until the total
value equaled $471,000.
17.

At the time of the used furniture purchase, no efforts were made to have a

legitimate appraisal done or to ascertain the fair market value of the used furniture.
18.

The minutes of the AWLIC Board of Directors dated June 29, 1996 indicated that

the used furniture purchase from LAWA in the amount of $471,000 was "ratified" after the sale
was completed and not prior to the purchase as required by § 31A-5-414 (l)(a), Utah Code Ann.
19.

No oral or written report of the AWLIC Board of Directors' ratification of the

used furniture purchase was given to the Utah DOI immediately after the AWLIC Board's
ratification.
20.

To the extent any of the foregoing Findings of Fact should be denominated as a

Conclusion of Law, such Finding of Fact shall be considered a Conclusion of Law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Memorandum in Opposition to the Liquidator's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment filed by the Wolf Family Defendants on September 13, 2002 failed to comply with the
requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Specifically, the Wolf
Family Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition failed to begin with a section that contained a
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the Wolf Family
Defendants contended a genuine issue existed followed by a concise statement of material facts
which support the Wolf Family Defendants' contentions. As a result, all of the facts recited by
the Liquidator in its Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are
deemed admitted and true.
2.

The Wolf Family Defendants filed the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf. The filing of

the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf did not cure or remedy the Wolf Family Defendants' failure to
comply with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Even
if the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf was to be considered as a statement of the disputed material
facts of the Wolf Family Defendants, the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf contained non-admissible
evidence (e.g., hearsay, unsubstantiated conclusions and opinions, irrelevant evidence, etc.).
Such non-admissible evidence did not create an issue of disputed material fact. Therefore, even
if the failure to comply with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was
overlooked, the Wolf Family Defendants have failed to marshal admissible evidence that created
a question of fact.
3.

The Liquidator has the authority and standing to bring this action. Pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-310, the Liquidator is "vested by operation of law with the title to all
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of the property, contracts, rights of action . . . of the insurer ordered liquidated, wherever located,
as of the date of the filing of the petition for liquidation."
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 provides that the Liquidator "may continue to

prosecute and institute in the name of the insurer or in his own name, any suits and other legal
proceedings, in this state or elsewhere."
5.

Before an insurance company enters into a material transaction with a director or

a company that the director controls, the insurance company must be certain that it complies with
§ 31A-5-414, Utah Code Ann., which states as follows:
Transactions in which directors and others are interested.
(1)
Any material transaction between an insurance corporation
and one or more of its directors or officers, or between an insurance
corporation and any other person1 in which one or more of its directors or
officers or any person controlling the corporation has a material interest, is
voidable by the corporation unless all the following exist:
(a)
At the time the transaction is entered into it is fair to the
interests of the corporation.
(b)
The transaction has, with full knowledge of its terms
and of the interests involved, been approved in advance by the board or by
the shareholders.
(c)
The transaction has been reported to the commissioner
immediately after approval by the board or the shareholders.
(2)
A director, whose interest or status makes the transaction
subject to this section, may be counted in determining a quorum for a board
meeting approving a transaction under Subsection (l)(b), but may not vote.
Approval requires the affirmative vote of a majority of those present.
(3)
The commissioner may by rule exempt certain types of
transactions from the reporting requirement of Subsection (l)(c). The
commissioner has standing to bring an action on behalf of an insurer to have
a contract in violation of Subsection (1) declared void. Such an action shall
be brought in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-5-414 (2001).

The definition of "person" is provided by § 31A-1-103(84), Utah Code Ann.:
individual, partnership, corporation, incorporated or unincorporated association . . . "
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""Person" includes an

6.

The statute imposes three requirements on an insurance company before it can

enter into a transaction with a director. One, the transaction must be fair to the insurance
company at the time the transaction is entered into. Second, the insurance company's Board of
Directors (with full knowledge of the terms and the interests involved) must approve the
transaction before it is consummated. Third, the transaction must be reported to the insurance
commissioner immediately after the board of directors approves it.
7.

The requirements of the statute apply to the three transactions at issue which

include the rental agreement, the used computer equipment purchase and the used furniture
purchase.
8.

The rental agreement violated two of the three requirements. First, at the time the

transaction was entered into, there is no evidence that the monthly rental payment of $55,000.00
was fair to the interests AWLIC. Second, the Wolf Family Defendants failed to immediately
notify the insurance commissioner of this transaction with directors.
9.

The used computer equipment transaction failed to satisfy all three requirements

imposed by the statute. There is no evidence that the $277,888.17 payment from AWLIC to
LAWA for used computer equipment was fair to the interests of AWLIC. Second, there is no
evidence whatsoever that the purchase was approved by the AWLIC Board of Directors prior to
the consummation of the transaction.

Finally, there is no evidence that the insurance

commissioner was notified of the transaction immediately after the AWLIC Board acted or even
after the transaction was ratified.
10.

The used furniture purchase did not satisfy any of the three requirements

mandated by the statue. There is no evidence that the payment of $471,000 from AWLIC to
LAWA for used furniture was fair to the interests of AWLIC because prior to the transaction,
11

Defendants never obtained any verifiable evidence such as an appraisal to ascertain the fair
market value of the furniture.

The transaction was not approved by the AWLIC Board of

Directors before the transaction took place. The insurance commissioner was never given notice
of the transaction.
11.

The Liquidator is entitled to void these transactions with directors and AWLIC is

entitled to restitution of the monies paid to LAWA and Sally Wolf.
12.

In connection with the transactions with directors and pursuant to § 31-5-414,

Utah Code Ann., the Wolf Family Defendants are entitled to a setoff for whatever value, if any,
AWLIC received from the rental agreement, the used computer equipment sale and the used
furniture sale. The value of the setoff shall be determined at trial and LAWA and Sally Wolf
shall have the burden of proving any setoff.
13.

Leland A. Wolf, Sally Wolf and LAWA are subject to violated Section 31A-27-

322 of the Utah Code Annotated which states as follows:
Recoupment from Affiliates
(1)
If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation
of an insurer authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this
chapter, the receiver appointed under the order has a right to recover on
behalf of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount
of distributions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital
stock, made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for
liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is subject to the
limitations of Subsections (2) through (6).
(2)
No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when
paid, the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not
know and could not reasonably have known that the distribution might
adversely affect its solvency.
(3)
The maximum amount recoverable under this section is the
amount needed, in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under
the receivership, reduced for each recipient by any amount the recipient has
already paid to receivers under similar laws of other states.

12
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(4)
Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at
the time the distributions were paid is liable up to the amount of
distributions he received. Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the
insurer at the time the distributions were declared is liable up to the amount
of distributions he would have received if they had been paid immediately. If
two or more persons are liable regarding the same distributions, they are
jointly and severally liable.
(5)
If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all
affiliates that controlled that person at the time the dividend was declared or
paid are jointly and severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the
amount recovered from the insolvent affiliate.
(6)
This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a director
under existing law.
(7)
An action or proceeding under this section may not be
commenced after the earlier of:
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under
Section 31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection
31A-27-306(2) or the liquidator is terminated under Section 31A-27-339.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322.
14.

An affiliate is defined as "any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under

common control with, another person. A corporation is an affiliate of another corporation,
regardless of ownership, if substantially the same group of natural persons manages the
corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-301(4).
15.

Leland A. Wolf and Sally Wolf are all affiliates of AWLIC. LAWA is also an

affiliate of AWLIC because there is common management and ownership, i.e., Lee and Sally
Wolf own and control both AWLIC and LAWA.
16.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322, the Liquidator is entitled to recover

from any affiliate any distribution made and received at any time during the five years preceding
the petition for liquidation.

The petition for liquidation was filed on August 18, 1997.

Consequently, any payments made on or after August 18, 1992 to any affiliate are recoverable by
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the Liquidator. Under this statute, Leland A. Wolf, Sally Wolf and LAWA are not entitled to
any setoff or other mitigating factors or circumstances.
17.

"When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking

to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plan language imless the language is
ambiguous." Wilson v. Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 54 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2002) (quotations
omitted). Furthermore, "[i]n construing a statute, [we] must assume that 'each term in the statute
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. State
Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted). Thus, the "primary goal in
interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language,
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000).
18.

The express language of Section 31A-27-322 of the Utah Code Annotated is clear

and unambiguous. Therefore, effect must be given to the plain language of the statute.
19.

The statute provides that the liquidator may recover "the amount of distributions"

which is the broad general rule. The next phrase (i.e., "stock dividends are not recoverable")
creates an exception to that general rule or a subset of the general class.
20.

The word "dividend" as used in this statute creates a special class of distributions

which the recipient shareholder could demonstrate as fair and reasonable and therefore not
returnable to the liquidation estate. This limitation on recovery only applies to the subset of
dividends; it does not apply to the broad general category of "distributions''.
21.

If the statute was considered ambiguous, which this Court does not find, the

legislative history of the statute would be considered.

After reviewing the supplemental

pleadings filed by the parties, the legislative history indicates that setoffs and the consideration
14

of other mitigating circumstances would not be allowed. The repayment of distributions to
affiliates without setoffs is consistent with the underlying policy of marshalling assets, protecting
policyholders, and giving priority to third-party arms-length creditors.
22.

To the extent any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law should be denominated as

a Finding of Fact, such Conclusion of Law shall be considered a Finding of Fact.
(REMINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

The Liquidator's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED for

the reasons stated forth above. However, the Court is not entering a judgment at this time due to
the fact that evidence of additional affiliate distributions may be introduced at trial which is
currently scheduled to commence on May 5, 2003.
2.

The Liquidator's Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition and

the Affidavit of Leland A. Wolf is granted for the reasons set forth above.
DATED this

2~*2^day 0 f May, 2003.

tr&s&b

BY THE COURT

Approved as to form:

X^-w&i/
^mMU^

Edwar
Attori

ride, Jr.
f Defendants Wolf Family

Darren K. Nelson
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
Michael M. Wheeler

Richard A. Van Wagoner
D. Jason Hawkins
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant
Bruce Noriega
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DATED this

day of May, 2003.
BY THE COURT

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
Approved as to form:

Edward W. McBride, Jr.
Attorney for Defendants Wolf Family

Richard A. Van Wagoner
D. Jason Hawkins
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant
Bruce Noriega

Darren K. Nelson
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
Michael M. Wheeler
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Jennifer A. James (Bar No. 3914)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH CREST INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION, and
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN
LIQUIDATION, and MERWIN U.
STEWART, Liquidator,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF LWP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Civil No. 030915527
Judge Hanson

LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS
CORP., a California corporation, and
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a
California corporation,
Defendants.

Defendants LWP Claims Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC") and LWP Claims
Solutions, Inc.fLWPCSI") (colllectively "LWP"), submit this memorandum in reply to
arguments made by the Liquidator in opposition to LWP's Motion for Summary
Judgment. For reasons set forth both herein and in LWP's opening memorandum,
LWP's motion should be granted.

-ul
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Liquidator brought this action and filed his motion for summary judgment
against LWP,1 claiming that, under Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-27-322, he is entitled to
recoup from LWP, as a matter of law, payments made for claims handling services
performed pursuant to contract.2 Although there remain peripheral factual disputes that
LWP has addressed in the Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Igoe filed herewith, the
issue presented by LWP is not a factual one; rather, it presents the issue of whether the
Liquidator's claims must be dismissed as a matter of law because he is not entitled to
recoupment from LWP under § 31 A-27-322.
The Liquidator flatly states that "[apliate transactions are so susceptible to
manipulation and abuse that the Liquidator is statutorily empowered by § 31 A-27-322 to
recoup those paid monies regardless of any defense asserted by the original
recipient/affiliate." Liquidator's Opposition Memorandum ("Liquidator's Opposition")
at 1, emphasis supplied. The Liquidator here argues that he need not even prove the

The Liquidator originally sought summary judgment on payments from both Wasatch
Crest Insurance Co. and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company. The Liquidator now seeks only
partial summary judgment on the claims regarding payments from Wasatch Crest Insurance Co.
Liquidator's Opposition Memorandum at 36. He dropped his request for summary judgment regarding
payments from Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company because he has not established that LWP and
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company were affiliates during the time that it made payments to LWP.
The Liquidator here concedes the basis for LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment as to those claims.
2

Notably, the Liquidator makes no allegations whatsoever of abuse, manipulation or
overreaching on the part of LWP. He tacitly admits both receipt of the claims handling services from LWP
and the reasonableness of the terms of the contracts for those services. (That reasonableness is also
demonstrated by the fact that the Utah Guaranty Association continues to utilize LWP to perform the same
services on the same terms during the liquidation. Exhibit A, If 18. ) In other words, acknowledging that
the companies received full value for the payments contemporaneously made to LWP, the Liquidator
wants a short-sighted windfall that will put LWP out of business and end its benefit to the Guaranty
Association. Neither the statute nor the Liquidator's allegations support that unseemly result.

-2-
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elements of § 31A-27-322 in order to recoup money from LWP. He is wrong. LWP's
motion is based in the clear failure of the Liquidator to allege and establish facts to
support the simple elements of his cause action. Indeed, the Liquidator has failed to
plead even a prima facie case, because (1) the Liquidator has not pled or argued, and
cannot demonstrate, that LWP is an "affiliate that controlled the insurer" as expressly
required by § 31 A-27-322, and (2) the payments received were not "distributions"
under § 3 1 A-27-322.
II. ISSUES RELATING TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS
A,

LWP properly controverted incorrect factual statements.

In the Liquidator's Opposition at 2-3, he takes issue with the format used by
LWP in responding to the factual statements in the Liquidator's summary judgment
memorandum. The Liquidator complains about LWP's responses, ignoring the fact that
he failed to comply with his requirement under Rule 7(c)(3)(a) that each "statement of
fact shall be separately stated and numbered." The Liquidator included multiple, run-on
facts in single numbered paragraphs. See, e.g., Liquidator's Facts numbered 5 and 8
(the Liquidator includes at least six different facts in paragraph 8, alone). LWP tailored
its response to the Liquidator's statement of facts to minimize the confusion caused by
the Liquidator's noncompliance with Rule 7. The Liquidator has shown no confusion or
prejudice as a result of LWP's response. To the contrary, the Liquidator demonstrated,
by fully responding to LWP's statement of disputed facts, that he understood it.
A further examination of LWP's response to the Liquidator's statement of facts
demonstrates that LWP in fact complied with the requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) by
-3-
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controverting those statements that were incorrect. It responded separately to each of
the Liquidator's statements of facts and designated by number the paragraph to which it
responded. LWP then stated whether or not the specific fact was admitted or denied.
Because the Liquidator included multiple facts in most of its numbered paragraphs,
LWP indicated which specific fact within each paragraph was being admitted. Thus, the
Liquidator's statements cannot be deemed admitted under Rule 7(c)(3)(A).
B. Undisputed facts.
Perhaps because of the complicated structure of insurance companies and the
transactions that give rise to this dispute, the parties have devoted extensive effort to
the affidavits and factual statements in their memoranda. Indeed, LWP has filed a
Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Igoe to further explain some of those circumstances.
Notwithstanding that effort, the facts relevant to LWP's Motion for Summary
Judgment remain undisputed. It remains clear, for example, that LWP was not an
affiliate of WCMIC when WCMIC made payments to LWP, and LWP was an affiliate of
WCIC only between the asset purchase on November 165, 1999 and the sale of LWP's
stock to John Igoe and Judy Adlam on May 8, 2002. Exhibit A, fflf 9,10; Liquidator's
Opposition at 10, 16.3 It is equally clear that LWP itself never owned, directed or
controlled WCG, WCIC, FCL or WCMIC, and the Liquidator candidly admits that he
"does not rely on Mr. Igoe's positions with LWPCAC, Insurance Co. and Group to
establish control and affiliate status." Liquidator's Opposition at 36. There is no claim

3

Whether that sale was effective as of closing or on the effective date for accounting
purposes of January 1 is irrelevant to LWP's motion
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that LWP received any dividend or other distribution of equity from WCIC, WCMIC or
any affiliated entity.
It is equally clear that LWP received payments for claims services, and that it
actually performed the services for which it was paid. That the exact amounts paid
remain a matter of dispute is irrelevant to LWP's motion. The fairness of the terms
under which LWP performed its adjustment and other claims handling services is
further indicated by the fact that LWP continues to perform such services to WCIC and
WCMIC on the same terms for the Utah Guaranty Association during the liquidation.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

LWP was never an "affiliate that controlled the insurer" as expressly
required to invoke § 31A-27-322.

The Liquidator has neither pled nor attempted to prove the basic element of
control necessary for him even to state a cause of action against LWP. Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-27-322 plainly allows a Liquidator to recover certain distributions made to
an affiliate "that controls an insurer

" The statute was obviously designed to keep

parent companies from raiding the capital of subsidiaries they control. However, there
is and can be no allegation that LWP controlled either WCIC or WCMIC because it did
not. In the instant case, the Liquidator attempts to turn the statutory scenario on its
head and claim as controlled distributions not equity distributed to a parent but
payments made to a subsidiary for services rendered. He goes to great lengths to
demonstrate that LWP was an affiliate of WCIC for a period of time and argues that
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some of the same individuals managed WCIC, WCG and LWP at various times.
Liquidator's Opposition at pp. 34-40. His argument doesn't suffice.
LWP does not dispute its affiliate relationship with WCIC as a sister subsidiary
for approximately two years. That it may for a time have been a sister affiliate,
however, does not come close to proving that LWP was an affiliate "that controlled the
insurer." That point is fatal to the Liquidator's claim.
The Liquidator argues that he can ignore the statutory element of control,
asserting that: "[o]nce affiliate status is proved, the affiliate has no defenses to assert
that will spare the affiliate from disgorging the distributions it received." Liquidator's
Opposition at 39. In making this statement, the Liquidator blatantly misstates the law.
While affiliate status may be established by proof of common management with another
entity under § 31A-1-301(5), the Liquidator is empowered to recover equity
distributions under § 31 A-27-322 only from an "affiliate that controls the insurer." As
noted in LWP's opening memorandum, there is no presumption of control under the
Utah insurance code.4 Rather, control remains a separate element of affirmative proof
under the statute that the Liquidator has not attempted to meet.
The Liquidator chooses to ignore the language which limits recoupment to
affiliates in control of an insurer for the obvious reason that LWP never controlled
WCIC or WCMIC.5 Nowhere in the Liquidator's summary judgment motion, or in the
4

See, Utah Code Ann § 31A-1-301(27).

5

There are numerous examples where the Liquidator willfully ignores the controlling
language of § 31 A-27-322 For example, the Liquidator argues that "LWPCAC is, therefore, an affiliate of
both [WCG and WCIC] As a result, LWPCAC must disgorge at least $5,615,090 " Liquidator's

-6-
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Liquidator's Opposition does the Liquidator acknowledge that recoupment may only be
obtained from a controlling affiliate. In fact, as noted, the Liquidator failed even to
allege in his complaint that LWP controlled WCIC or WCMIC. His failure (and inability)
to do so dooms his action.
B.

Contemporaneous payments made to LWP by the insurers for claims
handling services were not "distributions" under § 31 A-27-322.

Though there is a disagreement as to the amount paid, the parties agree the
funds sought by the Liquidator were paid to LWP by WCIC and WCMIC for claims
handling and administrative services rendered to or on behalf of the insurers by LWP.
The Liquidator has not alleged that these payments were excessive, unfair or obtained
by fraudulent means, but instead baldly asserts, without any precedential support, that
any payment of any nature made to an affiliate by an insurer is a "distribution" subject to
recovery under § 31 A-27-322.
The term "distribution" is not defined in the Utah Insurance Code, and extensive
research revealed no reported case discussing the meaning of the term in the context
of insurance cases.6 The Liquidator's argument about the meaning of the term is

Opposition at 44 The Liquidator also states "[i]t may be difficult for LWP to comprehend that
§ 31 A-27-322 concerns itself with only two operative questions (1) were distributions made?, and
(2) were the distributions made to an affiliate? Anything else is irrelevant" Liquidator's Opposition at 39
The Liquidator's illogic ignores the plain language of the statute which restricts its application only to those
affiliates that controlled an insurer and so directed the distribution in question
6

In the Liquidator's Opposition at 31, n 7, he cites to an interlocutory decision written by
the Liquidator's counsel, in the case of American Western Life Insurance Company in Liquidation, et al v.
Leland A Wolf, et al (Case No 980905251) The Liquidator cites the case for the proposition that
"distribution" under § 31 A-27-322 includes all transfers of property to an affiliate by an insurer This
unpublished district court decision, of course, has no precedential value Moreover, that case apparently
involved a situation where individuals in control of an insurer entered into transactions on less than armslength terms that resulted in payments to those in control, a situation entirely different from the present
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contradicted by the common meaning of the word "distribution," the definition of
"distribution" in Utah law governing the regulation of corporations, the use of the word in
§ 31A-27-322, and the way the term is used elsewhere in the Utah Insurance Code, all
of which consistently support LWP's position that the term "distribution" means a
transfer of money or property in respect of the equity of an insurer, such as a dividend,
and does not encompass payments made for services.7
As noted in LWP's opening memorandum at 4, the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act defines a "distribution" as a "direct or indirect transfer of money or other
property. . . in respect of any of [a corporation's] shares. . . in the form of a declaration
or payment of a dividend, a purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of shares,
distribution of indebtedness or otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-102(13). This
and other definitions indicate that a "distribution" is a kind of payment or transfer of
money or property which involves dividing, apportioning, or giving out the equity of a
company in respect to shares. The definition given in the corporate context makes it
clear that a distribution is a transfer based on stock ownership. The statutory

case In addition, for the reasons stated herein and in LWP's opening memorandum, LWP respectfully
submits that the broad interpretation of the term "distribution" in American Western Life is incorrect
7

The Liquidator's definition of 'distribution" as any payment is contrary to the legislative
purpose of Section 322 of remedying potential abuses by insurance holding companies See LWP's
Memorandum at 2-4 Under the Liquidator's construct, an insurer's payments for services fairly rendered
by an affiliate in the ordinary course of business within five years of the liquidation filing would be fully
recoverable, but dividends of any size would not be recoverable if lawful and made without reason to know
that the insurer's solvency was jeopardized Thus, a parent corporation could cause a subsidiary insurer
to issue a $50 million dividend that would not be recoverable, but a small payment made to an affiliate for
services fairly rendered would have to be disgorged
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requirement of affiliate control as a prerequisite for recoupment comports entirely with
this concept.
Further, the terms "distribution" and "dividend" are used synonymously in
Subsections (4) and (5) of § 31 A-27-322. Subsection (4) establishes that a person who
is an affiliate in control of an insurer at the time of distributions is liable up to the
amount of distributions received. Subsection (5) uses the word "dividend" completely
interchangeably with the word "distribution" in Subsection (4): "If any person liable
under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all affiliates that controlled that person at the time the
dividend was declared or paid are jointly and severally liable for any resulting
deficiency. . . ."
The language of other sections of Chapter 27 of Title 31 A, titled "Insurers
Rehabilitation and Liquidation," also supports LWP's position. Section 320, for
example, allows a liquidator to recover a "transfer" made within one year prior to the
liquidation filing when the transfer is fraudulent. And Section 321 allows the Liquidator
to recover a "preference," which is defined as "a transfer of any of the property of an
insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor," made within a certain time period.8 The use of
the terms "transfer" and "preference" to describe payments recoverable under those
provisions confirms that "distribution," as used in Section 322, does not mean all
payments. Rather, read correctly and in context, Section 322 covers only those

This provision, not Section 322, is the law that entitles the Liquidator to pursue recovery of
payments made for services rendered such as those at issue here
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transfers made by an affiliate with respect to the equity of an insurer for the benefit of
those in control.
Further, the word "distribution" is used throughout the Utah Insurance Code,
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A, to refer to transfers based on stock ownership. Under
§ 31A-5-506, for example, "[n]o policyholder in a nonlife mutual may receive a
distribution of shares . . ." of a certain type. Section 31A-5-418 refers to "dividends and
other distributions" and provides that "a stock corporation may make distributions" if the
"dividend" would not reduce the insurer's total adjusted capital below a certain level.
The section on registration of insurers, § 31A-16-105(2)(c)(vii), states that registration
statements shall contain information on "dividends and other distributions" to
shareholders, and § 31 A-16-106(2)(b), (c) and (d) provide standards for determination
of whether a "dividend or distribution" is extraordinary. In all of these contexts,
distribution is used to describe transfers made with respect to shares, not all payments
or other transfers.
The Liquidator also argues that Professor Spencer L. Kimball's comments on the
1986 Utah Insurance Code confirm the Liquidator's definition of "distribution" when, in
fact, the draft section and its comments do just the opposite. Liquidator's Opposition at
29-30. After acknowledging that § 96-17-6.5 of the 1983 Draft Code was the precursor
to § 31A-27-322 of the Code enacted in 1986, the Liquidator quotes the closing
paragraphs of Professor Kimball's comment: "There are other potential abuses, beside
excessive dividends, in the holding company development." Professor Kimball's
comment then describes some of those potential abuses. Section 96-17-6.5 of the
-10-

Draft Code, however, is limited to distributions based on stock ownership and uses the
terms "dividend" and "distribution" interchangeably.9
The payments to LWP for claims handling services were simply not
"distributions" and are thus not subject to recoupment under § 31A-27-322.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted, finding in LWP's favor on the Liquidator's claims as a matter of law and
dismissing the Liquidator's action with prejudice.
Dated this 22nd day of April 2005.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

EDWIN C. BARNES
CHARLES R. BROWN
JENNIFER A. JAMES
Attorneys for Defendants

The language from Professor Kimball cited by the Liquidator also confirms that the
recoupment powers were intended to prevent "abuse," including "improper transfer" of money, and "the full
range of less than arm's-length transactions that benefit affiliates at the expense of the insurer"
Liquidator's Opposition at 29, 30 None of those circumstances is even alleged in the present case The
Liquidator's action is instead an effort to get something for nothing - to recover monies paid pursuant to
contract for services actually rendered for the acknowledged benefit of the insurer The claims are not
fair, nor are they allowed by the statute invoked by the Liquidator
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply
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to the following this 22nd day of April 2005:

John P. Harrington
Jennifer L. Lange
Holland & Hart LLP
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Ray Barrios, Jr.
Liquidation Office General Counsel
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I, John A. Igoe, having first been duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1.

I have reviewed the Affidavit of Orrin T. Colby, Jr. filed by the Liquidator in

support of the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment and in opposition to LWP's
motion for summary judgment.
2.

Mr. Colby's Affidavit is inaccurate and misleading in a number of respects.

While LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment does not depend on these points, I would
like to correct them.
3.

In paragraph 6, Mr. Colby asserts that I was the Chief Operating Operator

and President of Wasatch Crest Group ("WCG") from 1999 to July 2003. As I stated in
paragraph 18 of my previous affidavit, I resigned from those positions on May 28, 2002.
Further, I was not Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of WCG prior to
November 6, 2001 when I became Acting Chairman of the Board and CEO, after
Mr. Colby was removed from those positions.
4.

Mr. Colby's statements in paragraph 8 of his affidavit concerning my role

in the negotiation of the sale of the assets of LWP Commercial Claims Administrators,
Inc. ("LWP Commercial") to WCG are also inaccurate. I negotiated on behalf of LWP
Commercial but not WCG. At the time of the negotiations, I was a member of the
Board of Directors of WCG, but there were other directors who negotiated the asset
purchase on behalf of WCG. After the asset purchase, I was not the CEO of LWP
Commercial but instead served in that role for a newly created company, LWP Claims
Administrators Corp. ("LWPCAC") to which WCG transferred the assets of LWP

2
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Commercial. In 2002, LWPCAC was sold to Judy Adlam and me, rather than to my
wife and me as Mr. Colby incorrectly asserts.
5.

In Paragraph 10 of his affidavit, Mr. Colby states that he attended board

meetings of Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("WCMIC") and that I also
attended those meetings as a member and officer. This statement is false. I never
served as a member of the Board of Directors of WCMIC or as an officer of that
company, and I did not attend its board meetings in that capacity. I did not attend any
WCMIC board meeting after November 27, 2000.
6.

Paragraph 11 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is also inaccurate. WCG was not the

parent company of LWPCAC after January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWPCAC by
WCG to Judy Adlam and me became effective. That sale closed on May 28, 2002,
effective as of January 1, 2002. Further, WCIMC was not an affiliate of WCG after a
November 27, 2000 capital restructuring in which WCMIC relinquished its shares in
WCG.
7.

Mr. Colby states in paragraph 12 of his affidavit that I was CEO of WCG

at the time the administrative services agreements between Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company ("WCIC") and LWPCAC and between WCMIC and LWP were entered into.
This statement is untrue. The administrative services agreements were orally entered
into in approximately June of 2000, and the agreement with WCIC was formalized in a
written administrative services agreement with an effective date of January 1, 2001. At
that time, Mr. Colby was CEO of WCG. I did not become Acting CEO of WCG until
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Mr. Colby was removed as CEO on November 6, 2001, well after these arrangements
were made. The administrative services agreements were drafted by Judy Adlam and
Charles Wilcox, Executive Vice President of Insurance Operations for WCIC. The
agreements were in turn reviewed and approved by the full board of directors of WCG. I
was only one of at least five directors of WCG at that time. I did not control the board,
which was instead under the control of an investor group.
8.

Paragraph 14 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is inaccurate in stating that LWPCAC

had the same employees and management team as WCG and WCIC from November
2001 through July 2003 when, in fact, I resigned from all management positions with
the Wasatch Crest companies on May 28, 2002, the date of the closing of the sale of
LWPCAC. After that date, I was not involved in any way in the management of any
Wasatch Crest companies, and Wasatch Crest management was not involved in the
management of LWPCAC. Further, I was never an officer and director of WCMIC and
never made management decisions for that company. I was not CEO of any Wasatch
Crest company (except LWPCAC) prior to November 27, 2001 when I became Acting
CEO of WCG and WCIC.
9.

Mr. Colby asserts in paragraph 15 of his affidavit that WCG, WCIC,

LWPCAC and WCMIC, among other companies, were under the common management
and control of the officers and directors of WCG. This broad assertion is inaccurate.
WCG was the parent of WCIC at all relevant times but the parent of LWPCAC only
from November 16, 1999 until January 1, 2002 when the sale of LWPCAC to Judy
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Adlam and me became effective. LWPCAC was not under common the control of
WCG after January 1, 2002. Similarly, WCMIC was not under common control with
WCG or the other companies after the capital restructuring effective on November 27,
2000.
10.

In paragraph 16 of his affidavit, Mr. Colby states that WCG, WCIC and

WCMIC and LWPCAC were affiliates during all relevant times. He is mistaken for the
reasons given in paragraph 9 above.
11.

Paragraph 17 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is false and misleading because I

never participated in the management of WCMIC, which was not affiliated with WCG
after November 27, 2000. The administration of WCMIC's claims was performed by
LWPCAC, but these services were provided pursuant to a contractual arrangement
between WCMIC and LWPCAC. I had no supervisory role with WCMIC. And, as
noted, I was not involved in the management of WCG or WCIC after May 28, 2002.
12.

Paragraph 18 of Mr. Colby's affidavit is similarly misleading. LWPCAC

was not managed or controlled by the management and controlling persons of WCG
after January 1, 2002.
13.

I have also reviewed the Liquidator's Memorandum in Opposition to

LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support of
Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Liquidator's Memorandum"). The
Liquidator's memorandum recited the inaccurate statements of Mr. Colby described
above and contains additional inaccurate and misleading statements.
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14.

For example, on page 20 of the memorandum, the Liquidator disputes

LWP's assertion that the Managing General Agency Agreement with North American
Specialty Insurance Company ("NAS") was between WCG and NAS, arguing instead
that the agreement was between WCIC and NAS. The Liquidator also disputes that
LWPCAC handled claims arising out of the agreement for WCG, rather than WCIC.
The Liquidator argues that LWP should produce the contract to verify its allegations.
LWP does not have the original or a copy of the Managing General Agency Agreement,
but, on information and belief, asserts that this agreement is in the possession of the
Liquidator and that it was not produced because it confirms LWP's assertion that LWP
provided claims handling services to WCG, not WCIC, pursuant to the Managing
General Agency Agreement between WCG and WCIC. Compensation to LWP for
these services was paid out of the WCIC bank account, but these were WCG funds, as
WCG at times deposited funds into and withdrew funds out of the WCIC bank
accounts. These inter-company transactions were appropriately accounted for in the
books and records of WCG and WCIC.
15.

On pages 22 -23 of the Liquidator's Memorandum, the Liquidator states

that Group was the parent company of LWPCAC "at all times between 1999 and July
2003," a statement inconsistent with the accurate acknowledgment in the preceding
paragraph on page 22 that LWPCAC was sold to Judy Adlam and me on May 28, 2002.
LWPCAC was not owned by WCG after the effective date of the sale, January 1, 2002,
but even if LWPCAC could be considered to have been owned until the date the sale
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documents were signed, that is, May 28, 2002, it was not a subsidiary of WCG after
May 28, 2002.
16.

On page 35 of the Liquidator's Memorandum, the Liquidator comments

that I do not aver that WCG or WCIC did not own, direct or control the business or
operations of LWPCAC. I agree and have stated that WCG owned LWPCAC and
directed the operations of LWPCAC from November 16, 1999 until January 1, 2001
when WCG sold LWPCAC. I have never averred, however, that WCIC controlled or
directed LWPCAC at any time. WCIC was a wholly owned subsidiary of WCG, as was
LWPCAC. As such, LWPCAC never owned or controlled WCIC, and WCIC never
owned or controlled LWPCAC.
17.

When my wife and I sold the assets of our claims administrative business,

LWP Commercial, to WCG in November 1999, we received $500,000 in cash and
$700,000 in promissory notes (only $333,000 of these notes were paid by WCG).
When Judy Adlam and I purchased LWPCAC from WCG in 2002, we paid
approximately $4 million to WCG (up front cash of $2 million, assumption of
approximately $1.8 million in liabilities and a contingency payment of $175,000). This
purchase price was found to be fair and adequate consideration for the company by the
outside appraiser retained by WCG's Board. By paying over $3 million more to WCG
for the business than WCG paid for the business, WCG (the parent of WCIC) was
compensated fully and fairly for any increase in the value of LWPCAC which occurred
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by virtue of the claims handling agreements with WCIC and WCMIC and LWPCAC's
other business operations.
18.

LWPCAC (which changed its name to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. in the

third quarter of 2002) continues to provide claims handling services to WCIC and
WCMIC during the liquidation period through an agreement with the Utah Guaranty
Association which is handling insurance claims for the liquidation estates of WCIC and
WCMIC. The services are provided on the same terms as the 2001 agreements
between WCIC and LWPCAC and between WCMIC and LWPCAC.
19.

Attached as Exhibit A is a schedule showing revenue recorded by

LWPCAC from NAS, WCIC, and WCMIC for claims handling and administrative services
during 2000 and 2001. The numbers were taken from LWPCACfs general ledger and
represent amounts that were audited by WCG's independent auditors (Ernst & Young)
as part of their annual review and audited financial report on Wasatch Crest companies.
Dated this ffftTay of April 2005.

j p t i N A . IGOE
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this (& —day of April 2005
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Igoe to be hand-delivered to the following this 22nd
day of April 2005:

John P. Harrington
Jennifer L. Lange
Holland & Hart LLP
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Ray Barrios, Jr.
Liquidation Office General Counsel
215 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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LWP Claims Solutions, Inc
Revenue History
North American Specialty Insurance Company (NAS)
Wasatch Crest Insurance Company (WCIC)*
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company (WCMIC)
includes Wasatch Crest Casualty Insurance Company

Revenue Source
NAS
Date Recorded
2000
Jun
Jul
2000
Aug
2000
Sep
2000
2000
Oct
Nov
2000
2000 _ 692.368
Dec
Total
2000 _ 692.368
2001
184,591
Jan
2001
127,892
Feb
Mar
2001
48,015
2001
257,954
Apr
2001
197,286
May
2001
203,090
Jun
2001
219,588
Jul
2001
244,691
Aug
Sep
2001
197,449
2001
244,889
Oct
Nov
2001
182,590
Dec
2001 _ 201.099
2001..2,309.135
Total
Total
3,001,503

WCIC
53,333
53,333
53,333
53,333
53,333
53,333
195.569
515.567
89,306
123,446
48,007
77,016
80,697
57,043
61,240
56,278
53,242
55,500
55,604
55.165
812.543
1.328,110

WCMIC

Total
-

53,333
53,333
53,333
53,333
53,333
53,333
420.054 1,307.991
420.054 1,627.989
35,212
309,108
69,990
321,328
58,326
154,347
30,827
365,798
28,659
306,642
26,947
287,081
32,463
313,291
30,287
331,256
23,670
274,361
20,591
320,979
19,543
257,737
16.080 , 272.343
392,595 3,514,273
812,650 5,142,263
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In Re:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

WASATCH CREST MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY IN LIQUIDATION, and
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE COMPANY
IN LIQUIDATION,

CASE NO. 030915527
(Consolidated with 030915528)

Respondents.

The above-referenced matter was before the Court on crossMotions

for Summary

Judgment.

The

first

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment was filed by LWP Claims Administrators Corporation and LWP
Claims Solutions, Inc., seeking Summary Judgment determining that
payments made to LWP Claims Administrators and LWP Claims Solutions
are not subject to return to the liquidator as liquidator alleges.
The liquidator for Wasatch Crest Insurance Company has filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to have this Court determine as
a matter of law that the payments made to LWP are in fact subject
to return to the liquidator on the basis that the liquidator was an
affiliate of Wasatch Crest Insurance Company which controlled the
insurer, and that the payment for claims services were a dividend,
all referring to Section 31A-27-322 of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 as
amended.

IN RE: WASATCH CREST
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.

PAGE 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Court heard argument of counsel, and at the conclusion of
argument took the matter under advisement to further review the
submissions of the parties and consider the oral arguments offered
by counsel in relation thereto.
The Court has had an opportunity to consider all those matters
and being fully advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.
The liquidator for Wasatch Crest Insurance Company is entitled
to recover from LWP any amounts that LWP received from Wasatch
Crest Insurance Company that constitutes a "dividend" if, at the
time the dividend was received, LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch
Crest Insurance Company and controlled Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company.
The liquidator argues that LWP was an affiliate, and LWP
agrees that it was an affiliate.

The liquidator asserts that

because there were common owners and operators of both Wasatch
Crest and LWP, that constitutes sufficient evidence of control so
as to meet the statute.
payment

for

claims

Finally, the liquidator argues that the

services made by Wasatch

Crest

to LWP do

constitute a dividend, and therefore recoverable.
LWP, while admitting that it was an affiliate, denies that it
controlled the insurer, and suggests that there is absolutely no
evidence in the record that LWP controlled Wasatch Crest, so as to
influence the payments made by Wasatch Crest to LWP for insurance

IN RE: WASATCH CREST
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

claims services. Further, LWP argues that the payment for services
rendered do not constitute a dividend that is recoverable under the
statute.
Unfortunately, Section 31A-27-322, of the Utah Code Ann., 1953
as amended, is not a model of clarity, however, the Court is able
to determine the intent of the legislature by referring to the
plain language of the statute.
There is no question that LWP was an affiliate of Wasatch
Crest Insurance Company. The Court is not persuaded, however, that
mere common ownership or operation, at least to the extent set
forth in this record, is a sufficient basis to presume control.
Assuming for the sake of discussion that there were some periods of
time in which there were joint owners or joint operators, that
fact, in and of itself, is insufficient to raise a question of LWP
controlling Wasatch Crest for the purposes of making payments to
Wasatch Crest which might be considered a dividend or, for that
matter, a distribution.
The Court determines herein that there is no evidence that LWP
as an affiliate

"controlled

the insurer," as required by the

statute, which determination ends the inquiry as to whether or not
the payments

received

by

LWP

recoverable by the liquidator.

for

insurance

service work

are

IN RE: WASATCH CREST
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

However, the Court deems it advisable at this point in time to
proceed forward, and indicate that, even assuming that LWP was an
affiliate that controlled the insurer, the statute does not allow
recovery of payments for services rendered under Section 31A-27322, inasmuch as the legislature used, and presumably advisedly so,
the term "dividend."

A dividend cannot be considered as a payment

for services rendered, and therefore assuming that LWP in fact
controlled Wasatch Crest Insurance Company for the purposes of
making distributions, it did not receive a dividend.
Accordingly, the Court accepts the position of LWP as the
correct position as to when affiliates may be required to repay
dividends

to an insurer, and grants LWP's Motion for Summary

Judgment.

The Court likewise is therefore required to deny the

Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the liquidator on this
issue.
Counsel for LWP should prepare an appropriate Order, all in
accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
setting forth in detail the basis for this Court's decision, and
submit that Order for review and signature.
The Court requests a second Order, although it only needs to
be in brief form, indicating that the receiver's Motion for Summary

IN RE: WASATCH CREST
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judgment is denied. That Order should/likewise be submitted to the
Court for review and signature.

/

IN RE: WASATCH CREST
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this

c:

V

day of

June, 2005:
John P. Harrington
Jennifer L. Lange
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Wasatch Crest
Mutual Insurance Co.
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
J. Ray Barrios
Attorney for Wasatch Crest
Mutual Insurance Co
215 S. State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edwin C. Barnes
Charles R. Brown
Attorneys for Defendants LWP Claims Administrators
201 S. Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Merwin U. Stewart, Liquidator
Lennard W. Stillman, Special Deputy Liquidator
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Co.
215 S. State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent Michie
Utah Insurance Commissioner
in his capacity as Liquidator of WCIC
3110 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Allen Muhlestein
Executive Director
Utah Property and Casualty Insurance
P.O. Box 1626
Sandy, Utah 84091-1626
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Mailing Certificate - Continued
Kenneth L. Pedersen
Jarom A. Whitehead
Attorneys for Clinton and Andrea Corrington
161 Fifth Avenue, Suite 301
P.O. Box 2349
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-2349
Taylor L. Anderson
Attorney for Clinton and Andrea Corrington
3865 S. Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Blake G. Hall
Joel E. Tingey
Attorneys for City of Chubbuck, Idaho
4 90 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
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FILEDI DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217)
Charles R. Brown (Bar No. 0449)
Jennifer A. James (Bar No. 3914)
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
201 South Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-322-2516
Fax:
801-521-6280

SALT LAKE COUNTY

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH CREST INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION, and
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN
LIQUIDATION, and MERWIN U.
STEWART, Liquidator,
Plaintiffs,
-vsLWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS
CORP., a California corporation, and
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a
California corporation,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER GRANTING LWP'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 030915527
Judge Hanson

:
:

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 17, 2005, came on for
hearing before the Court on Monday, May 16, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. Defendants were
represented by Edwin C. Barnes and Jennifer A. James of the law firm of Clyde Snow
Sessions & Swenson. Plaintiffs were represented by John P. Harrington and Jennifer L.

•79-7/^

Lange of the law firm of Holland & Hart and by J. Ray Barrios, Jr., Estate General
Counsel.
The Court, having reviewed the extensive materials filed by Defendants and
Plaintiffs, considered the arguments of counsel, and taken the matter under advisement
for further review, issued a Memorandum Decision on June 21, 2005 stating that
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment would be granted. Now, in accordance with
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court issues this more detailed
statement of the multiple grounds for the Court's decision. Plaintiffs also filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment that was argued and submitted at the same time. Based on the
reasoning of the Memorandum Decision and this Order, the Court will enter a separate
Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion.
The action filed by the Plaintiffs (collectively, the "Liquidator") on June 7, 2004
asserts the right to recoup certain payments made by Wasatch Crest Insurance
Company ("Insurance") and Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company ("Mutual") to
LWP under the stated authority of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322. The first section of
that statute reads as follows:
If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in this
state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver appointed
under the order has the right to recover on behalf of the
insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the
amount of distributions, other than stock dividends paid by
the insurer on its capital stock, made at any time during the
five years preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation,
or conservation. This recovery is subject to the limitations of
Subsections (2) through (6).
-2-
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The parties agree that the Liquidator's Complaint, and both parties' Motions for
Summary Judgment, turn on this statutory language. In particular, the dispositive issue
presented by both motions is whether payments made by Insurance and Mutual to LWP
are subject to recoupment under this statute. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
has determined as a matter of law that they are not. Accordingly, the Court grants
LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
Both Defendants and The Liquidator have provided affidavits referencing
numerous documents in support of the positions they advocate. They disagree on some
factual points, but those disagreements all involve matters peripheral to the issues
presented to the Court by LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment. The affidavits and
materials filed with the Court demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any fact
material to LWP's motion. The principal material facts as to which no genuine issue
exists are as follows:
1.

Insurance was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah, which

was placed into liquidation in the Third District Court on or about July 31, 2003.
2.

Mutual was an insurance company domiciled in the State of Utah, which

was placed in liquidation in the Third District Court on or about July 31, 2003.
3.

Defendant LWP Claims Administrators Corp. was a California corporation,

the name of which was changed to LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. Though they are listed
as separate Defendants in this matter, they are the same company.

-3-
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4.

Wasatch Crest Group purchased substantially all of the assets and

business operations of a prior business, LWP Commercial Claims Administrators, Inc.,
from John and Erica Igoe on November 16, 1999. In connection with that purchase,
Wasatch Crest Group formed a new entity, LWP Claims Administrators Corp., to hold the
acquired assets. LWP was later sold to John Igoe and Judy Adlam.
5.

Shortly after the purchase of the LWP assets, John Igoe became president

and chief operating officer of Wasatch Crest Group and two of its subsidiaries, including
Insurance. Igoe was never an officer or director of Mutual.
6.

LWP was a subsidiary of Wasatch Crest Group and therefore a sister

company or affiliate of Insurance from October 1998 until the sale of LWP to Igoe and
Adlam in 2002. Mutual was restructured on November 27, 2000 so that it was no longer
a subsidiary of Wasatch Crest Group, and LWP was not an affiliate of Mutual at any time
after that date. (The Liquidator originally alleged an affiliate status between LWP and
Mutual, but later withdrew its summary judgment motion as to the claims of Mutual. The
Liquidator does not question the November 27, 2000 reorganization date or that Mutual
then relinquished its interest in Wasatch Crest Group. The affiliate relationship of
Mutual, however, is immaterial to the disposition of LWP's motion.)
7.

LWP began providing workers compensation claims adjusting and

administrative services to Insurance in about June 2000. In return for these services,
LWP received a percentage of the premiums earned by Insurance and a percentage of
the medical cost savings realized by Insurance through the claims administration. LWP's
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services were provided first pursuant to an oral agreement, and later pursuant to a
written agreement with equivalent terms.
8.

A similar oral agreement for claims adjusting and administrative services

was reached between Mutual and LWP Commercial. The agreement with Mutual,
however, was never executed. All payments made to LWP by Mutual were for claims
adjusting and administrative services after the November 27, 2000 date when Mutual
relinquished its interest in Wasatch Crest Group.
9.

John Igoe and Judy Adlam purchased the stock of LWP from Wasatch

Crest Group for the sum of $2 million in cash, an assumption of liabilities of
approximately $1.8 million, and a contingency payment later made in the amount of
$175,000. The parties disagree as to whether the effective date of the sale was
January 1, 2002 or May 8, 2002, but that issue is not material to LWP's motion. The
Liquidator does not contend, and there is nothing in the record to indicate, that the terms
for the purchase of the LWP stock were other than fair market value. Payment of fair
market value to Wasatch Crest Group in 2000 would logically have included payment for
the value of ongoing claims adjusting and administrative business as of that date. In any
event, the Liquidator does not contradict LWP's assertion that the Wasatch Crest Group
board of directors retained Hales & Company to provide independent advice as to the
fairness of this transaction.
10.

John Igoe and Judy Adlam resigned from their respective positions with all

Wasatch Crest companies as of May 8, 2002, the closing date of the transaction.
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11.

Though the parties differ on the exact amounts paid, it is admitted that

LWP received payments from Insurance and Mutual and that all such payments were for
claims adjusting and administrative sen/ices. The combined payment figures for both
entities submitted to the Court by the parties range from $5,142,263.00 to
$6,678,668.64.
12.

It is acknowledged by the parties that all of the payments in question were

made for claims adjusting and administrative services performed pursuant to the oral and
written agreements.
13.

There is no claim or evidence that LWP received any dividend or other

distribution of equity from Insurance or Mutual.
14.

Since Insurance and Mutual were placed into liquidation, LWP has

continued to provide adjusting and administrative services for the claims of Insurance
and Mutual at the request of the Utah Guaranty Association, on the same commercial
terms previously extended to Mutual and Insurance.
15.

While some individuals served simultaneously on the governing boards of

both LWP and Insurance prior to May 8, 2002, there was not a complete identity of those
boards. Neither was it demonstrated that LWP "controlled" Insurance or Mutual, through
their boards of directors or otherwise, to the extent LWP could have required Insurance
or Mutual to make payments to LWP.
16.

The Liquidator does not contend, and has not offered any evidence to

support a contention, that LWP ever owned either Insurance or Mutual. There is no
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allegation that LWP appointed or otherwise controlled the directors of Insurance or
Group. In particular, the Liquidator concedes that it does not "rely on Mr. Igoe's positions
with LWPCAC, Insurance Company and Group to establish control and affiliate status."
Instead, the Liquidator addressed the control issue by asserting that LWP, Insurance and
Mutual were "under common control."
DISCUSSION
From these facts it is apparent that LWP was an affiliate of Insurance, at least
until early 2002. Both parties agree, and the Court finds, that LWP had affiliate status
with Insurance. LWP contends that all amounts paid by Mutual to LWP were paid after
Mutual had relinquished its interest in Wasatch Crest Group and thus during a period in
which LWP was not an affiliate of Mutual. The Liquidator has not acquiesced to this
argument of LWP, but withdrew its Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to Mutual
so that the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Judgment now embraces only the claims
advanced on behalf of Insurance. LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment, by contrast,
seeks dismissal of all claims advanced by the Liquidator on behalf of both Insurance and
Mutual. In light of the Court's dispositive ruling on related issues, the question about the
affiliate status of Mutual need not be resolved.
The statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-322, may not be a model of
clarity, but the Court is able to determine the legislative intent from the plain language of
the statute. That statute allows a liquidator to recover only "distributions" made to an
affiliate "that controls an insurer." The Liquidator essentially argues that affiliate status
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is the same as control; that is, it is enough that some of the same people served on the
various corporate boards or held management positions. That is not a sufficient
showing, as there is, under the Utah State Insurance Code, no presumption of control
from the fact that an individual or individuals hold a particular position. Utah Code Ann.
§31A-1-301(27)(a).
The Liquidator was granted sweeping powers by § 31A-27-322 for the limited
purpose of recovering distributions made to an "affiliate that controlled the insurer." It
appears that the Legislature used that language advisedly and that the word "controlled"
would not have been included if affiliate status were all it intended to require. That
construction also makes practical sense, as the potential abuses the Liquidator
describes as underlying the statute can arise only if the party receiving the distribution is
in a position of control sufficient to dictate its payment.
Accordingly, the Liquidator would have to demonstrate that LVVP "controlled"
Insurance or Mutual to the extent that it could direct them to make payments to LWP in
order to prevail herein. There is, in the Complaint and the extensive documents
submitted to the court, neither allegation nor evidence that LWP actually "controlled"
either Insurance or Mutual. That these entities may have been affiliates does not, in and
of itself, suffice. Without claim and proof of actual control, the Liquidator is not entitled to
recover money from LWP under Section 31A-27-322 as a matter of law.
While the foregoing determination is sufficient for the Court to grant LWP's Motion
for Summary Judgment and conclude this action in its entirety, the Court deems it
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advisable also to address the issue of whether the payments the Liquidator seeks to
recover under Section 31A-27-322 were "distributions," and thus recoverable in the event
LWP were shown to have controlled Insurance or Mutual. The Court concludes that the
payments to LWP for claims adjusting and administrative services contemporaneously
rendered were not such "distributions."
The Liquidator argues that all payments made to affiliates within five years
preceding the Petition for Liquidation are "distributions" subject to recovery under that
statute. LWP counters that the term "distributions" means dividends or other
distributions of equity, and that it does not include payments for services rendered.
The term "distribution" is not expressly defined in the Utah Insurance Code. It is,
however, defined in the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act as a "direct or indirect
transfer of money or other property . . . in respect to any of [a corporation's] shares . . . in
the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend, a purchase, redemption, or other
acquisition of shares, distribution of indebtedness or otherwise." Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-1 Oa-102(13). Under this provision, "distribution" means a payment or transfer of
money or property which involves dividing, apportioning, or giving out the equity of a
company in respect to shares.
The term "distribution" is used similarly where it appears in the Utah Insurance
Code. For instance, the terms "distribution" and "dividend" are used synonymously in
subsections (4) and (5) of Section 31 A-27-322. There, the word "dividend" in subsection
(5) is used interchangeably with the word "distribution" in subsection (4). The Court also

-9-

notes that the Liquidator's definition of the term "distribution" would result in the
anomalous situation where pure dividends of any size could not be recovered if lawful
and made without reason to know that the dividend might adversely affect the company's
solvency, but small payments for services fairly rendered in the ordinary course of
business would be fully recoverable. The Court can perceive a real potential for abuse in
the distribution of a company's equity arising from situations of affiliate control, but that
potential for abuse is not present in payments by the company for services actually and
fairly rendered.
The Court also notes the contrasting descriptions of payments made in other
sections of the Utah Insurance Code where the term "distribution" is not used. For
instance, Section 31 A-27-320 allows a liquidator to recover "transfers" made within one
year prior to the liquidation filing when the transfer is fraudulent. Further, Section
31A-27-321 allows a liquidator to recover a "preference," which is specifically defined as
"a transfer of any of the property of an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor" within a
certain time period. The words "transfer" and "preference" are clearly used by the
legislature to describe the various payments recoverable under those sections. Their
use indicates that the Legislature intended something else by the term "distribution" in
Section 31A-27-322. The term does not embrace all payments for services rendered,
recovery of which may be available under the limited circumstances described in
Sections 31 A-27-320 or -321. Rather, the term "distribution" embraces only dividends or
other transfers of equity made to a controlling affiliate.

-10-

The evidence before the Court confirms that the monies that the Liquidator seeks
to recover here were not dividends or other transfers of equity; rather, they were
payments made by Insurance and Mutual for services contemporaneously rendered.
Notably, the Liquidator has advanced no argument that the payments to LWP were
excessive, unfair or obtained by fraudulent means. The Court may also infer that the
terms are commercially reasonable from the fact that the Utah Guaranty Association has
continued to utilize LWP's services on the same terms to adjust Wasatch Crest claims
since the filing of the Petitions for Liquidation. The Court need not rely on that inference,
however, because the payments made by Insurance and Mutual to LWP for services
rendered are not "distributions" within the meaning of Section 31A-27-322. Since the
payments from Insurance and Mutual that the Liquidator seeks to recoup from LWP were
not distributions, they are not recoverable under Section 31 A-27-322 as a matter of law.
ORDER
The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to LWP's
motion and that LWP is entitled to summary judgment as prayed. In particular, LWP is
entitled to judgment dismissing the Liquidator's Complaint and each cause of action
therein as a matter of law on the alternative grounds that LWP was not an affiliate "that
controlled the insurer" as required for recovery under Section 31 A-27-322, and that the
payments made to LWP by Insurance and Mutual were not "distributions" within the

-11-
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meaning of that section. Accordingly, the Liquidator' Complaint is hereby dismissed, with
prejudice.
Dated this

;§/

day of S M u i ijtffur 2005.
BY TbfE COURT:
A* -^

„ C/x

'IMOTHY R. HANSONr;
/District Court Jucige " „«**
Approved as to form:

John P. Harrington
Holland & Hart, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Granting LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment to be delivered or mailed, postage
prepaid, as indicated to the following this 31 st day of August 2005:
John P. Harrington
Jennifer L. Lange
Holland & Hart LLP
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hand-delivered
J. Ray Barrios, Jr.
Liquidation Office General Counsel
215 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mailed
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court of Utah.
Cindy GUTIERREZ, Petitioner,
v.
The Honorable Tyrone E. MEDLEY, Respondent.
Melissa Gutierrez, Petitioner,
v.
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Respondent.
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Johnny Augusti Gutierrez, et al., Defendants and
Appellant.
Nos. 970472,970473 and 970476.
Dec. 29, 1998.
Murder defendant moved to quash subpoenas
issued to his wife and daughter on ground that
Subpoena Powers Act did not permit issuance of
subpoenas to aid State in investigation after
criminal charges had been filed. The District Court,
Salt Lake Division, Tyrone Medley, J., denied
motion to quash. Defendant appealed, and wife and
daughter brought original proceeding in which they
petitioned for extraordinary relief. The Supreme
Court, Russon, J., held, on issue of first impression,
that Subpoena Powers Act could not be used after
charges had been filed.

[2] Statutes €==>184
361kl84 Most Cited Cases
In interpreting a statutory act, court is to give effect
to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose
the act was meant to achieve.
[3] District and Prosecuting Attorneys €=>8
13 lk8 Most Cited Cases
Subpoena Powers Act, under which witnesses may
be subpoenaed to aid State in criminal investigation,
can be used only prior to the filing of formal
criminal
charges.
U.C.A.1953,
77-22-1,
77-22-2(l)(a),(2)(a).
*913 John D. O'Connell, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Cindy Gutierrez.
Rebecca C. Hyde, Salt Lake City, for Melissa
Gutierrez.
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Judge
Medley.
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Christine Soltis, Asst.
Att'y Gen., E. Neal Gunnarson, Barbara J. Byrne,
Bel-Ami De Montreux, Salt Lake City, for the State.

Ordered accordingly.

James C. Bradshaw, Salt Lake City, for Johnny
Gutierrez.

Stewart, J., filed concurring opinion.

RUSSON, Justice:

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €=>l 134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
The proper interpretation and application of a
statute is a question of law which Supreme Court
reviews for correctness, affording no deference to
the district court's legal conclusion.
[2] Statutes €==>181(1)

Johnny Gutierrez, his wife Cindy Gutierrez, and his
daughter Melissa Gutierrez challenge the Third
District Court's order denying a motion to quash
subpoenas issued to Cindy and Melissa Gutierrez
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2. We
reverse and remand.
FACTS
On or about August 5, 1996, Roberto Huerta was
shot and killed during a gun battle at the home of

) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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defendant Johnny Gutierrez. Both Cindy and
Melissa Gutierrez were at the home at the time of
the shooting. Both were interviewed briefly at the
scene and were told that a homicide detective would
contact them later to obtain a statement concerning
their observations.
When a detective later
contacted them, Cindy and Melissa refused to
cooperate.
On August 7, 1996, a criminal information was
filed against Johnny Gutierrez and several others,
[FN1] charging them with murder. *914 Following
a preliminary hearing, defendants were bound over
to stand trial.
FN1. The other defendants are Lupe
Najera, Gilbert Najera, and Steven Najera.
On August 15, 1997, one year after charges had
been brought and one week before the scheduled
trial, the district court issued an order, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 to -5 (the "Subpoena
Powers Act"), permitting the State to subpoena
Cindy and Melissa Gutierrez to provide sworn
statements "to aid the State in its pre-trial
investigation of the killing of Roberto Huerta."
Johnny Gutierrez moved to quash the subpoenas on
the ground that the Subpoena Powers Act did not
permit such subpoenas after the filing of formal
criminal charges. Cindy and Melissa Gutierrez
also opposed the subpoenas. On September 18,
1997, the court denied the motion to quash, ruling
that the Subpoena Powers Act was not limited to the
period of investigation preceding the filing of
criminal charges but could be utilized during 2iny
period of the State's pretrial investigation of a
criminal case. In support of its ruling, the court
stated that the language of the Subpoena Powers
Act did not specifically limit its use to only the
period of investigation preceding the filing of
charges. The court further supported its decision
by citing to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22b-l, entitled
"Immunity granted to witness." That section
states in part:
A witness who refuses, or is likely to refuse, on
the
basis
of
his
privilege
against
self-incrimination to testify or provide evidence
or information in a criminal investigation,
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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including a grand jury investigation or
prosecution of a criminal case, ... may be
compelled to testify or provide evidence or
information by any of the following, after being
granted use immunity...
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22b-l(l)(a) (Supp.1998)
(emphasis added). The district court reasoned that
because section 77-22b-l describes a criminal
investigation to include a criminal prosecution, it
followed that a criminal investigation under the
Subpoena Powers Act included that period of
investigation during prosecution, and thus the
subpoena power could be used after the filing of
criminal charges.
Johnny Gutierrez appeals the denial of his motion
to quash the subpoenas, and Cindy and Melissa
Gutierrez petition for extraordinary relief against
the Honorable Tyrone E Medley, also challenging
the denial of the motion. The Gutierrezes argue
that the language of the Subpoena Powers Act, its
legislative
history,
and
important
policy
considerations all compel the conclusion that the
Act cannot be used after criminal charges have been
filed.
The Gutierrezes also argue that the
subpoenas should be quashed because the State did
not request or obtain authorization from the district
court to conduct a Subpoena Powers Act
investigation, as is required. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-22-2(1) (1995).
The State responds that the Subpoena Powers Act
is not limited to the time prior to the filing of
charges, but can be used during any period of the
State's pretrial investigation. The State also argues
that the procedures of the Act were complied with
because the district court found that there was good
cause for the investigation.
Thus, the principal issue before us is whether the
Subpoena Powers Act can be used to subpoena
witnesses after formal criminal charges have been
filed. Because we hold that the Subpoena Powers
Act cannot be used after charges have been filed
and we reverse the district court on that ground, we
need not consider whether the State complied with
the procedures of the Act in this case. [FN2]
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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FN2. The State also argues that defendant
Johnny Gutierrez lacks standing to
challenge the subpoenas inasmuch as he is
not the subject of the subpoena and he has
not otherwise put forth evidence that an
exception in his case should apply. See
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah
1991); Society of Prof. Journalists v.
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987).
Because the petitions of Cindy and Melissa
Gutierrez raise the same issue Johnny
Gutierrez raises,
i.e., whether
the
Subpoena Powers Act can be used after
charges have been filed, we will consider
the merits of the issue without addressing
whether, under the facts of this case,
Johnny Gutierrez lacks standing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] The proper interpretation and application of a
statute is a question of law which *915 we review
for correctness, affording no deference to the
district court's legal conclusion. See Salt Lake
Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019
(Utah 1995).
ANALYSIS
Upon a showing of good cause and the approval of
the district court, the Subpoena Powers Act permits
the attorney general, the county attorney, or the
district attorney (the "state's attorneys") to conduct
a criminal investigation. Utah Code Ann. §
77-22-2(1 )(a). Once such an investigation is
approved by the court, the state's attorneys may
subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony and
the production of physical evidence. Id. § 7722-2(2)(a). The state's attorneys are required to
disclose, among other things, that the subpoena is
issued in aid of a criminal investigation, the general
subject matter of the investigation, that the witness
has the privilege to refuse to answer any question
that may result in self-incrimination, and that the
witness has the right to have counsel present during
interrogation. Id. § 77-22-2(3) & (4). If the witness
is suspected of committing the crime that is under
investigation, the state's attorneys must inform the
witness of that status, as well as the nature of the
charges under consideration against him. Id. §
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

77-22-2(5).
Furthermore, upon showing a
reasonable likelihood that the public release of the
identity of the witness or the substance of the
evidence obtained would threaten harm to a person
or impede the investigation, the court may order the
identity of the witness and the evidence obtained to
be kept secret. The court may also order the
witness, under appropriate circumstances, not to
disclose the substance of his or her testimony to
others. Id. § 77-22-2(7).
While the Gutierrezes and the State do not dispute
that the state's attorneys can conduct an
investigation under the Act in which they have the
power to subpoena witnesses and compel their
testimony, they do dispute when that power may be
exercised. The Gutierrezes claim that the subpoena
power can be used only prior to the filing of
criminal charges.
Thus, according to the
Gutierrezes, an investigation under the Act is
limited to the preindictment investigation. The
State, however, draws no distinction between an
investigation prior to the filing of charges and an
investigation after the filing of charges. Thus, the
State claims that when it is authorized to conduct a
"criminal investigation" under the Act it may use
the subpoena power any time during its pretrial
investigation.
[2] Therefore, we need to determine when the
subpoena power can be used. In other words, we
need to decide when a criminal investigation, for
purposes of the Subpoena Powers Act, begins and
ends. In interpreting a statutory act, we seek to
give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of
the purpose the act was meant to achieve. See
Mariemont v. White City Water Improvement Dist.,
958 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1998). In doing so, we
look to the plain language of the act and consider
the act in its entirety, " 'harmoniz[ing] its provisions
in accordance with the legislative intent and
purpose.' " Id. at 225 (citations omitted). If there
is ambiguity in the act's plain language, "we then
seek guidance from the legislative history and
relevant policy considerations." Id. at 224-25
(citations omitted).
[3] We conclude that the Subpoena Powers Act is
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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ambiguous as to when the subpoena power may be
used. On the one hand, the legislature soughl to
"grant subpoena powers in aid of criminal
investigations." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22- 1. As
the State points out, this phrase is not specifically
limited to the investigation prior to the filing of
charges, and it is axiomatic that the State
investigates criminal cases both before and after
charges have been filed. On the other hand, the
Act when read as a whole seems to suggest that a
criminal investigation, for purposes of the Act, ends
with the filing of criminal charges. For example,
the Act states in part that (1) it is necessary "to
provide a method of keeping information gained
from investigations secret both to protect the
innocent and to prevent criminal suspects from
having access to information prior to prosecution,"
id § 77- 22-1 (emphasis added); (2) if the state's
attorneys have evidence that the particular witness
"has committed a crime that is under investigation,
*916 [they] shall inform that witness in person prior
to interrogation of that witness's target status and of
the nature of the charges under consideration
against him," id § 77-22-2(5) (emphasis added);
and (3) "[t]he subpoena need not disclose the names
of possible defendants;' id § 77-22- 2(6)(a)
(emphasis added).
The use of language such as "prior to prosecution,"
"target status," "charges under consideration," and
"possible defendants," implies that the Act is to be
used prior to formal charges. In our prior cases, we
have taken this view, although we have never
directly ruled on the issue See Parsons v Barnes,
871 P.2d 516, 519 n. 3 (Utah 1994) (emphasizing
that "[a] county prosecutor proceeds under section
77-22-2 prior to commencing prosecution of a
defendant or defendants"); In re Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 652 (Utah 1988)
(stating that the Act is intended to "enable the state's
attorneys to gather sufficient evidence with which to
initiate
formal
adjudicative
crimmal
proceedings"). But see id at 666 (Stewart,
Assoc.C.J., dissenting) (stating that "the Act allows
prosecutors to engage in criminal discovery even
after a formal charge has been filed"). Having
found the Act ambiguous as to when the state's
attorneys may use the subpoena power, we look to
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

the legislative history to infer the legislative intent.
The Subpoena Powers Act was sponsored by
Representative M. Byron Fisher in 1971 and was
enacted that same year. See Utah Code Ann. §§
77-45-19 to -21 (1971). The Act was then
recodified in 1980 as Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 to
-3.
In
1988, this court addressed
the
constitutionality of the Act. See In re Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988). In that
case, the Act was upheld as constitutional, but only
after this court interpreted the Act as "incorporating
a number of substantive and procedural
safeguards." Id at 636 In 1989, the legislature
amended the Act to specifically include those
safeguards.
During debate of the proposed Act in the House of
Representatives in 1971, Representative Fisher
stated:
The purpose of the bill is to permit the
investigation of criminal activities and suspect
crimes by [the state's attorneys] by ... allowing
them to subpoena witnesses and to bring people
before them for the purpose of obtaining
information for the filing of criminal complaint
This action would take place prior to the filing of
complaints and would not necessarily come
about in the filing oj a criminal complaint or
culminate in that activity
Floor Debate, Statemenl of Rep M. Byron Fisher,
39th Utah Leg., Gen Sess. (Feb. 17, 1971)
(emphasis added).
Later that same day,
Representative Fisher also stated, "With the
subpoena power, [the state's attorneys] could obtain
... evidence and if it showed what is believed is
occurring, then the action could be brought and a
complaint filed" Id (emphasis added).
On
reintroducing the bill the next day to continue the
debate, Representative Fisher stated that the
proposed Act "is the subpoena powers granting to
the [state's attorneys] an opportunity to obtain
evidence by investigation without the filing of
complaint for the determination of whether
criminal complaints should be filed" Floor Debate,
Statement of Rep. M. Byron Fisher, 39th Utah Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Feb. 18, 1971) (emphasis added). As
this history makes clear, the subpoena power was
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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intended to be used prior to the filing of criminal
charges.
This conclusion is further supported by the
legislature's
amendments
in
1989.
Those
amendments constituted a significant overhauling of
the Act, which incorporated the substantive and
procedural safeguards read into the Act in In re
Criminal Investigation. In that case, this court also
rejected the claims that the Act violated a
defendant's constitutional rights to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses. In doing so, this
court relied heavily on its view that investigations
under the Act are "preliminary investigative
proceedings" which "only lead[ ] to the filing of
criminal charges." In re Criminal Investigation,
754 P.2d at 652. Thus, at the time of the 1989
amendments, the legislature knew that this court
viewed the use of the subpoena power as occurring
only prior to the filing of formal charges. Because
the legislature did not amend the Act to specifically
state that the subpoena power could be *917 used
after the filing of charges, we conclude that this
court's view that it could not be so used is consistent
with legislative intent.
See Christensen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah
1982) ("A well-established canon of statutory
construction provides that where a legislature
amends a portion of a statute but leaves other
portions unamended ... the legislature is presumed
to have been satisfied with prior judicial
constructions of the unchanged portions of the
statute and to have adopted them as consistent with
its own intent."). [FN3]
FN3. Furthermore, we note that had the
legislature clearly stated that the Act
applied after the filing of charges without
adding
other
substantive
provisions
permitting a defendant to present evidence,
confront the witness, and engage in
reciprocal discovery, the Act might have
then been of questionable constitutional
validity. See In re Criminal Investigation,
754 P.2d at 650-52; id. at 666 (Stewart,
Assoc.C.J.,
dissenting);
Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37
L.Ed.2d82(1973).
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the
Subpoena Powers Act can be used by the State only
prior to the filing of formal criminal charges. We
therefore grant the petitions of Cindy and Melissa
Gutierrez for extraordinary relief and order the
district court to quash the subpoenas.
Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
DURHAM, and Justice ZIMMERMAN concur in
Justice RUSSON's opinion.
STEWART, Justice, concurring:
I concur with the majority in holding that the
Subpoena Powers Act does not permit prosecutors
to take discovery depositions after the filing of an
information. I submit that a contrary construction
of the Act would raise significant due process issues.
Furthermore, given the many recent revelations of
oppressive prosecutorial abuses by various federal
special prosecutors under the federal Independent
Counsel Act, [FN1] which vests special prosecutors
with broad inquisitional powers directed at the
person, I again reiterate the objections I stated with
respect to the Utah Act and this Court's opinion in
In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 659-66
(Utah 1988) (Stewart, Assoc.C.J., dissenting).
That opinion sustained the constitutionality of the
Act with respect to its preinformation ex parte
inquisitorial procedures. I pointed out in that
dissent the vast potential, if not temptation, for
prosecutorswhether
well-meaning,
unduly
zealous, or partisan-to crush personal liberties and
rights of privacy. I repeat what I stated in my
dissent in In re Criminal Investigation:
FN 1.
Independent
Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§
591-99.
I believe the Subpoena Powers Act (the "Act") is
unconstitutional on its face. The United States
Supreme Court has observed, in language which I
believe is applicable to this Act, "A general,
roving, offensive,
inquisitorial, compulsory
investigation, conducted by a commission without
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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any allegations, upon no fixed principles, and
governed by no rules of law, or of evidence, and
no restrictions except its own will, or caprice is
unknown to our constitution and laws; and such
an inquisition would be destructive to the rights
of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny." Jones
v. S.KC, 298 U.S. 1, 27, 56 S.Ct. 654, 662, 80
L.Ed. 1015 (1935) (quoting In re Pacific Ry.
Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.Cal.1887)).
This
language applies in essential respects to the
powers the Legislature has sought to confer on
county prosecutors and the Attorney General
The Subpoena Powers Act vastly extends the
compulsory inquisitorial power of state and
county prosecutors over both citizens and
government officials. Anglo-American history is
fraught with examples of abuses of similar
powers by government officials.
754 P.2d at 659-60.
972 P.2d 913, 359 Utah Adv. Rep. 46
END OF DOCUMENT
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C
Supreme Court of Utah.
Claudia HILL, by and through her Guardian ad
Litem, Mary Hill Fogel, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
GRAND CENTRAL, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 12082.
Nov. 25, 1970.
Complaint for libel. The Second District Court,
Weber County, John F. Wahlquist, J., entered a
judgment dismissing the complaint and the plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that
where trial judge overruled motion of defendant to
dismiss complaint, he had performed the full
measure of his duties, and he acted improperly
when he entered order reciting that upon failure of
plaintiff to produce evidence to support allegations
of actual malice within 30 days defendant would be
granted a summary judgment and then entered a
summary judgment.

307Ak306.1 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 307Ak306, 127k79 Discovery)
Where answers to interrogatories are to be used to
establish fact, the answers can be used only as
admissions against party making them.
[3] Pleading €==>360
302k360 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 302k360( 16))
[3] Pretrial Procedure €==>691
307Ak691 Most Cited Cases
Where trial judge overruled motion of defendant to
dismiss libel complaint, he had performed the full
measure of his duties, and he acted improperly
when he entered order reciting that upon failure of
plaintiff to produce evidence to support allegations
of actual malice within 30 days defendant would be
granted a summary judgment and then entered a
summary judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
12(b)(6).
**150 *122 Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for
plaintiff-appellant.

Judgment of dismissal reversed with directions.

Rex J. Hanson, Leonard H. Russon, Salt Lake City,
for defendant-respondent.

Henriod, J., concurred in result.

**151 ELLETT, Justice:

West Headnotes
[1] Judgment €=>183
228kl83 Most Cited Cases
When motion to dismiss is accompanied by
affidavits it may be treated as a motion for summary
judgment, but court should not on its own initiative
try to convert a motion for dismissal into one for
summary judgment, as court has no more right to
ask plaintiff how he will establish his claim than he
has to require defendant to state what his defense
will be. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b) (6).
[2] Pretrial Procedure €=^306.1
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

The appellant appeals from the granting of a
summary judgment against her in her action for
libel.
After she filed her complaint wherein she alleged
malice on the part of the defendant, the defendant
without answering moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),
U.R.C.P.
The order of the court was unique:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED as follows:
1. That defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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complaint be denied.
2. That plaintiff be granted 30 days from the date
of this hearing to produce evidence to support her
allegations of actual malice.
3. That upon failure of the plaintiff to produce
evidence to support her allegations of actual
malice, within 30 days, defendant will be granted
a summary judgment upon defendant's motion for
the same.
*123 Thereafter the defendant moved for summary
judgment. Interrogatories were propounded by the
plaintiff and answered by the defendant and an
affidavit was filed by plaintiffs attorney. Based
upon the pleadings, the affidavit of plaintiffs
counsel and defendant's answers to interrogatories
the court granted the motion for summary judgment.
We think at a pretrial conference, after the issues
are stated by way of pleadings on both sides, it is
proper for the court to make inquiry as to what
evidence will support a contention and to eliminate
those issues which cannot be supported by
competent proof. However, we do not think il is
proper for a court to require a plaintiff to state what
proof he will produce on an issue which has not
even been raised.

there be any such disputed issues of fact, they
cannot be resolved by summary judgment even
when the parties properly bring the motion before
the court.
[2] In any case where answers to interrogatories are
to be used to establish a fact, they can only be used
as admissions against the party making them. They
are objectionable when offered by the party making
them because they are self-serving and not subject
to cross-examination.
[3] The trial judge performed the full measure of
his duty when he overruled the defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. He was in
error in dismissing the complaint as he did.
The judgment of dismissal is reversed with
directions to reinstate the complaint and to proceed
with the case pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Costs are awarded to the appellant.
CROCKETT,
C.J.,
and
TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

CALLISTER

and

HENRIOD, J., concurs in the result.
[1] True it is that when a motion to dismiss is
accompanied by affidavits it may be treated as a
motion for summary judgment, yet the court should
not on his own initiative try to convert a motion for
dismissal into one for summary judgment. He has
no more right to ask the plaintiff how he will
establish his claim than he has to require the
defendant to state what its defense will be. It would
have been highly improper for the court, on the
motion to dismiss, to have given the defendant 30
days to present proof as to the truth of the alleged
statement or as to the lack of malice.

25 Utah 2d 121,477 P.2d 150
END OF DOCUMENT

The answers to the interrogatories in this case were
apparently taken as being true since the summary
judgment was based upon them, at least in part.
Summary judgment is never used to determine
what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether
there are any material issues of fact in dispute If
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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[2] Evidence 157 €=>91
United States District Court,N.D. Georgia,Atlanta
Division.
In re CHICKEN ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
Civ. A. No. C-74-2454-A.
March 22, 1982.
Subsidiaries of a defendant in chicken antitrust
litigation filed a motion for clarification, asking the
court to rule that they were entitled to recover as
members of settlement classes, and asking the court
to rule that they had opted out of the class
settlement in the event court found them not entitled
to class membership because of affiliation with or
ownership by their parent. The District Court,
O'Kelley, J., held that three subsidiaries of a
defendant were not entitled to participate in the
settlement fund, since they were not sufficiently
independent of their parent to warrant participation;
they "shared" officers and directors, raising a
strong inference of parental domination, and they
were completely owned by their parent.
Order in accordance with opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Corporations 101 €=^1.6(1)
101 Corporations
1011 Incorporation and Organization
101kl.6
Particular
Occasions
for
Determining Corporate Entity
101kl.6(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Three subsidiaries of a defendant in chicken
antitrust litigation were not entitled to participate in
settlement fund, since they were not sufficiently
independent of their parent to warrant participation;
they "shared" officers and directors, raising a
strong inference of parental domination, and they
were completely owned by their parent.

157 Evidence
157III Burden of Proof
157k91 k. Party Asserting or Denying
Existence of Facts. Most Cited Cases
Generally, burden of proof of disputed facts rests on
party affirming the existence of the facts and
claiming rights and benefits from their existence.
[3] Corporations 101 €=^1.5(3)
101 Corporations
1011 Incorporation and Organization
101kl.5 Separate Corporations, Disregarding
Separate Entities
101kl.5(3) k. Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations. Most Cited Cases
While full ownership alone would be insufficient to
show that a subsidiary was not independent of its
parent, it is a factor highly indicative of control by
the parent.
[4] Corporations 101 €=>1.5(3)
101 Corporations
1011 Incorporation and Organization
101kl.5 Separate Corporations, Disregarding
Separate Entities
101kl.5(3) k. Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations. Most Cited Cases
"Shared" officers and directors raise a strong
inference of domination of subsidiary by its parent
and indicate "common direction and supervision."
*1006 ORDER
O'KELLEY, District Judge.
Presently pending before the court are two motions
by KFC FN1 and a stipulation filed by KFC and the
Settlement Administration Committee modifying
the two previous motions. KFC is a putative class
claimant in the settlement fund established in this

> 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://web2.westlaw.coirVprin^^

n&

^/1^/onn^;

560F.Supp. 1006

Page 2

560F.Supp. 1006
(Cite as: 560 F.Supp. 1006)
protracted antitrust litigation. In KFC's first
motion, KFC moved for clarification, asking the
court to rule that KFC was entitled to recover as a
member of two settlement classes, Class 111(b) and
Class IV, made up respectively of (1) restaurants
and fast food franchisees, and (2) wholesale
distributors. In the same motion, KFC asked the
court to rule that KFC had opted out of the class
settlement in the event the court should find that
KFC was not entitled to class membership because
of affiliation with or ownership by a defendant.
The second motion by KFC was a 60(b) motion,
filed after final judgments were entered on March
19, 1980 setting up the settlement *1007 classes.
Final judgments were entered before the court had
ruled on the KFC motion for clarification. KFC
subsequently filed the 60(b) motion for relief from
the final judgments, apparently having read the
judgments to deny class membership to KFC.

FN1. "KFC," as used in the two motions,
is a collective term referring to KFC
Corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary, KFC National Management
Company.
On June 11, 1981, this court entered an order
addressing the motion for clarification and the 60(b)
motion. In that order, the court concluded that the
60(b) motion was premature since its resolution
would depend upon a ruling on KFC's class status
The court accordingly declined to rule on the 60(b)
motion. The court declared, "KFC unquestionably
is not a member of Settlement Class 111(b)." The
court went on to say, however, that the court would
defer ruling on whether KFC had effectively opted
out until such time as the parties had fully briefed
the issue.
KFC and the Settlement Administration Committee
have recently filed a stipulation addressing the
status of KFC. The stipulation narrows the issues
presented by the two KFC motions to the question
whether KFC Corporation and two of its
subsidiaries may participate in the settlement as
members of Classes 111(b) and IV. In the
stipulation the parties agree that KFC Corporation
(KFC) is a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Heublein, Inc., that KFC National Management
Company (Management) is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of KFC, and that Commonwealth Food
Services, Inc. (CFI), now dissolved, was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Management. The parties
agree for the purposes of the motions that KFC,
Management, and CFI filed timely proofs of claim
to participate as members of Classes 111(b) and IV,
and have elected not to opt out of the settlement.
KFC and Management seek to participate in the
settlement fund as purchasers of broilers sold to
consumers through Kentucky Fried Chicken stores
owned and operated by KFC and Management.™2
CFI sets forth a claim to participate as a wholesale
distributor,FN3 stating that during the relevant
period,™4 CFI purchased to resell at wholesale
approximately 6,638,590.23 pounds of broilers
from processors other than defendant Heublein, Inc.
Finally, the parties agree that certain documents
which were attached to the response of the
settlement committee to KFC's 60(b) motion
pertaining to the corporate relationships among the
three claimants are accurate. The court will treat
this stipulation as a modification of the motion to
clarify. The court will therefore grant the motion
to clarify and will determine the eligibility of the
claimants to participate.

FN2. Class III is comprised of hotel,
motel, restaurant, fast-food franchisee, and
institutional feeder claimants.
FN3. Class IV is made up of wholesale
distributors.
FN4. The relevant period was January 1,
1970 through October 31., 1977.
[1] In the final judgments entered March 19, 1980,
this court restricted the right of any defendants or
defendant affiliates to recover. The restriction
stated:
(1) all named party defendants, their affiliates, and
subsidiaries, to the extent that they are not legally
independent
and
autonomous
from
their
parent-defendant or affiliate-defendant, shall be
excluded from participating as claimants under any
of the settlement classes herein;
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(2) all legally independent and autonomous
subsidiaries and/or affiliates of all named
defendants herem not expressly excluded from
settlement Classes I-IV may participate as either
direct purchaser claimants under settlement Class V
or as wholesaler-distributor claimants under
settlement Class IV as appropriate whether or not
they are controlled or owned in whole or m part by
their parent-defendant or affiliate-defendant,
(3) no legally independent and autonomous
subsidiaries and/or affiliates of all named
defendants herein who are permitted to participate
as claimants m these settlements under part (2)
supra shall be permitted to recover for purchases
from their parent-defendant or affiliate-defendant
Accordingly,
only
defendant-affiliates
or
defendant-subsidiaries that can show that *1008
their corporation is "legally autonomous and
independent" of the defendant parent/affiliate may
participate as claimants This restriction was
imposed to preserve the settlement fund for truly
adverse entities who were harmed by the alleged
wrongdoing by defendants and to prevent reduction
of the settlement fund by defendants through their
subsidiaries and affiliates in violation of obvious
intent of the settlement agreement Smce all three
claimants here are subsidiaries of defendant,
Heublem, Inc , the court is now called upon, for the
first time, to define its "independent and
autonomous" standard
In the court's view, factors discussed in cases
considermg whether to disregard the corporate
fiction are also relevant to the question whether a
subsidiary is sufficiently independent of its parent
to warrant permitting the subsidiary to participate m
a settlement fund partially contributed by its parent
In Markow v Alcock, 356 F2d 194 (5th Cir 1966),
in discussmg whether to disregard the corporate
fiction, the court listed these factors
(1) are the formal legal requirements observed, (2)
is the "subsidiary" adequately financed or does the "
parent" furnish the capitalization , (3) by whom
are the salaries and expenses paid, (4) do the
directors of the "subsidiary" act m the independent
and primary interest of the "parent," (5) are the two
operations so integrated through the commingling
of funds, interactivities and common direction and
© 2006 Thomson/West No

supervision that they should be considered as one
enterprise, and (6) generally, is one corporation so
organized and controlled and its business conducted
in such a manner as to make it merely an agency,
instrumentality, adjunct or alter ego of the other?
Markow v Alcock, 356 F2d 197-98 (citations
omitted) See also Andrew Martin Marine Corp v
Stork-Werkspoor Diesel, 480 F Supp
1270
(ED La 1979) (applying the Markow factors) and
Johnson v Warnaco, lnc, 426 F Supp 44
(SD Miss 1976) (applying similar factors derived
from Fish v East, 114 F 2d 177 (10th Cir 1940))
In Luckett v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 618 F2d 1373
(10th Cir 1980), the court cited the following
factors m deciding whether to disregard the
corporate status of a subsidiary (1) the parent owns
all the stock, (2) both have common directors and
officers, (3) the parent finances the subsidiary, (4)
the parent causes the subsidiary's incorporation, (5)
the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital, (6)
the parent pays salaries or expenses of the
subsidiary, (7) the subsidiary has no business
except with its parent or subsidiary corporation or
no assets except those transferred by its parent or
subsidiary, (8) directors and officers do not act
independently in the interests of the subsidiary, (9)
formal legal requirements of the subsidiary such as
keeping corporate minutes are not observed, (10)
distinctions between the parent and the subsidiary
and subsidiary and its subsidiary are disregarded or
confused, (11) subsidiaries do not have full boards
of directors
618 F 2d at 1378, n 4
[2] While many of the factors outlined in these
cases are also probative on the question of
mdependence and autonomy of a subsidiary from its
parent, the court will require a considerably lesser
showing for its "independent and autonomous"
standard than is required when disregard of the
corporate entity is sought The court strongly feels
that only truly adverse entities should be permitted
to participate in the settlement fund Otherwise,
the settlement fund could be dissipated in violation
of the obvious intent of the settling plaintiffs, and
future antitrust settlements would be discouraged
Furthermore, in the view of the court, the burden of
to Ong U S Govt Works
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proof on the "legally independent and autonomous"
standard belongs upon the subsidiary corporation
seeking to recover as a claimant. Generally, the bu
rden of proof of disputed facts rests on the party
affirming the existence of the facts and claiming
rights and benefits from their existence. Marcum v.
United States, 452 F.2d 36 (5th Cir.1971). In this
case, the subsidiaries seeking to recover as
claimants are in the better position to present to the
*1009 court facts showing their independence from
defendant Heublein, Inc., and they are the parties
seeking to participate in the settlement fund
partially set up by their parent corporation.
Therefore, the court finds that the burden rests
properly on the subsidiaries to show their
independence from the parent.
In the June 11, 1981 order, the court declared
without discussion that KFC was not a member of
settlement Class 111(b). That order dealt with "KFC
" in the aggregate, which was comprised of KFC
and Management. The order did not address KFC's
claim to membership in Class IV, nor were the
claims of CFI discussed in that order.™5 The
court is not inclined, however, to alter its previous
ruling excluding KFC and Management from
participation in Class 111(b). Furthermore, since the
court finds that KFC, Management and CFI have
failed to show that they are legally independent and
autonomous of parent/defendant Heublein, Inc.,
none may recover as claimant members of either
Class 111(b) or Class IV.
FN5. CFI's claims were not raised in the
initial motion by KFC.
[3][4] The parties stated in their stipulation that the
documents labeled Exhibits D through I and
attached
to the
Settlement
Administration
Committee's brief in opposition to the 60(b) motion
were authentic. The court has studied these
documents and finds that they reveal that the
relationship among Heublein, Inc., KFC, and
Management was not sufficiently autonomous and
independent to permit these subsidiaries to recover
as claimants. The stipulation shows that each
subsidiary was "wholly owned." KFC had been
publicly owned until it was acquired by Heublein in
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

1971. After the acquisition, Heublein owned all of
the KFC slock. While full ownership alone would
be insufficient to show that the subsidiaries were
not independent, it is a factor highly indicative of
control by the parent. See Luckett v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., supra. Furthermore, the exhibits
reveal that several officers and directors of
defendant Heublein, Inc., were also officers and
directors of KFC, Management, and other
subsidiaries of Management. These "shared"
officers and directors raise a strong inference of
domination by the parent and indicate the "common
direction and supervision" cited as a relevant factor
in Markow v. Alcock, supra. The shared directors
and complete ownership alone would convince the
court that for purposes of claiming a portion of a
settlement fund partially contributed by defendant
Heublein, Inc., KFC and Management are too
entangled with Heublein
to permit their
participation. The court need not rest its decision
on these factors alone, however. The documents
filed by the Committee show that Barry Rowles and
Mike Miles, officers and directors of KFC and
Management, reported to Hicks Waldron, president
of Heublein. This
indicates control and
supervision of KFC by Heublein, Inc. Exhibit D
shows that in answer to a question concerning
frequency of meetings of the boards of directors and
whether minutes were maintained, the KFC legal
department supplied this response: "Meetings of
the boards of KFC and Management seldom, if
ever, were held. Necessary action was taken by
consent resolution." This failure to hold board
meetings indicates a disregard of the formality of
the corporate entity, a factor mentioned in both
Markow v. Alcock, supra, and Luckett v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., supra and, further, that the boards were
not actual functioning bodies. Another document
also demonstrates an intermingling of authority. A
memorandum dated July 9, 1979, from David M.
Stigler, Assistant General Counsel for Heublein,
Inc., to Michael J. McGraw, Vice-President/General
Counsel for KFC, clearly shows cooperation
between the legal departments of KFC and
Heublein in directing their franchisees to prepare
claims in this litigation. While the court is hesitant
to read too much into a single memorandum, the
conclusion that an identity of interest existed is
inescapable. In short, several items of information
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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supplied to the court show that free interchange of
information between Heublein and KFC occurred.
*1010 The court can only conclude, in the
absence of any evidence which would demonstrate
independence, and in the face of several items
indicating control by Heublein, that neither KFC
nor Management are independent or autonomous of
Heublein, Inc., for purposes of participating in the
claimant universe.™6
FN6. The court expresses no opinion
whether the corporate status of the
subsidiaries should be disregarded, and is
only deciding that the subsidiaries are so
closely related to a defendant in this action
that they are barred from recovering as
plaintiffs. The court would presume that a
greater showing of inter-relation and
intermingling than was made for this
purpose would be required to cause
disregard of the corporate entity for other
purposes.
Where CFI is concerned, there is more of a close
question since the court has been supplied with only
scant information about its status. CFI is a wholly
owned subsidiary, however, and its kinship to
Heublein, Inc., derives from two other wholly
owned subsidiaries whose status the court has found
non-autonomous. Therefore, in view of the failure
of CFI to come forward with evidence to show its
legal independence and autonomy from Heublein,
the court will find CFI barred as a claimant as well.
In summary, the court previously ruled that the
60(b) motion was premature. By the terms of this
order and the stipulation filed by the parties, it is
now moot and will therefore be denied. The KFC
motion for clarification as modified by the
stipulation is granted. The court holds that neither
KFC, Management nor CFI are entitled to
participate in the Settlement Fund.
D.C.Ga.,1982.
In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation
560 F.Supp. 1006
END OF DOCUMENT
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Briefs and Other Related Documents
Supreme Court of Utah.
In re Marriage of Juanita GONZALEZ and Martin
Briceno.
Juanita Gonzalez aka Juanita L. Briceno, Petitioner
and Appellant.
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance
Company, Intervenor and Appellee.
No. 970521.
Jan. 28,2000.
Rehearing Denied May 31, 2000.
Insured's alleged common law wife filed petition
for adjudication of marriage to insured, who had set
fire to her home, and insurer was permitted to
intervene upon petitioner's stipulation. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone E.
Medley, J., granting summary judgment in favor of
insurer on statute of limitations grounds, and denied
petitioner's motions to dismiss insurer's complaint in
intervention and to amend her complaint. Petitioner
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, A.C.J.,
held that proceeding for adjudication of marriage
was required to be commenced, but not completed,
within one year of termination of relationship
between alleged common law wife and insured.

De novo standard of review applies when
intervention as of right is before the Supreme Court
on appeal. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 24(a).
[2] Statutes €=>181(1)
361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases
[2] Statutes €=^184
361kl84 Most Cited Cases
In construing a statute, the Supreme Court's aim is
to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.
[3] Statutes €=^181(1)
361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases
[3] Statutes €==>184
36Ik 184 Most Cited Cases
[3] Statutes €=^206
361k206 Most Cited Cases
When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning
or application of an act's provisions, an analysis of
the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its
provisions harmonized in accordance with the
legislative intent and purpose.
[4] Statutes €^>183
36Ik 183 Most Cited Cases
[4] Statutes €^>206
361k206 Most Cited Cases

Affirmed in part, but reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Russon, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Howe, C.J., joined.

[4] Statutes C=>208
361k208 Most Cited Cases
In construing a statute, courts will look to the
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of
the statute dealing with the subject.

West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error €==>893(1)
30k893(l) Most Cited Cases
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

[5] Constitutional Law €==>48(1)
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases
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[5] Statutes €=^181(1)
361kl81(l) Most Cited Cases
Courts have a duty to construe a statute whenever
possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and
avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or
infirmities.
[6] Limitation of Actions €==>61
241k61 Most Cited Cases
Proceeding for adjudication of marriage was
required to be commenced, but not completed,
within one year of termination of relationship
between alleged common law wife and husband.
U.C.A.1953, 30-1-4.5(2).
[7] Limitation of Actions €=^61
241k61 Most Cited Cases
Statute of limitations applicable to petitions for
adjudication of marriage requires that an action for
adjudication must be filed within a year of the
termination of the relationship. U.C.A.1953,
30-1-4.5(2).
[8] Stipulations €=>18(2)
363kl8(2) Most Cited Cases
Insurer's
intervention,
pursuant
to parties'
stipulation, was properly allowed in action
commenced by insured's alleged common law wife
seeking adjudication of marriage to insured, who
had set fire to her home; insurer's interest in action
was not so speculative so as to preclude alleged
wife from agreeing to have insurer's challenges
adjudicated in determination proceeding.
*1074 Concurring opinion of Zimmerman, J., with
Chief Justice and one
Justice concurring.
*1075 Tamara J. Hauge, Salt Lake City, for
Gonzalez.
Robert L. Stevens, Salt Lake City, for Metropolitan.
SUMMARY
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice:
**1 Petitioner Juanita L. Gonzalez appeals a
decision of the district court granting summary
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

judgment in favor of intervenor Metropolitan
Property
& Casualty
Insurance
Company
("Metropolitan") and denying her motions to
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention
and to amend her complaint. This is an action
based on Ms. Gonzalez's petition for adjudication of
marriage, brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
30-1-4.5 (Supp.1998), regarding her relationship
with Martin Briceno. [FN1] Metropolitan moved to
intervene. Ms. Gonzalez contested the intervention
but ultimately stipulated to it. Metropolitan moved
for summary judgment on the ground that Ms.
Gonzalez failed to complete the adjudication of her
petition within the statutory time period. This
appeal followed. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings, but note the following
divergence in the justices' separate opinions
concerning the issues: (1) as to the interpretation of
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.1988)
("ONE-YEAR
LIMITATION"),
this opinion
reflects a majority view, being concurred in by
Justices Stewart and Zimmerman; (2) as to the
propriety of the trial court's refusal to dismiss
Metropolitan
as
an
intervenor
below
("INTERVENTION"), Justice Zimmerman concurs
in that portion of Justice Russon's opinion, joined
by Chief Justice Howe, but only to the extent it
holds that intervention pursuant to the stipulation
was properly permitted.
FN1. The 1998 version of the statute is
exactly the same as the statute originally
passed in 1987.

BACKGROUND
**2 According to the petition for adjudication of
marriage (the "petition"), Ms. Gonzalez and Mr.
Briceno began living together in September, 1983.
On October 21, 1995, Briceno set fire to Gonzalez's
home. Ms. Gonzalez alleges that her relationship
with Briceno "terminated" on that day. At the time,
Briceno had insurance throu^ti Metropolitan. If
Gonzalez was Briceno's spouse at the time of the
fire, she would have a claim under the Metropolitan
policy. Presumably, premiums were calculated on
this basis.
**3 On February 5, 1996, Metropolitan filed a
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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motion to intervene pursuant to rule 24(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Metropolitan
asserted that Briceno had no reason to contest the
recognition of the alleged marriage and that
Metropolitan's
interest
was
therefore
not
represented in the action. In its memorandum in
support of the motion, Metropolitan stated that it
moved to intervene because Gonzalez had filed the
petition "to establish her insurance claim against
Metropolitan."
Gonzalez opposed the motion,
arguing that Metropolitan had failed to attach a
memorandum of points and authorities or
appropriate affidavits, as required under rule 4-501
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Gonzalez answered the intervener's complaint on
March 11, 1996. On March 12, 1996, the parties
filed a Stipulation for Leave to Allow Metropolitan
to Intervene. An order granting Metropolitan leave
to intervene was filed on March 12, 1996.
**4 Metropolitan formally denied Ms. Gonzalez's
insurance claim on June 4, 1996. On August 7,
1996, the trial court set a date of January 7, 1997,
for trial of Ms. Gonzalez's petition, depending on
the court's availability. On October 4, 1996,
Metropolitan moved for summary judgment. Its
motion was based upon "the fact that Ms. Gonzalez
did not have a uniform reputation as the wife of
Martin Briceno," as required under section 30-1-4.5
of the Utah Code. No affidavits were attached.
That motion was denied.
**5 A minute entry of January 6, 1997, noted that
the trial date, scheduled for the following day, had
been stricken. The trial was continued because of a
criminal trial that took precedence on the court's
calendar. On March 18, 1997, the court ordered a
new scheduling conference for April 8, 1997. Trial
was reset for August 5, 1997. Gonzalez never
requested an accelerated trial.
*1076 **6 On April 10, 1997, Metropolitan filed a
"Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Failure
to Comply with Statutory Time Limits," in which it
claimed that Ms. Gonzalez's petition should be
dismissed because she failed to obtain a judgment
concerning her alleged marriage within one year of
its termination, as required under Utah Code Ann. §
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

30-1-4.5. Metropolitan contended that the statutory
time period ran from the date the relationship
terminated, allegedly October 21, 1995, and that the
statute of limitations was not tolled by filing the
action. Metropolitan did not contend, and has not
argued here, that the statute of limitations expired
prior to Ms. Gonzalez's commencement of this
proceeding.
**7 In an affidavit in support of her memorandum
in opposition, Gonzalez admitted that on October
21, 1995, she considered her relationship with
Briceno "permanently terminated."
She also
indicated, however, that "[s]ince that time, I have
re-established a relationship with Martin."
Gonzalez filed a second motion to amend her
petition to allege the re-establishment of the
relationship on April 23, 1997.
**8 On May 8, 1997, Gonzalez moved to dismiss
Metropolitan's complaint as intervenor.
She
asserted that she had stipulated to Metropolitan's
intervention based on its alleged suggestion that a
decision on her marital status would dispose of all
coverage questions in Briceno's insurance policy.
She then argued that Metropolitan was not a proper
party under rule 24(a) because it had in fact already
denied Gonzalez's insurance claim based on lack of
coverage.
She asserted that Metropolitan's
intervention would prejudice the rights and social
status of herself and her three children, whose father
is Briceno, inasmuch as denial of her petition would
prevent all of them from "assuming[ ] legal rights,
responsibilities and social status due them under the
circumstances of their joint relationships."
**9 In Metropolitan's memorandum in opposition,
it argued that its interest in Ms. Gonzalez's status
remained, despite its unequivocal denial of
coverage to her.
**10 After arguments on all the motions,
Gonzalez's motion to amend was denied, as was her
motion to dismiss the intervener's complaint. The
court granted Metropolitan's motion for summary
judgment based on Gonzalez's failure to comply
with the statutory time limit.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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**11 In its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
complaint in intervention, the court concluded that
Gonzalez had "presented no valid legal basis for her
withdrawal of [the] Stipulation," thus allowing the
complaint m intervention to stand The court also
ruled that Metropolitan "falls squarely withm rule
24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding intervention " In its findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding intervener's motion for
summary judgment, the court held that the statutory
limitation period expired on October 21, 1996,
which date occurred after the commencement of the
action This date was also prior to the initial trial
date set by the court
**12 In its conclusions of law, the trial court
determined that the "petitioner is not and never has
been married to Martin Bnceno in any solemnized
or unsolemmzed relationship "
**13 Petitioner raises three issues on appeal
First, she argues that it was error for the trial court
to grant Metropolitan's motion for summary
judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that
the petition was not adjudicated withm one year of
the termination of the relationship Second, Ms
Gonzalez contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant her motion to dismiss
Metropolitan's complamt in intervention Finally,
Ms Gonzalez argues that the trial court should not
have denied her motion to amend the petition to
allege a contmumg relationship with Bnceno
**14 As noted m f 1, this opmion (Durham, J ) ,
jomed by Justice Stewart and Justice Zimmerman,
determines the result regarding the statute of
limitations issue As to the intervention issue,
Justice Zimmerman concurs in that portion of
Justice Russon's opmion, joined by Chief Justice
Howe, but only to the extent it holds that
intervention pursuant to the stipulation was properly
permitted
*1077 STANDARD OF REVIEW
**15 A trial court's grant of summary judgment is
appropriate only when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to a
© 2006 ThomsonAVesl No
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judgment as a matter of law See Utah R Civ P
56(c), see also Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt
Paving, Inc v Blomquist, 713 P2d 1382, 1385
(Utah 1989)
When deciding whether the trial
court correctly found that there was no genume
issue of material fact, this court reviews the facts
and inferences to be drawn therefrom m the light
most favoiable to the losing party
See id
Additionally, because summary judgment is granted
as a matter of law, we give the trial court's legal
conclusions no deference and review their decision
for correctness See White v Gary L Deseelhorst
NP Ski Corp, 879 P 2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994)
[1] **16 This court has not heretofore identified
the standard it employs when reviewing a motion to
intervene as of right under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a) See Lma v Chambers, 657 P2d
279 (Utah 1982) (reversmg trial court's denial of
intervention but not stating standard of review for
that reversal) We now adopt a de novo standard
of review when interveni ion as of right is before us
on appeal [FN2]
FN2 The majority of federal appeals
courts follow a de novo standard of review
when intervention as of right is involved
See Northwest Forest Resource Council v
Ghckman, 82 F 3d 825, 836 (9th Cir 1996)
(intervention as of right reviewed de
novo), Alameda Water & Sanitation Dist
v Browner, 9 F 3d 88, 90 (10th Cir 1993)
(same), Sierra Club v Robertson, 960
F2d 83, 85 (8th Cir 1992) (same), United
States v Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp, 923 F2d 410, 412 (5th Cir 1991),
Grubbs v Noms, 870 F 2d 343, 345 (6th
Cir 1989) (same), Walters v City of
Atlanta, 803 F 2d 1135, 1151 n 16 (11th
Cir 1986) (reviewing denial of motion to
intervene as of right "for error"), Cook v
Boorstin,
763 F 2 d 1462, 1468
(DC Cir 1985) (holdmg application for
mtervention as of right seems to pose only
question of law, but "we would ordinarily
give substantial weight to a trial court's
findings" regarding whether intervention
comports with
efficiency
and due
to Orig U S Govt Works
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process). But see In re Sierra Club, 945
F.2d 776, 779 (4th Cir.1991) (utilizing
abuse of discretion standard).
While several other circuits appear to be
adopting an abuse of discretion standard,
they
make
distinctions
between
intervention as of right and permissive
intervention.
The standard seems to
inhabit an area somewhere between de
novo review and abuse of discretion when
intervention as of right is involved. See
International Paper Co. v. Town of Jay,
887 F.2d 338, 345 (1st Cir.1989); Harris
v. Pemsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 336,
98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987); United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d
968, 990-91 (2d Cir.1984).
ONE-YEAR LIMITATION
**17 In 1987, the Utah Legislature enacted a
statute that recognized the possibility of establishing
an unsolemnized marriage. See Utah Code Ann. §
30-1-4.5 (Supp.1998). [FN3] Subsection two of the
statute states, in pertinent part, "The determination
or establishment of a marriage under this section
must occur during the relationship described in
subsection (1), or within one year following the
termination of that relationship." Id. § 30- 1-4.5(2)
(emphasis added).
FN3. The statute sets forth the following
criteria that must be met in establishing the
existence of an unsolemnized marriage:
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized
according to this chapter shall be legal and
valid if a court or administrative order
establishes that it arises out of a contract
between two consenting parties who: a)
are capable of giving consent; b) are
legally capable of entering into a
solemnized marriage under the provisions
of this chapter; c) have co-habited; d)
mutually assume marital rights, duties, and
obligations; and, e) who hold themselves
out as and have acquired a uniform and
general reputation as husband and wife.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1998).

**18 The trial court found that "[m]ore than one
year has passed since the termination of the
relationship between Martin Briceno and the
petitioner," and that Ms. Gonzalez had therefore not
met the requirement that determination of the
marriage occur within one year of the relationship's
termination. The trial court appeared to assume
that the statute required completion of the
proceeding, not merely its commencement, within
the one-year period. Furthermore, it put the burden
of assuring a resolution of the petition on Ms.
Gonzalez, stating: "This court is just confident that
if a request for expedited disposition had been [sic]
in this matter, between January and early October of
1996, we could have brought this matter to a
resolution." Finally, *1078 at the same hearing, the
trial court did not permit Gonzalez a second
amendment to her petition to allege a resumption of
her relationship with Briceno, which she contended
would show a continuous relationship from the time
they first began living together in 1983.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
**19 The process of statutory interpretation is
often a difficult one, as courts try to apply the terms
of a statute to an unanticipated situation. As Judge
Richard Posner has pointed out:
Omniscience is always an unrealistic assumption,
and particularly so when one is dealing with the
legislative process. The basic reason why
statutes are so frequently ambiguous in
application is not that they are poorly drafted ...
and not that the legislators failed to agree on just
what they wanted to accomplish in the statute ...
but that a statute necessarily is drafted in advance
of, and with imperfect appreciation for the
problems that will be encountered in, its
application.... Matters are not decided until they
have to be.
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi.
L.Rev. 800,811(1983).
**20 Our own legislature seems to have had the
same point in mind when it included a severability
clause for chapter 246, in which the statutory
marriage provision is found, stating that "if any
provision of Chapter 246, or the application of any
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provision to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the chapter is to be given
effect
without
the
invalid
provision
or
application." 1987 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 5. Thus,
the legislature has acknowledged that unforeseen
issues in the application of statutes such as the one
involving statutory marriage might arise.
**21 The facts of this case would appear to have
been far from the legislature's contemplation when
the statute recognizing unsolemnized marriages was
enacted. [FN4] So far as the limited legislative
history shows, the apparent aim was to give Utah's
Office of Recovery Services an avenue to prevent
the exclusion of an alleged "common law" spouse's
income when an application for government
benefits was made, thus preventing welfare fraud.
See Floor Debate, remarks of Norman Angus,
Director of State Social Services Admin., 47th Utah
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1987) (Sen. Recording
No. 75). [FN5] Utah has no doctrine of common
law marriage, and thus a statutory creation was
necessary.
The subsection of the statute
concerning the amount of time allotted for
adjudication of a petition after the relationship's
termination was added in an amendment and was
apparently designed to protect the parties to a
putative marriage from fraud or mistake due to long
delays in adjudication.
The only substantive
comment on the amendment appears to be the
following:
FN4. While the form of unsolemnized
marriage recognized by Utah was created
only relatively recently by statute, its roots
are long and deep, lying in the common
law concept of "common law" marriage.
There appears to be no meaningful
distinction
between
Utah's
statutory
scheme and the concept of common law
marriage.
FN5. For a fuller discussion of the
legislative history of section 30-1-4.5, see
Recent
Developments
in
Utah
Law—Legislative Enactments— Family
Law, 1988 Utah L.Rev. 273.
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No

This amendment ... brings in a time focus, the
other protection that Senator Reese put in the bill
yesterday provides that that determination of
common law marriage must occur by a court or
administrative agency during the relationship or
within one year after its [sic] been terminated. I
think that gives the protection of having a
marriage declared twenty years after the
relationship when the parties had no intention of a
marriage. I think it would still give protection to
the Office of Recovery Services
Floor Debate, remarks of Sen. Lyle Hillyard, 47th
Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1987) (Sen. CD No.
81B).
**22 Senator Hillyard's remarks suggest that the
legislature was concerned with situations in which
the couple never intended to *1079 be married but
where, years later, most likely at the time that one
of them dies, some party is trying to prove the
existence of such a marriage.
[2][3][4][5] **23 In construing a statute, our aim
is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. See
Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999
Utah 18, f 25, 974 P.2dl 1194, 1201. When doubt
or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or
application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the
act in its entirety should be undertaken and its
provisions harmonized in accordance with the
legislative intent and purpose. See id. at 1202. "
'One of the cardinal principles of statutory
construction is that the courts will look to the
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of
the statute dealing with the subject.* " Mountain
States Tel & Tel. Co. v Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466
(Utah 1989) (citation omitted). Further, we have "a
duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to
effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it
from constitutional conflicts or infirmities." State v.
Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989).
1. Statute of Limitations
[6] **24 Conventional statutes of limitation run
until the date on which an action is commenced.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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The question raised in this action is whether the
somewhat unusual language of section 30-1-4 5 was
intended to create a novel phenomenon a statute of
limitations not tolled by the filing of an action, so
that an action filed in a timely manner could still
fail the limitation period due to delays in discovery
or a court's crowded docket The legislature should
not be deemed to have created such a potentially
unfair rule without clear and convincing language
evidencing its intent to do so, the ambiguities
created in this statute appear to be the result of
nothmg more than inartful drafting It is clear that
the legislative purpose of preventing welfare fraud,
which gave rise to the time limitation, has nothing
to do with Ms Gonzalez's attempts to establish a
statutory marriage to Mr Bnceno, and that strict
construction of the subsection regarding the
completion of an adjudication of the relationship no
later than a year after it allegedly terminated does
not further the underlymg purpose of the statute
We are not persuaded that the legislature meant to
place the burden of crowded court dockets, and
other matters completely out of a petitioner's
control, solely on the petitioner In fact, as noted
above, in this case the trial was delayed at the
beginning of 1997 because a criminal trial took
precedence at the last moment
[7] **25 A more reasonable interpretation of the
legislature's intent, which would not upset the
underlymg purpose of the statute, is that the statute
is simply an ordinary statute of limitations which,
like all statutes of limitations, requires that an action
for adjudication must be commenced within a year
of the termination of the relationship This would
still protect parties who never meant to be
statutorily married from adjudications many years
after their relationship has ended, but without
placmg an undue burden on petitioners who cannot
control every circumstance in the judicial arena In
fact, even if the insurer had not intervened in this
uncontested action (a point addressed more fully
below), given the court's initially scheduled trial
date, the petition would not have been decided
withm the one-year time-frame It seems unlikely
that the legislature mtended to create such a trap for
the unwary, leading to the dismissal of timely filed,
uncontested lawsuits
© 2006 Thomson/West No

**26 State and federal speedy trial acts provide
some useful guidance m this area, masmuch as they
also contam requirements that cases be resolved
withm specific time-frames Section 77-l-6(l)(h)
of the Utah Code, for example, requires that a trial
begin withm thirty days after arraignment if the
accused is not posting bail, as long as the court's
other business presents no obstacle to this See
Utah Code Ann § 77-l-6(l)(h) (1990) Even in
the criminal trial context, however, where the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are implicated,
the United States Supreme Court has declined to
establish "rigid time requirements" to determine
whether a defendant's nght to a speedy trial was
violated See HOSOState v Hoyt, 806 P2d 204,
208 (Utah CtAppl991) (citing Barker v Wingo,
407 U S 514, 521, 92 S Ct 2182, 33 LEd2d 101
(1972)) The Court m Barker outlined a four-part
test to assess any violation, including "[l][l]ength of
the delay, [2] the reason for the delay, [3] the
defendant's assertion of his right, and [4] prejudice
to the defendant" Barker, 407 U S at 530, 92
SCt 2182 Thus, even when a party has a
constitutional right to a speedy trial, delay will be
excused where it is not prejudicial
Were the
mtervenor in this case entitled to such concern,
which of course it is not, the "delay" here would not
rise to the level of bemg overly lengthy or
prejudicial
Indeed, Metropolitan could not
demonstrate any prejudice m this case Moreover,
as Ms Gonzalez has pomted out, without the
msurer's intervention any delays would have been
unlikely, except to the extent that they were caused
by the court's own docket
2 Constitutional Considerations
**27 Were we to accept intervener's claim that the
legislature meant to create an entirely new type of
statute of limitations, the statutory tune limitation
would be subject to constitutional challenge For
example, m White v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co,
907 F Supp 1012 (E D Tex 1995), the court had to
apply a similar Texas statute The case mvolved a
woman suing her auto msurer under the unmsured
motorist clause of her policy, regarding the death of
her alleged common law husband The Texas
statute stated " 'A proceedmg in which a marriage
to Ong U S Govt Works
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is to be proved under this section must be
commenced not later than one year after the date on
which the relationship ended....' " Id. at 1017
(quoting Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 1.91(b) (West
Supp.1989) (emphasis added). [FN6]
FN6. The court in White noted that
although the 1989 version of the Texas
statute had been recently amended, the
earlier version of the statute specifically
instructed that the 1995 amendment not be
retroactively applied. See White, 907
F.Supp. at 1017 n. 2 (citing Tex.
Fam.Code
Ann.
§
1.91(b) (West
Supp.1996) (Act of May 29, 1995, 74th
Leg., R.S., ch. 891, § 1)). The 1995
amendment extended the statute of
limitations to two years, and by the terms
of the amendment, even that time period is
not absolute. See Shepherd v. Ledford,
926 S.W.2d405,409 n. 1 (Tex.App.1996).
**28 The court in White held the Texas one-year
statutory limitation period unconstitutional under
the United States Constitution on equal protection
grounds. The court found that the statute made a
distinction
between
"ceremoniously
married
persons" and "informally or common-law married
persons," and that the one-year period to commence
an action must be reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental interest. See White, 907 F.Supp. at
1017-18. Finding that the interest in requiring
proof of the existence of a common law marriage in
a timely fashion was to insure that Texas courts did
not have to rely on stale evidence in divorce and
probate proceedings, the court reasoned that while
the interest was legitimate, the statutory scheme was
not rationally related to the goals. See id. at 1018.
**29 Noting the severity of the bar to commencing
an action to prove a common law marriage within
just one-year of the relationship's termination, the
White court was particularly concerned about the
community property rights that would be
extinguished and the legitimacy of the two children
of the marriage that would be unresolved. See id.
The court relied on a United States Supreme Court
case that held a similar Texas statute regarding a

one-year period to prove the legitimacy of a child
violated equal protection because the time period
was too short in light of the important rights
involved. See id; Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S.
91, 100, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982).
[FN7] But *I08I see Shepherd, 926 S.W.2d at
405-09 (applying, without mentioning White, the
Texas statute involved in White according to its
terms).
FN7. The constitutionality of the one-year
statutory limitation period is not before us
on this appeal, since Ms. Gonzalez
concededly filed her petition within
one-year of the termination of her
relationship. Metropolitan argues that the
case of Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918
(Utah Ct.App.1995), is dispositive here
and stands for the proposition that a
petition for adjudication of marriage must
be brought and decided within a year of
the relationship's termination. Intervenor
misconstrues this case. In Bunch, a
divorce action was filed ten months after
the parties separated. Id. at 919. The trial
court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that no statutory marriage had been
established and it therefore lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. On
appeal, the court of appeals explicitly
refused
to
consider
constitutional
arguments raised by the appellant, stating
that these arguments were not sufficiently
articulated below. Id. at 921. Finding
section 30-1- 4.5 to be unambiguous
regarding the time limitation, it affirmed
the trial court. Id. We agree with Ms.
Gonzalez that her case is clearly
distinguishable inasmuch as it involves a
petition to establish a marriage, not to
obtain a divorce. We believe that today
we begin to clarify some of the issues left
unresolved by the court in Bunch.
However, since the constitutionality of a
one-year statute of limitations is not before
us, we express no opinion on the issue.
**30 In light of the considerations discussed
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above, we construe the statute of limitations in
question to avoid potential unconstitutionality, and
conclude that section 30-1-4.5 requires only the
filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage
within one year after the termination of the
relationship. Our decision rests on our analysis of
the legislature's intent, and therefore, we do not
reach the constitutional arguments raised by Ms.
Gonzalez.
See
Sutherland
on
Statutory
Construction § 45.11, at 49 (rev. 5th ed.1992).
Further, in light of our ruling, we do not reach the
issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Ms.
Gonzalez's motion to amend her second petition.
Should Ms. Gonzalez still wish to amend after
remand, she should renew her motion, and we
presume the court will give her motion due
consideration in light of this opinion. Typically,
motions to amend are liberally granted. See Timm
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993).
INTERVENTION
**31 Next, we turn to Ms. Gonzalez's contention
that it was error for the trial court to deny her
motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in
intervention.
Gonzalez
initially
challenged
Metropolitan's motion to intervene, but later
reversed course and stipulated to the intervention.
**32 Stipulations between the parties are usually
honored by the courts. See First of Denver
Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600
P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). Nevertheless, the
courts may ignore such agreements "when points of
law requiring judicial determination are involved."
Id. No consideration was undertaken by the trial
court of Metropolitan's standing to intervene in Ms.
Gonzalez's petition to adjudicate marriage;
nevertheless, the question of the legitimacy of
Metropolitan's presence in this lawsuit implicates
significant public policy concerns that should be
addressed on appeal.
**33 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a), an applicant must be allowed to intervene if
four requirements are satisfied: (1) the application
is timely; (2) the applicant has an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that the

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter,
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect
that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest is not
adequately represented by the existing parties.
**34 Spouses are ordinarily the only appropriate
parties to divorce litigation. See Frank D. Wagner,
Annotation, Divorce-Third Parties' Claims, 63
A.L.R.3d 373, 378 (1975). An exception to this is
generally made, however, for third-party claims that
concern the "actual or equitable ownership of real
property, or to some other asserted interest such as
an encumbrance upon real property, or the
ownership of personal property." Id. (footnotes
omitted). This case, which concerns a petition for
adjudication of marriage, is analogous to cases
where a third party attempts to intervene in a
divorce action. The threshold question here, for
both the requirements of rule 24(a) and intervention
in a marriage context, is whether Metropolitan has
an interest relating to a property or transaction
which is the subject of the action.
**35 Metropolitan never alleged any "interest" in
any property or transaction relating to the subject
matter of the petition. In its complaint in
intervention, prior to the stipulation, Metropolitan
stated as its basis for intervention that it "believes
that this petition is filed as an attempt to defraud an
insurance company by falsely attempting to
establish a marriage where none existed." *1082
This is clearly not an acceptable reason for
intervening as of right in a proceeding to establish
the existence of a marriage.
Laudable as
attempting to prevent fraud is, it does not approach
the type of property interest that is typically
contemplated by courts considering this issue in the
context of an intervenor's application in a divorce
proceeding.
**36 Looking to the treatment of this issue in
other jurisdictions, we find that while most allow
intervention
in divorce
proceedings,
such
intervention is granted only after the intervenor
meets a heavy burden. Analyzing an identical
intervention rule in West Virginia, the court found
that "[a] third party seeking intervention in a
divorce proceeding for the purpose of protecting a
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property interest assumes the burden of
demonstrating an interest which will outweigh the
substantial privacy interests of the divorcing
parties." Boyle v. Boyle, 194 W.Va. 124, 459
S.E.2d 401, 404 (1995). In Boyle, the court denied
intervention to a third party claiming a right to buy
stock obtained by the wife as part of the divorce
settlement. See id. at 405. Embracing the
rationale of the Boyle court, another court recently
allowed the second wife to intervene in a
proceeding brought by the first wife, challenging
the validity of her divorce settlement. See Cohen v.
Cohen, 748 So.2d 91 (Miss. 1999). There, the
court stressed (at least seven times in one form or
another) the "rare fact driven" nature of this case
and that it is a significant departure from the normal
rule. See id. at 92-94. At the outset of its
discussion in Cohen, the court made it clear that
under its intervention rule, identical to our own, "an
economic interest alone in the litigation is
insufficient to allow intervention." Id. at 93.
(citations omitted).

interest is one that is not 'remote' or 'contingent.' "
Id. at 356 (citing 3B James W. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice % 24.07[2], at 24-54 (2d
ed.1995)). It continues, "[a] 'legally protective'
interest is one that 'the substantive law recognizes
as belonging to or being owned by the applicant.' "
Id (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas
Pipe Line, 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir.), cert,
denied, 469 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 434, 83 L.Ed.2d
360 (1984) (emphasis in original)). Finally, the
court states that "[a] party who qualifies as a 'real
party in interest' under rule 17(a), F.R. Civ. P., is a
party with a 'legally protectible' interest." Id. (citing
6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1543,
at 339 (2d ed. 1990)) ("[T]he real party in interest
requirement ... must be satisfied for purposes of
asserting ... a claim by an intervenor."). Since the
court found that the valuation of minority shares in
a close corporation was a speculative undertaking, it
held that the children did not have an interest in
their parents' property that was "direct, substantial,
and legally protectible." Id. at 356. [FN8]

**37 Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar
rationale. For instance, in In re Marriage of
Perkinson, 147 Ill.App.3d 692, 101 Ill.Dec. 137,
498 N.E.2d 319 (1986), an order of dissolution of
marriage was entered shortly before the former
husband drowned while working on his employer's
tugboat. The employer, however, potentially liable
for the drowning death of the man, was not
permitted to intervene in an action seeking to set
aside the order of dissolution. See id. 101 Ill.Dec.
137, 498 N.E.2d at 324. The court reasoned that
though the former wife might bring a wrongful
death action against the employer if the dissolution
order was set aside, the employer's current interest
in any future action that she might bring was at most
"speculative, hypothetical, and incidental." Id.

FN8. See also Arnold v. Arnold, 214 Neb.
39, 332 N.W.2d 672, 674 (1983) (denying
intervention to parents of one of the
divorcing parties on grounds that they
attempted to introduce into dissolution
proceeding a number of legal actions
involving themselves and divorcing parties
that had nothing to do with division of
marital assets); Nielson v Thompson, 982
P.2d 709, 712 (Wyo.1999) (denying
intervention to creditor where divorcing
husband had no "possessory or marketable
interest" in his spouse's property, making
payment of his debt to creditor unavailable
from such source).

**38 Likewise, in Fisher v. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d
354, 358 (N.D.I996), the court found that the
children of divorcing parents did not have a right to
intervene in their divorce proceedings regarding the
appointment of a receiver for their closely held
company, even if such appointment might affect the
value of the children's shares in the company. The
court's analysis begins by stating that "[a] 'direct'

*1083 **39 The claims of the parties who
attempted to intervene in these actions are entirely
analogous to those of the insurer in the present
action. The privacy interests of a couple in
determining their status and property rights without
the interference of outside parties are clearly
paramount. Certainly, Metropolitan's "interest" in
this action is no greater than the employer in

© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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Perkinson, who was likely to be sued if the order of
dissolution was set aside.
**40 Many of the cases denying intervention also
find that it would be possible for the intervenor to
bring a separate action to enforce any alleged rights,
thereby avoiding their inappropriate insinuation into
the private affairs of a married couple. See Ex
parte Kirkley, 418 So.2d 118, 121 (Ala.1982)
(former wife could not intervene in former
husband's subsequent divorce proceeding to obtain
any money owed her under their divorce decree, but
rather could file contempt suit); Fisher, 546
N.W.2d at 358; Boyle, 459 S.E.2d at 405. [FN9]
FN9. Metropolitan would be able to
contest its obligation in an action on the
insurance contract, which is not before us
on this appeal.
**41 Metropolitan has failed to show any interest
in this action that requires its intrusion into an
otherwise private matter between two persons
regarding the nature of their relationship. In fact,
as petitioner argues, Metropolitan denied Ms.
Gonzalez's insurance claim during the pendency of
the proceedings below, making it clear that it could
proceed without the court's adjudication of this
matter. Accordingly, adopting the rationale of the
court in Boyle, I would hold that the trial court erred
in permitting Metropolitan to intervene, and that it
should have granted Ms. Gonzalez's motion to
dismiss. As noted earlier, this view is joined only
by Justice Stewart, and a majority of the court
affirms on this question.
PROCEDURE ON REMAND
**42 Having found that section 30-1-4.5 requires
only that an action to determine or establish a
marriage be commenced within a year of the
termination of the relationship, we reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Metropolitan on the issue of the statute of
limitations.
**43 On remand, should Gonzalez choose to
proceed with the petition for adjudication of
marriage, the trial court should apply a
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No

preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to
the establishment of a marriage under the statute.
See Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 935-36 (Utah
Ct.App.1998). While no single factor is
determinative in the trial court's analysis, and while
"numerous factors should be considered," evidence
proving each of the five statutory elements is
essential. See Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793
(Utah 1994). The parties must make a showing of
capacity to marry, capacity to give consent,
assumption of marital rights and duties,
cohabitation, and a holding out as, and acquiring a
uniform and general reputation as, husband and
wife. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-l-4.5(l)(a)- (e)
(1998). One commentator has noted "the success
of the common law marriage doctrine, and
especially of the requirement of 'holding out,' in
distinguishing between cases in which the parties'
intent was marriage and those in which they
cohabited without any such intent." Cynthia Grant
Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back
Common Law Marriage, 1996 Or. L.Rev. 709, 749
(1996). At trial, the court will have to determine
whether Ms. Gonzalez meets this standard. The
dispute regarding the existence of a "uniform"
reputation is a material fact in this case and to the
extent that the trial court's grant of summary
judgment was based on that ground, it may not
stand.
**44 Although not discussed by any party to this
appeal, we note a point that may assist in the
disposition of the case on remand. On March 26,
1999, after the entry of summary judgment in this
case, Gonzalez filed an action in federal district
court against Metropolitan, alleging various
contractual and tortious causes of action related to
its insurance policy. It is not clear from *1084 the
complaint in that case whether the claim therein
relies on the case of Proctor v. Insurance Co. ofN.
Am., 714 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1986), but it appears that
this case is highly instructive. In Proctor, two
claimants disputed the disbursement of the proceeds
of two insurance policies. See id. at 1157. The
policies did not name a beneficiary by name, but
they both insured the "member and spouse." Id. At
the time the policies were purchased, the insured
was married to his second wife. His divorce,
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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however, from his first wife was not finalized until
nine months after his ceremony of marriage to his
second wife. Thus, the second marriage was
illegal. See id. at 1158.
**45 In response to the first wife's contention that
her minor daughter was the rightful claimant under
the policy, the court held that the principles of
contract and insurance governed in this instance,
and since the second wife was clearly the intended
beneficiary, she should receive the proceeds of the
policy. See id. The court in Proctor noted, among
other things, that the insured was required to pay
additional premiums for coverage for his "spouse."
See id. at 1159. Proctor was not cited by either
party in the case before us, but we note that it has a
direct bearing on Metropolitan's obligation to
Gonzalez under its policy, and further that, while a
successful adjudication of marriage in state court
would presumably determine her federal court
claims, it would also not be a sine qua non for such
a determination. Proctor appears to stand for the
proposition that in some circumstances one who is
not legally married may nevertheless be a "spouse"
for purposes of coverage in an insurance policy,
depending on the language of the policy and the
intent of the parties. See id. at 1158-59.
CONCLUSION
**46 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in
part, but reversed on the statute of limitations issue,
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
**47 Justice STEWART concurs in Associate
Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion.

Russon's opinion to Ihe extent it holds that
intervention pursuant to the stipulation was properly
permitted. Justice Durham looks to cases from
other jurisdictions concerning interventions in
divorce proceedings for guidance, and then applies
those rules and policies to a proceeding to
determine a marriage, labeling the situations
"analogous." She would hold that a party in
Metropolitan's situation cannot be permitted to
intervene, even on stipulation, because it would
violate public policy. I cannot accept the easy
public policy analogy Justice Durham draws
between determination of marriage actions under
the Utah statute and actions brought to end an
existing legal marriage, particularly where the
proceeding to determine a marriage appears to have
been commenced solely to give Gonzalez legal
entitlement to claim under the insurance policy and
to sue Metropolitan. In such a situation, I would
hold that the company's interest is not so speculative
that Gonzalez cannot be permitted to agree to have
the company's challenges adjudicated in the
determination proceeding. It may have been
tactically unwise for Gonzalez to have stipulated to
the intervention in that context, but she did so. I
see no overriding public policy against permitting
that stipulation to be made effective.
**50 Unlike Justice Russon, however, I would not
address the broader question of when third parties
may properly be permitted to intervene in
adjudications concerning a marriage over the
objections of a party to the actual or putative
marriage in question. Therefore, I do not join in
that portion of Justice Russon's opinion.
RUSSON, Justice, dissenting:

ZIMMERMAN, Justice, concurring:
**48 I concur in that portion of the opinion of
Associate Chief Justice Durham that holds that a
proceeding for the determination of marriage must
be commenced within a year, but not completed.
That is a more reasonable interpretation of the
statute, and it seemingly protects the state's interest
in avoiding fraud.
[8] **49 I concur in that portion of Justice
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

VitttWAx/^Vi? wpctlawrnm/nrint/nrintstrpflm

**51 I dissent from Justice Durham's lead
opinion. 1 would affirm all of the trial court's
rulings.
*1085 **52 First, the trial court did not err in
dismissing Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet
the jurisdictional time limitation set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. Justice Durham's opinion
does not even attempt to read the statute on the
basis of its plain language, but instead simply
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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rewrites its provisions by attributing motives to the
legislature. Although the requirement relating to
conclusion, rather than commencement, of legal
proceedings is unusual and could potentially raise
constitutional concerns in certain hypothetical
scenarios, this case is not one of them. Gonzalez
had thirteen years in which to commence a petition
for adjudication and failed to do so. Moreover,
after filing her petition, she made no attempt to
obtain an adjudication within the time limit. The
trial court specifically found that an accelerated
schedule could have been arranged if Gonzalez had
sought one. This is not a case where petitioner was
prevented from meeting the statutory deadline by
events wholly beyond her control. Rather, it is
evident from the record that Gonzalez simply failed
to recognize the nature of the time limitation and
falsely assumed it functioned as a traditional statute
of limitations that had been satisfied at the time the
petition was filed. It is not the constitutional duty
of this court to rescue parties from their inability to
read the plain language of a statute. I would affirm
the court's decision in view of the particular facts of
this case.
**53 Second,
as
recognized
by
Justice
Zimmerman's opinion, the trial court correctly
denied Gonzalez's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's
complaint. Although Justice Durham undertakes an
analysis of the standard of review relating to
contested motions to intervene as of right, she fails
to correctly reference the standard of review for the
only question properly brought to us on appeal: the
court's refusal to set aside the stipulation for
intervention. She thus attempts to establish a new
standard of review for a question not properly
brought before us on appeal. This purported
establishment of a new standard of review has not
been joined by a majority of this court.
**54 Justice Durham implicitly relies on our
statement in First of Denver Mortgage Investors v.
CM. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah
1979), that a "court" is not bound by stipulations
between parties "when points of law requiring
judicial determination are involved." [FN1]
Durham Op. \ 32. However, this statement in
First of Denver (whatever it means) clearly does not
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

empower us to review de novo a trial court's
decision to set aside a stipulation as to matters of
law. Rather, First of Denver recognizes that the
trial court-not the Supreme Court-is entrusted
with the discretion whether to honor such a
stipulation between parties. Indeed, as we further
stated in that case, whether a stipulation involves
issues of fact or law, "[p]arties are bound by their
stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the [trial]
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation
entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause."
Id.; see also 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 13, at 548
(1974) ("It is generally recognized that it is within
the discretion of the court to set aside a stipulation
of the parties relating to the conduct of a pending
cause."). As a result, a stipulation not set aside
below will be reversed on appeal only if the trial
court abused its discretion. The well-established
abuse of discretion standard of review requires us to
"presume that the discretion of the trial court was
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows
the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530,
534-35 (Utah 1984). [FN2]
FN1. I must confess that the scope and
import of this statement, as quoted in
isolation by Justice Durham, utterly
escapes me. So far as I am aware, all
disputed cases brought before courts
involve "points of law requiring judicial
determination." Hence, a literal reading
of this passage would require all courts
everywhere to disregard all stipulations for
the sake of rendering a full-blown
independent determination of the legal
soundness of the parties' choices.
FN2. In this regard, Justice Durham states
that the trial court failed to consider
whether Metropolitan had standing to
intervene in this action. Durham Op. %
32. But Gonzalez did not appeal any
alleged failure of the trial court to enter
specific findings that Metropolitan had
standing to intervene at the time it
approved the stipulation, nor is there any
indication that the trial court was obligated
to do so. Rather, Gonzalez appeals the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

httD://web2.west1 a w com/nrint/nrintQtrpam netw9ro=WT W £ fi££V^r,*:~«+:~—~+- o—

^

f\ D_

/~ / 1 r ir\r\r\

y

1 P.3d 1074

Page 14

1 P.3d 1074, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 2000 UT 28
(Cite as: 1 P.3d 1074,2000 UT 28)
later denial of her motion to dismiss
Metropolitan's complaint in intervention.
With respect to that motion, the court
received extensive briefing on Gonzalez's
motion, heard oral argument, and entered
findings of fact and rulings of law that
specifically treated Metropolitan's standing
to intervene. There is no basis in those
careful and correct findings for us to
attribute an abuse of discretion.
*1086 **55 Employing the correct standard of
review, I would uphold the trial court's ruling
denying
Gonzalez's
petition
to
dismiss
Metropolitan's complaint. In this case, the trial
court carefully reviewed the particular facts and
circumstances before it and rendered a reasoned
opinion refusing to set aside the stipulation. It
found there was a sound legal basis for
Metropolitan's intervention and that Gonzalez had
failed to meet her burden of showing why the
stipulation should be set aside. [FN3]
FN3. Gonzalez's primary argument in her
motion was that she had been misled by
Metropolitan's counsel into believing there
were no other potential bases in the
insurance contract for denying her claims.
The trial court correctly found that
Metropolitan had reserved its right to deny
coverage under other provisions of the
contract and had notified Gonzalez that it
reserved the right to do so from the outset.
**56 Finally, I would hold that Metropolitan has a
right to intervene in this action. Contrary to Justice
Durham's assertion, this case is not "analogous to
cases where a third party attempts to intervene in a
divorce action." Durham Op. f 34. In a divorce
action, the status of the marriage relationship (and
the attendant legal and personal interests that attach
to that relationship) have already been established.
Because divorce constitutes such a fundamental
alteration in the lives of a husband and a wife, the
law justifiably presumes that a divorce will be
sought
for
legitimate
personal
reasons.
Intervention in divorce cases is typically sought by
creditors who claim that their interests are

implicated by the disposition of the spouses'
financial assets. Such interventions are disfavored
because they present a substantial risk of confusing
the central issues relating to the parties'
already-established private relationship. Moreover,
the likelihood that parties to a marriage will seek a
divorce for the sole or primary purpose of
defrauding or damaging a creditor is small. [FN4]
Hence, courts properly impose more stringent
standards when entertaining applications for
intervention in divorce cases.
FN4. It was suggested at oral argument
that annulments might present a closer
analogy and could be affected by our
decision here. Whether or not annulment
is an adequate analogy, it does not alter the
fundamental
policies
governing
intervention in the particular circumstances
of this case. To the extent there is a
properly supported allegation that parties
to a relationship are attempting to alter
their legal status, where that status (and
the attendant privacy rights it entails) is in
doubt, and they are attempting the
alteration for the sole or primary purpose
of deceit or fraud (and the other criteria of
rule 24 are met), a right of intervention
should be granted. Moreover, to the
extent we find it necessary to craft
particular rules to meet new circumstances,
we may do so when the proper case arises.
**57 The reasons for denying intervention in most
divorce cases manifestly do not apply to the facts of
this particular case. In this case, Metropolitan
specifically alleged a fraudulent basis for the
marriage petition. In its complaint in intervention,
Metropolitan asserts theit "Juanita Gonzalez's sole
purpose in filing this petition is to attempt to create
a relationship of husband and wife between herself
and Martin Briceno for the sole purpose of
obtaining insurance coverage under a policy issued
by Metropolitan to Martin Briceno." In other
words, Metropolitan contends that Gonzalez and
Briceno had not actually met the criteria of the
unsolemnized marriage statute at the time of the fire
and that they did not actually believe they met the
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criteria. If this contention is proven correct,
Gonzalez's attempt to retroactively establish a legal
status for the sole purpose of obtaining insurance
benefits would constitute fraud and manipulation of
a state statute. I submit that where there is a good
faith assertion that a petition to validate an
unsolemnized marriage is filed for fraudulent
purposes, the principles governing permissive
intervention and the statutory policies underlying
the marriage statute grant a right of intervention. A
party clearly has a right of intervention in an action
that was brought for the sole purpose of defrauding
that party. [FN5]
FN5. It is no answer to state, as does
Justice Durham, Durham Op. supra note 9,
that Metropolitan may litigate its concerns
in the context of a separate contract action
on the insurance policy. Metropolitan
obviously cannot litigate, in the context of
a separate contract dispute, a decision
regarding marital status that has been
established and recognized by another
court of competent jurisdiction.
*1087 **58 Given the fact that Metropolitan is
alleging a fraudulent basis for the petition, and
because the retroactive establishment of an
unsolemnized marriage does not proceed from the
same presumptions of the established legal status
inherent in any divorce action, no special
heightened burden applies to Metropolitan's
application for intervention. Consequently, the
issues regarding the right of intervention are
governed by the traditional standards of Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 24(a).
**59 According to that rule, the four traditional
requirements for intervention are met. First, there
is no dispute that the application was
timely; second, Metropolitan has a clear interest in
avoiding the payment of fraudulent insurance
claims; third, Gonzalez's petition may impair that
interest if Metropolitan does not have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the petition has
been brought for fraudulent purposes; and fourth,
no party other than Metropolitan has a clear interest
or opportunity to present evidence demonstrating

that Gonzalez's petition is fraudulent.
**60 The trial court correctly dismissed
Gonzalez's petition for failure to meet the time
limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5; it did not
abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez's request to
ignore her stipulation; and it correctly refused to
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. I
would affirm the trial court on all grounds.
**61 Finally, I write to express my disapproval of
Justice Durham's apparent attempt to give legal
advice to one of the parties. She states in her
section titled "Procedure on Remand" that
"[although not discussed by any party to this
appeal, we note a point that may assist in the
disposition of the case on remand." Durham Op. |
44. However, the issue she thereafter discusses
has nothing to do with any disputed legal question
this court believes is likely to occur on remand to
the district court. See State v. James, 819 P.2d
781, 795 (Utah 1991). Rather, she provides an
advisory opinion that is apparently exclusively
related to collateral and factually distinct
proceedings in federal court. She does so under
the apparent presumption that petitioner's counsel
has failed to locate relevant, perhaps even
dispositive, authority relating to petitioner's federal
claim. This court has no business giving such
advice to parties represented by counsel. Nor can
we provide such advice to a federal court when no
questions have been properly certified from that
court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2( 1) (1996).
**62 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Justice
RUSSON's dissenting opinion.
**63 Justice STEWART acted on this opinion
prior to his retirement.
1 P.3d 1074, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 89, 2000 UT 28
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Briefs and Other Related Documents
United States District Court,District of Columbia.
Monique JOHNSON-TANNER, Plaintiff,
v.
FIRST CASH FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., and
Famous Pawn, Inc. Defendants.
No. CIV.A.01-718 PLF.
Jan. 2,2003.
African-American former employee brought § 1981
racial discrimination action against both employer's
parent corporation and its subsidiary, seeking
injunctive relief and monetary damages. Employer
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
improper venue, and failure to state a claim. The
District Court, Paul L. Friedman, J., held that: (1)
District Court could exercise personal jurisdiction
over parent corporation; (2) venue was proper; and
(3) allegations stated claim for § 1981 employment
discrimination.
Motions denied.
West Headnotes
[1] Federal Courts 170B C=?1037
170B Federal Courts
170BXI Courts of District of Columbia
170BXI(A) In General; District Court
170Bkl035 Jurisdiction of District Court
170Bkl037 k. Persons Subject. Most
Cited Cases
District of Columbia's long-arm provision allows
for personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent
permissible under the Due Process Clause.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; D.C. Official Code,
2001 Ed. § 13-423(a)(l).

92 Constitutional Law
92X11 Due Process of Law
92k304 Civil Remedies and Proceedings
92k305 Actions
92k305(4) Jurisdiction and Venue
92k305(5) k. Nonresidents in
General. Most Cited Cases
Due Process, in the context of personal jurisdiction,
is satisfied where a defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum jurisdiction such that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[3] Constitutional Law 92 €==>305(5)
92 Constitutional Law
92X11 Due Process of Law
92k304 Civil Remedies and Proceedings
92k305 Actions
92k305(4) Jurisdiction and Venue
92k305(5) k. Nonresidents in
General. Most Cited Cases
Minimum contacts, for the purpose of personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, are
established where a defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum jurisdiction such that the defendant
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[4] Federal Courts 170B €=^96
170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk96 k. Affidavits and Other
Evidence. Most Cited Cases
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving a prima
facie case of personal jurisdiction by alleging
specific acts linking a defendant with the forum.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.

[2] Constitutional Law 92 €=^305(5)
[5] Federal Courts 170B €=^96
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170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk96 k. Affidavits and Other
Evidence. Most Cited Cases
In deciding whether a basis for personal jurisdiction
exists, factual discrepancies in the record must be
resolved in the plaintiffs favor.
[6] Federal Courts 170B C=?82
170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk77 Corporations, Actions by or
Against
170Bk82 k. Agent Within District;
Parent and Subsidiary. Most Cited Cases
Ordinarily, a defendant corporation's contacts with a
forum may not be attributed to affiliated
corporations, for the purpose of establishing
personal jurisdiction over affiliated corporations.
[7] Federal Courts 170B €==>82
170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk77 Corporations, Actions by or
Against
170Bk82 k. Agent Within District;
Parent and Subsidiary. Most Cited Cases
When the corporation contesting jurisdiction is
found to be nothing more than the alter ego of an
affiliated corporation over which the district court
does have jurisdiction, the affiliated corporation's
jurisdictional contacts may be extended to reach the
other corporate entity.
[8] Federal Courts 170B €=>97
170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk97 k. Determination of Venue
Questions. Most Cited Cases
Whether one corporation is the alter ego of another,
for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction
over one when the district court has jurisdiction
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over the other, is a question of law to be decided by
the district court. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[9] Federal Courts 170B € ^ 8 2
170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk77 Corporations, Actions by or
Against
170Bk82 k. Agent Within District;
Parent and Subsidiary. Most Cited Cases
Ultimately, in determining whether personal
jurisdiction exists over parent corporation in forum
court when it exists over subsidiary corporation, the
question is whether the parent corporation so
dominated the subsidiary corporation as to negate
its separate personality, making the exercise of
jurisdiction over the absent parent fair and
equitable. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[10] Federal Courts 170B €=>82
170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk77 Corporations, Actions by or
Against
170Bk82 k. Agent Within District;
Parent and Subsidiary. Most Cited Cases
To determine whether a parent corporation is a
separate corporate entity distinct from its
subsidiary, over which district court has personal
jurisdiction, or merely the alter ego of the
subsidiary, for purposes of deciding existence of
personal jurisdiction over parent corporation, the
district court must evaluate: (1) whether there is
such a unity of interest and ownership that the
separate
corporate
personalities
of
parent
corporation and subsidiary effectively no longer
exist, and (2) whether an inequitable result would
follow if the district court treats subsidiary's
allegedly wrongful acts as those of subsidiary alone
and not also those of parent corporation. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[11] Corporations 101 €==>1.6(9)
101 Corporations
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170Bk82 k. Agent Within District;
Parent and Subsidiary. Most Cited Cases
Existence of unity of interest and ownership blurred
any distinction
between employer's parent
corporation and subsidiary, so that District Court
could exercise personal jurisdiction over parent
corporation, in employee's racial discrimination
action against both parent corporation and
subsidiary, when District Court had personal
jurisdiction over subsidiary; parent and subsidiary
shared at least three key common officers and
directors, none of the shared officers and directors
maintained separate phone or facsimile line for their
dual roles, one executive employee was transferred
from parent to subsidiary, employee of parent made
hiring and firing decisions for subsidiary, parent
headquarters maintained nearly all records for
subsidiary employee, and parent and subsidiary
maintained joint payroll and accounting systems.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

1011 Incorporation and Organization
101kl.6
Particular
Occasions
for
Determining Corporate Entity
101kl.6(9) k. Remedies and Procedure;
Parties. Most Cited Cases
Unity of interest between parent corporation and
subsidiary is established, for purposes of
determining if subsidiary is alter ego of parent
corporation, in analyzing existence of personal
jurisdiction over parent corporation when it exists
over subsidiary, if parent corporation had active and
substantial control over subsidiary at the time of the
alleged wrongful acts that form basis of lawsuit, but
this control does not have to amount to actual
day-to-day control or supervision. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14.
[12] Corporations 101 €=>l.6(9)
101 Corporations
1011 Incorporation and Organization
101kl.6
Particular
Occasions
for
Determining Corporate Entity
101kl.6(9) k. Remedies and Procedure;
Parties. Most Cited Cases
Among the factors the district court is to consider in
determining if subsidiary is alter ego of parent
corporation, in analyzing existence of personal
jurisdiction over parent corporation when it exists
over subsidiary, are whether there was a failure to
maintain separate corporate minutes or records, a
failure to maintain corporate formalities, a
commingling of funds or other assets, a diversion of
one corporation's funds to the other's uses, the use
of the same office or business location, and a joint
accounting and payroll system, whether the
subsidiary is operated as a mere division of the
parent or exclusively in the interest of the parent,
and whether there is a transfer of personnel back
and forth between the parent corporation and its
subsidiary. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

[14] Federal Courts 170B €=^1041
170B Federal Courts
170BXI Courts of District of Columbia
170BXI(A) In General; District Court
170Bkl040 Procedure in District Court
170Bkl041 k. Venue and Change of
Venue. Most Cited Cases
Venue in District of Columbia was proper, in
employee's racial discrimination action against both
employer's parent corporation and its subsidiary,
where parent corporation was subject to personal
jurisdiction under District of Columbia's long-arm
statute by virtue of its inextricable links to and
control over subsidiary, which operated businesses
in the District of Columbia. 28 U.S.C.A. §
1391(b)(1); D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. §
13-423(a)(l).
[15] Federal Civil Procedure 170A €=^673

[13] Federal Courts 170B €=>82

170A Federal Civil Procedure
170A VII Pleadings and Motions
170AVII(B) Complaint
170AVII(B)1 In General
170Ak673 k. Claim for Relief in
General. Most Cited Cases
Under the notice pleading requirement, a plaintiffs

170B Federal Courts
170BII Venue
170BII(A) In General
170Bk77 Corporations, Actions by or
Against
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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complaint need only contain a short and plain
statement of the claim and the grounds on which it
is based, and need not plead law or match facts with
each element of a legal theory. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 8(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.

*36 Michael G. Ka.ne,Meredith S. Francis,
Cashdan, Golden & Kane, P.L.L.C, Washington,
DC, for plaintiff.
Joseph Yenouskas, Douglas P. Lobel, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius, McLean, VA, for defendants.

[16] Civil Rights 78 €==>1395(8)

OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
This action was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, seeking
injunctive relief and monetary damages for
allegedly unlawful employment discrimination
based on race. Plaintiff alleges that First Cash
Financial Services, Inc. and its wholly owned
subsidiary, Famous Pawn, Inc., refused to laterally
transfer the plaintiff, allegedly causing her
constructive discharge. This matter comes before
the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and failure
to state a claim.™1 For the reasons that follow,*37
this Court denies defendants' motions to dismiss.

78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k 1392 Pleading
78k 13 95 Particular Causes of Action
78k 1395(8) k. Employment Practices.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k235(3))
Civil Rights 78 €=^1532
78 Civil Rights
78IV Remedies Under Federal Employment
Discrimination Statutes
78k 1532 k. Pleading. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k375)
While plaintiff ultimately has the burden of proving
a prima facie case in an employment discrimination
case, plaintiff is not required to set forth the
elements of a prima facie case at the initial pleading
stage. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 8(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A
[17] Civil Rights 78 €==>1395(8)
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k 1392 Pleading
78k 13 95 Particular Causes of Action
78k 1395(8) k. Employment Practices.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k235(3))
Allegation by African-American female former
employee that employer's refusal to transfer her on
the basis of her race constituted a violation of her
rights under § 1981 and caused her to be
constructively discharged properly put defendants
on notice as to nature and basis of her claims and
thus adequately stated claim under § 1981 for
employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981;
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 8(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.

© 2006 Thomson/West. No

FN1. First Cash's motion to dismiss
includes defenses under Rules 12(b)(2),
12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Famous Pawn's
motion to dismiss does not raise the Rule
12(b)(2) lack of personal jurisdiction
defense. Given the similar nature of the
defendants' separately filed motions for
dismissal, the Court will address both
motions together.

I. BACKGROUND
From June 1997 to September 1998, plaintiff
Monique Johnson-Tanner, a resident of the District
of Columbia and an African American female, was
employed as a salesperson by First Cash and/or by
Famous Pawn. Plaintiff was originally hired to work
at a pawn shop in Georgetown in the District of
Columbia but, after several transfers, she ended up
working at a Silver Spring, Maryland pawn shop.
After being twice denied a transfer back to the
Georgetown store, allegedly because of her race,
plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on May 8,
2001.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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First Cash is a Delaware Corporation with its
prmcipal place of business in Arlington, Texas
Famous Pawn is a Maryland Corporation that
operates pawn shops in Maryland, Virginia and the
District of Columbia First Cash previously was
the subject of a similar employment discrimination
suit, the testimony from which plaintiff relies on
heavily m the instant case FN2
FN2 See Williams v First Cash, Inc, Civ
Action 98-3567 (DC Superior Court
1998)
II PERSONAL JURISDICTION
[1][2][3][4][5] District of Columbia law controls
the extent to which the Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant See
Crane v Carr, 814 F 2d 758, 762 (DC Or 1987)
D C Code Section 13-423(a)(l) provides that the
Court "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person, who acts directly or as an agent, as to a
claim for relief arising from the person's
transacting any busmess in the District of Columbia
" This long-arm provision allows for jurisdiction
to the fullest extent permissible under the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution
See Crane v New York Zoological Soc'y, 894 F 2d
454, 455 (DCCirl990) Due Process is satisfied
where a defendant has "minimum contacts" with the
District of Columbia such that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction will not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice"
International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 U S
310, 316, 66 SCt 154, 90 L Ed 95 (1945) Such
minimum contacts are established where a
defendant "purposefully avails" itself of the
privilege of conducting activities withm the forum
jurisdiction such that the defendant "should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court" there
Hanson v Denckla, 357 U S 235, 253, 78 SCt
1228, 2 LEd2d 1283 (1958) S ee World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 U S 286, 297,
100 SCt 559, 62 LEd2d 490 (1980) The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction by alleging specific
acts linking a defendant with the forum See Crane
v New York Zoological Soc'y, 894 F2d at 456,
© 2006 Thomson/West No

United States v Philip Morris, Inc, 116 F Supp 2d
116, 121 (DDC2000) In deciding whether a
basis for personal jurisdiction exists, factual
discrepancies in the record must be resolved m the
plaintiffs favor See United States v Philip
Morris, Inc, 116 F Supp 2d at 121
In an effort to establish that First Cash transacts
business in the District of Columbia and possesses
the necessary minimum contacts, plaintiff lists
numerous facts indicating that Famous Pawn is "not
its own business, but that of the parent corporation
[First Cash] " Plaintiffs Opposition at 6 ("PI Opp "
) In opposition, First Cash argues that it and
Famous Pawn are in fact separate companies
maintaining all corporate formalities First Cash
further states that it owns no property m the District
of Columbia, is not licensed to do *38 business in
the District and transacts no busmess m the District
This Court finds no genumely separate identity
between First Cash and Famous Pawn, and the
Court therefore has personal jurisdiction over First
Cash (not just over Famous Pawn)
A Alter Ego Analysis
[6][7][8] Ordinarily, a defendant corporation's
contacts with a forum may not be attributed to
affiliated corporations See El-Fadl v Central
Bank of Jordan, 75 F 3d 668, 675-76
(DCCirl996), Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, PC
v Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d 15, 22 (D D C 2000),
Material Supply Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co,
62 F Supp 2d 13, 19 (DDC 1999) An exception
exists, however, when the party contesting
jurisdiction is found to be nothing more than the
alter ego of an affiliated corporation over which the
court does have jurisdiction, in that case the
affiliated corporation's jurisdictional contacts may
be extended to reach the other corporate entity
See El-Fadl v Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F 3d at
676 ("if parent and subsidiary 'are not really
separate entities,'
or one acts as an agent of the
other,
the local subsidiary's contacts can be
imputed to the foreign parent"), Material Supply
Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at
20 (same, where parent corporation so dommates
subsidiary as "to negate its separate personality") "
to Ong U S Govt Works
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In such cases, the foreign parent will be found to be
transacting busmess in the forum state through the
activities of its subsidiary" Color Sys, Inc v
Meteor Photo Reprographic Sys, Inc, 1987 WL
11085, *4 ( D D C 1987) Whether one corporation
is the alter ego of another is a question of law to be
decided by the court See Shapiro, Lifschitz &
Schram, PC v Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d at 22,
Material Supply Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co,
62 F Supp 2d at 19-20
[9] [10] The defendants concede that the Court has
personal jurisdiction over Famous Pawn which
admittedly operates pawn shops in the District of
Columbia The question is whether the Court also
has personal jurisdiction over First Cash as the alter
ego of Famous Pawn To determine whether
Famous Pawn is a separate corporate entity distinct
from First Cash or merely the alter ego of first
Cash, the Court must evaluate (1) whether there is
such a unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of First Cash and Famous
Pawn effectively no longer exist, and (2) whether
an inequitable result would follow if the Court treats
Famous Pawn's allegedly wrongful acts as those of
Famous Pawn alone and not also those of First
Cash See Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P C v
Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d at 23, Material Supply Int'l,
Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at 20
Ultimately, the question is whether the parent
corporation "so dominated the [subsidiary]
corporation as to negate its separate personality,"
making the exercise of jurisdiction over the absent
parent fair and equitable Material Supply Int'l, Inc
v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at 20 (
quoting Hart v Department of Agriculture, 112
F 3d 1228, 1231 (D C Cir 1997))
1 Unity ofInterest and Ownership
[11][12][13] Unity of interest is established if First
Cash had active and substantial control of Famous
Pawn at the time of the alleged racial
discrimination, see Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram,
PC v Hazard, 90 F supp 2d at 23, but this control
does not have to amount to actual day-to-day
control or supervision See Material Supply Int'l,
Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co, 62 F Supp 2d at 20
© 2006 Thomson/West No

Among the factors the Court is to consider in
making this determination are whether there was a
failure to maintain separate corporate minutes or *39
records, a iailure to maintain corporate formalities,
a commingling of funds or other assets, a diversion
of one corporation's funds to the other's uses, the
use of the same office or business location, and/or
a joint accounting and payroll system Id It is also
relevant whether the subsidiary is operated as a
mere division of the parent and/or whether the
subsidiary is operated exclusively in the interest of
the parent See id The transfer of personnel back
and forth between the parent corporation and its
subsidiary or affiliate is another relevant factor
See Color Sys, Inc v Meteor Photo Reprographic
Sys, Inc, 1987 WL 11085 at *5 In this case, a
number of these factors lead the Court to conclude
that there is sufficient unity of interest and
ownership to blur any distinction between the two
companies' respective personalities and to permit
the Court reasonably to exercise personal
jurisdiction over First Cash Fmancial Services
First, First Cash and Famous Pawn share at least
three key common officers and directors Rick
Powell, Alan Barron and Rick Wessel See PI
Opp, Exhibit 22, First Cash Responses to Plaintiffs
Interrogatones at 6, 8 F N 3 Rick Powell is both
Chairman/CEO of First Cash and a Director of
Famous Pawn Alan Barron serves as the Chief
Operatmg Officer of First Cash and as the President
of Famous Pawn Rick Wessel handles the duties of
Chief Financial Officer for both First Cash and
Famous Pawn, he also fills the roles of Director,
Secretary and Treasurer of First Cash Sharing
officers between the parent and the subsidiary or the
presence of "interlocking directorates" are
indicative of common corporate ownership and
control See Color Sys, Inc v Meteor Photo
Reprographic Sys, Inc, 1987 WL 11085 at **5, 6
(finding alter ego test satisfied in part where parent
and subsidiary shared two of three members of
board of directors and where one co-manager of
parent was also president of subsidiary), Shapiro,
Lifschitz & Schram, PC v Hazard, 90 F Supp 2d
at 26 (suggestmg operational nexus where two
seemingly separate construction-related companies
shared the sole employee of one of the companies),
Material Supply Int'l, Inc v Sunmatch Indus Co,
to Ong U S Govt Works

Vit+rWAx^h? wpQtlaw rnm/nrint/nrintstream asnx?rs=WLW6 06&destinatlon=atD&vr=2 0&...

6/15/2006

Page 7

239 F.Supp.2d 34
239 F.Supp.2d 34
(Cite as: 239 F.Supp.2d 34)
62 F.Supp.2d at 22 (strong evidence of control
where president of parent makes all final business
and financial decisions regarding subsidiary).
FN3. Unless otherwise noted, all exhibits
cited herein are Exhibits to Plaintiffs
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.
Second, according to Rick Wessel, none of the
common executives/directors maintains separate
phone or fax lines for their respective dual roles.
See Exhibit 19, September 21, 2001 Deposition of
Rick Wessel at 127-28 ("Wessel Dep"). This is
another indicator that there is a unity of interest and
operations. See Shapiro, Lifschitz <£ Schram, P.C
v. Hazard, 90 F.Supp.2d at 26 n. 11
(undifferentiated use of office equipment such as
phones, faxes, copiers and computers by dual
employees is relevant factor in assessing nature of
corporate ownership and control).
Third, the joint executives/directors listed above
ordered the transfer of at least one employee, Chris
Lee, from First Cash in Texas to the Washington,
D.C. metropolitan region to serve as First Cash or
Famous Pawn's Regional Vice President, with
responsibility for overseeing District of Columbia
stores. See Wessel Dep. at 24; Exhibit 9, 2001
Deposition of Chris Lee at 32. The only stores in
the District of Columbia, it should be noted, were
Famous Pawn shops.FN4 As First Cash's Regional
*40 Vice President, Lee had responsibility for store
operations in Washington, D.C, which included the
responsibility to terminate employees from District
of Columbia-that is, Famous Pawn-stores. See
Exhibit 8, 1998 Deposition of Chris Lee at 16-17.
One of the employees whom Lee terminated was
Cynthia Williams, who worked in a pawn shop
located in Georgetown. Id.
FN4. Lee, who testified that he was
employed by First Cash during his 1998
deposition in Williams v. First Cash, Inc.,
now states that he erroneously labeled
himself a First Cash employee when in fact
he worked for Famous Pawn. See First
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Cash's Reply in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
at 12-13 ("First Cash's Reply"). If this is
true, this only provides farther evidence
that at least one employee was transferred
between the parent and the subsidiary.
Another employee, Karie McBride, testified that
she was hired as First Cash's Regional Human
Resource Director by Scott Williamson, a First
Cash Senior Vice President who subsequently
served as McBride's supervisor. In this position,
McBride had hiring authority, which she exercised
during visits to District of Columbia stores. See
Exhibit 11, 1998 McBride Deposition at 7-8, 13 ("
McBride Dep. I"); Exhibit 34, McBride Trial
Testimony at 3. This statement was made during
McBride's deposition in Williams v. First Cash, Inc.
During McBride's deposition three years later in the
instant case, Ms. McBride claimed to have
mistakenly identified herself as a First Cash
employee during her Williams deposition, and
testified that she-like Chris Lee-was in fact a
Famous Pawn employee. See First Cash's Reply at
13. If McBride was actually a Famous Pawn
employee, hired and supervised by a First Cash
employee, this only further demonstrates First
Cash's exercise of management control and
authority over Famous Pawn employees.
Since the primary focus of the alter ego analysis is
to ascertain whether the parent corporation "so
dominated the [subsidiary] corporation as to negate
its separate personality," see Material Supply Int'l,
Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., 62 F.Supp.2d at 20,
First Cash's control of Famous Pawn supervisory
employees and its high degree of oversight and
management activity-including the hiring and firing
of First Pawn employees-is an extremely relevant
factor, independent of the actual sharing of officers.
See Color Sys., Inc. v. Meteor Photo
Reprographic Sys., Inc., 1987 WL 11085 at *5
(transfer of personnel between parent and
subsidiary is factor for consideration); cf. Richard
v. Bell Atlantic Corp., Inc., 976 F.Supp. 40, 44,
47-48 (D.D.C.1997) (common management of
human resources functions probative of whether
parent
controls
employment
decisions
of
subsidiaries;
evidence
of
"
'consultative
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

http://web2.westlawxom/print/Drintstream.asnx^rs;=WT W6 f>6#ripot;r»at;™=o+~*r,~-o np.

239 F.Supp.2d 34

Page 8

239 F.Supp.2d 34
(Cite as: 239 F.Supp.2d 34)
involvement' with respect to decisions concerning
hiring, promotion, evaluation, work assignments,
training, and discharge" of subsidiary's employees
also relevant factor).
Fourth, according to Ms. McBride, First Cash
headquarters in Arlington, Texas inputs, stores and
maintains nearly all records concerning Famous
Pawn employees, including those employed in the
District of Columbia. See McBride Dep. I at
16-17; see also Wessel Dep. at 66-67, 87. These
personnel files include employment applications,
performance
reviews,
background
checks,
separation (termination) forms-all of which are
supplied by First Cash directly-and information on
employee demographics. See Exhibit 12, 2001
McBride Deposition at 135, 156-57, 161-62 ("
McBride Dep. II"). Ms. McBride forwarded some
of the human resources materials to First Cash in
Texas for processing and storage and regularly
contacted the First Cash employee in charge of
payroll, Phyllis Christian, in order to gain access to
the information contained in the *41 personnel files.
See id. at 158, 180-81; McBride Dep. I at 16-17.
In addition, the First Cash job application telephone
hotline and the employment page on the First Cash
website-both advertised at the Georgetown Famous
Pawn shop-put prospective employees in touch with
John Hamilton, the First Cash human resources
recruiter. See Exhibit 43, Affidavit of Michael
Marraffi[3-5.
Fifth, First Cash and Famous Pawn also maintain
joint payroll and accounting systems. See Wessel
Dep. at 90-91, 110. Employees at First Cash's
Texas headquarters provide "accounting [services],
payroll processing, accounts payable processing
[and] financial statement generation" for Famous
Pawn's District of Columbia stores. Id. at 110 In
fact, Famous Pawn pay stubs bear the name of First
Cash along with its Texas address. See, e.g.,
Exhibit 31 (Monique Tanner Pay Stub). First Cash
also supplies Famous Pawn with income tax
services, including processing "of Famous Pawn's
property taxes, ... sales tax payments and state
income tax filings." Id. Health benefits, 401(k)
account administration, worker's compensation
insurance, an integrated computer network,
computer support and e-mail services also are
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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provided by First Cash to Famous Pawn and First
Cash's other subsidiaries. See Wessel Dep at 44,
47-48,68,91,112.
Although First Cash asserts that these services are
provided through contract, there is no evidence that
First Cash bills Famous Pawn directly for these
services. It appears that First Cash merely
calculates an amount owed by Famous Pawn based
upon Famous Pawn's revenues vis-a-vis the total
revenues from the First Cash family of companies
and then simply deducts that amount from Famous
Pawn accounts-another indicator of a unity of
interest, ownership and control. See Shapiro,
Lifschitz & Schram, P.C v. Hazard, 90 F.Supp.2d
at 24 (unity of financial transactions and no written
documentation
showing
separate
corporate
identities when monetary exchanges are at issue
important factors); cf MCI Communications Corp.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1983 WL 1881, ** 10,
12-13 (D.D.C.1983) (common employee insurance
and stock benefit plans are factors for consideration
in analysis of transacting business venue provision).
Based on all of these factors, the Court concludes
that First Cash exercised a sufficient degree of contr
ol over Famous Pawn and there was a sufficiently
clear unity of interest and ownership that the two
companies cannot be treated as separate and distinct
corporate identities. This Court therefore may
exercise personal jurisdiction over First Cash as
well as Famous Pawn.
2. Inequitable Result
This Court finds that it would create an injustice to
permit First Cash to escape the consequences of its
substantial
connection
to
Famous
Pawn's
employment practices and procedures in the District
of Columbia. It is evident from the record that
there is a unity of interest between the two entities.
First Cash has sufficient ownership and control over
all aspects of Famous Pawn's business to establish
that First Cash is transacting business in the District
of Columbia, and thus to satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction. See
International Shoe Co v. Washington, 326 U.S. at
316, 66 S.Ct. 154. There is nothing unfair or
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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inequitable in treating the wrongful acts of Famous
Pawn (if proven) as those of First Cash as well.
Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 90
F.Supp.2d at 26.
*42 III. VENUE
[14] Defendants also argue that venue is improper
in this district. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), this
district is an appropriate venue if both First Cash
and Famous Pawn reside here. As corporations,
defendants are "deemed to reside in any judicial
district in which [they are] subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced."
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Famous Pawn has never
contested personal jurisdiction because it operates
pawn shops in the District of Columbia. As
discussed above, the Court finds that First Cash is
subject to personal jurisdiction under the D.C.
long-arm statute by virtue of its inextricable links to
and control over Famous Pawn. Thus, venue is
proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

IV. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Plaintiff brings her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which prohibits racial discrimination in the "
making, performance, modification, and termination
of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed
to state a claim because she has not alleged an
adverse employment action in her complaint, an
essential element of a prima facie case of
employment discrimination. See, e.g., Brown v.
Brody, 199 F.3d 446,452 (D.C.Cir.1999).
[15][16] Defendants' argument is of no avail. This
Court need not determine at this stage whether the
denial of plaintiffs lateral transfer constitutes an
adverse action. More to the point, plaintiff is not
required to allege an adverse action in her
complaint. Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs complaint need
only contain a short and plain statement of the claim
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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and the grounds on which it is based, and need not
plead law or match facts with each element of a
legal theory. Therefore, a complaint may be
dismissed for failure to state claim only if "it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of [her] claim which would
entitle [her] to relief." Sparrow v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99,
2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Furthermore, in deciding a
motion to dismiss, the Court must accept plaintiffs
allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in plaintiffs favor. Glymph v. District of
Columbia, 180 F.Supp.2d 111, 114 (D.D.C.2001).
While plaintiff ultimately has the burden of proving
a prima facie case in an employment discrimination
case, she "is not required to set forth the elements
of a prima facie case at the initial pleading stage."
Glymph v. District of Columbia, 180 F.Supp.2d at
114; see Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216
F.3d at 1114 ("[n]one of this, however, has to be
accomplished in the complaint itself.").
[17] Furthermore, Count I of plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint expressly states: "First
Cash/Famous Pawn's refusal to transfer Ms.
Johnson-Tanner on the basis of her race constituted
a violation of her rights under 42 U.S.C. Section
1981 and caused her to be constructively discharged.
" First Amended Complaint H 20 ("Comp.").
This statement clearly puts defendants on notice of
the nature and basis of plaintiffs claim. See
Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1115
. Plaintiff identifies herself as a member of a
minority class, effectively asserts that she requested
and was denied a transfer, and cites three separate
statements that implicate race as a deciding factor in
denying*43 the transfer. See Compl. ff 3, 10,
12, 13, 15-16. Taking these allegations as true, it is
apparent that plaintiffs complaint properly puts
defendants on notice as to the nature and basis of
plaintiffs claims and thus adequately states a claim.
See Glymph v. District of Columbia, 180
F.Supp.2d at 114. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and
failure to state a claim are DENIED; and it is
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for all parties
shall appear for a status conference on January 29,
2003 at 9:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.
D.D.C.,2003.
Johnson-Tanner v. First Cash Financial Services,
Inc.
239 F.Supp.2d 34
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top)
• l:01cv00718 (Docket) (Apr. 02, 2001)
END OF DOCUMENT
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30k934(l) Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals of Utah.
LUCKY SEVEN RODEO CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Pat CLARK, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 880079-CA.
June 9, 1988.
On appeal from summary judgment by the District
Court, Washington County, terminating easement in
property, the Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held
that: (1) language of stipulated court order granting
easement did not clearly and unambiguously require
that dike and reservoir be preserved and area used
for irrigation purposes, and (2) removal of portion
of dike and reservoir did not conclusively result in
abandonment of easement, particularly in light of
ten-year
nonuse
provision
delineated
for
termination thereof.

[3] Appeal and Error €=>1024.4
30k 1024.4 Most Cited Cases
After reviewing facts in light most favorable to
appellant, if Court of Appeals concludes there is
dispute as to material issue of fact it must reverse
trial court's summary judgment and remand for trial
on that issue.
[4] Judgment €=>185(6)
228kl85(6) Most Cited Cases
[4] Judgment €=>186
228k 186 Most Cited Cases
It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed
material facts in ruling on summary judgment, and
it matters not that evidence on one side may appear
to be strong or even compelling; one sworn
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute
averments on other side of controversy and create
issue of fact, precluding entry of summary judgment.

Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error €==>863
30k863 Most Cited Cases
[1] Appeal and Error €=^934(1)
30k934(l) Most Cited Cases
In reviewing summary judgment, Court of Appeals
applies analytical standard required of trial court
and liberally construing facts and viewing evidence
in light most favorable to party opposing motion.
[2] Appeal and Error €=>863
30k863 Most Cited Cases
Because summary judgment is granted as matter of
law rather than fact, Court of Appeals is free to
reappraise trial court's legal conclusion.
[3] Appeal and Error C=>934(1)

[5] Judgment €^181(15.1)
228kl81(15.1) Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 228kl 81(15))
Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether
stipulated court order granting easement required
that dike and reservoir be preserved and area used
for irrigation purposes, precluded summary
judgment terminating easement after portion of dike
was removed and ground was leveled in preparation
for planting.
[6] Judgment €=>91
228k91 Most Cited Cases
Ambiguous stipulated judgment is subject to
construction according to rules that apply to all
written contracts.
[7] Judgment €=^181(8)
228kl81(8) Most Cited Cases
If stipulated judgment is ambiguous and there are
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disputed issues of fact as to what parties intended,
summary judgment is inappropriate.
[8] Contracts €==>256
95k256 Most Cited Cases
"Abandonment" of contract means intentional
relinquishment of one's rights therein, and in order
to nullify such rights there must be clear and
unequivocal showing of such abandonment.
[9] Contracts €==>256
95k256 Most Cited Cases
When there is dispute as to whether "abandonment
of contract" has occurred, it is usually question of
fact to be determined from all facts and
circumstances of particular case, including
expressions of intent and other actions of parties.
[10] Waters and Water Courses €=^165
405k 165 Most Cited Cases
Removal of portion of dike and reservoir did not
conclusively result in abandonment of easement,
particularly in light of ten-year nonuse provision
delineated for termination of easement.
*751 Timothy B. Anderson (argued), Dale R.
Chamberlain,
Jones,
Waldo,
Holbrook
&
McDonough, St. George, for plaintiff and appellant.
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for defendant
and respondent.

In March of 1981, Lucky filed suit against Pat
Clark to quiet title to a parcel of land, hereinafter
referred to as the reservoir and dike area, bordering
their respective properties. On the third day of
trial, the parties negotiated a settlement. The
stipulation was reduced to writing and signed by the
parties and their counsel. An order and judgment
incorporating the stipulation was signed by the
judge on February 13, 1984.
The stipulation and order granted title to the
reservoir and dike area to Pat Clark and Tex Gates,
and granted an easement to Lucky. The easement
relevant to this action is contained in the following
paragraphs, with our emphasis added:
3. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and
its successors and assigns (hereinafter "Plaintiff)
shall have an exclusive and perpetual easement to
use, maintain and operate the reservoir and dyke
arefaj which are described in paragraph 2 above
for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of
animals and agricultural purposes, together with
the obligation that plaintiff shall maintain the
fences enclosing the area hereinabove described.
***
6. In the event the reservoir and Dyke [sic] area
described in paragraph 2 above were to fall into
non-use for a period of Ten (JO) consecutive
years, the easement granted in paragraph 3
above would expire automatically without notice.

Before BENCH, JACKSON and BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation
("Lucky") appeals from a summary judgment which
terminated Lucky's easement in property owned by
respondent Pat Clark. Lucky contends that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment, arguing
that the court misconstrued the unambiguous order
establishing the easement or that the order granting
the easement was ambiguous, and, thus, summary
judgment was inappropriate. We reverse and
remand.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

In 1985, Lucky removed from the easement a
portion of a dike located on the property, and began
to level the ground in preparation for planting. Pat
Clark, the fee owner, filed this action to terminate
Lucky's easement in the property, alleging Lucky's
removal of the reservoir and dike destroyed the
need for the easement, and indicated Lucky's intent
to abandon it. Clark further alleged that Lucky had
failed to maintain the fences on the property and
had in fact destroyed the fences, contrary to the
agreement of the parties, and the consequent court
order.
It is undisputed that Lucky removed the dike, but
there is disagreement as to whether Lucky removed
fences that were part of the easement agreement, or
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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other fences with no relevance to the easement.
Lucky filed an affidavit of its president, Russel
Walter, stating that he understood the easement
agreement to grant alternative uses of the property
and that Lucky had elected to use the property for
agricultural purposes as provided for in the
agreement. Lucky denied any intent to abandon the
easement, and believed that its removal of the dike
and reservoir was consistent with the language of
the easement and the intent of the parties in
allowing use of the property for agricultural
purposes.
The court granted Clark's motion for summary
judgment and terminated Lucky's easement. The
court indicated that there was ambiguity in the
agreement, but stated that it had "a clear memory in
this case" and, in making its decision, had relied
upon its recollection of the previous trial. In
making his ruling, the judge stated:
*752 It is my direct impression that the purpose
of the lawsuit with respect to the area was for a
reservoir and dike. That's my view. I believe
that the purpose of the settlement, the purpose of
the order and judgment of the Court, the purpose
of resolving all of the law suit, was to maintain a
reservoir and dike use. That's not done. Motion
granted.
Lucky appeals the court's entry of summary
judgment, claiming that the court erroneously relied
on its own pre-stipulation recollection of the facts
and claims the stipulation and court order clearly
grant an easement for the use of the property for
agricultural purposes. Lucky further claims that, if
the language is ambiguous, the court erred in
granting Clark's motion for summary judgment
because there was a clear factual dispute as to the
intent of the parties and Lucky's intent to abandon
the easement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3][4] In reviewing a summary judgment, we
apply the analytical standard required of the trial
court. Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P.2d 1155, 1156
(Utah Cr.App.1988). We liberally construe the
facts and view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Moreover, because a summary judgment is granted
as a matter of law rather than fact, we are free to
reappraise the trial court's legal conclusion. Atlas
Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987); Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156; K.O.
v. Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable
to appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a
material issue of fact, we must reverse the trial
court's determination and remand for trial on that
issue. Atlas, 131 P.2d at 229; Denison, 748 P.2d at
590. It is inappropriate for courts to weigh
disputed material facts in ruling on a summary
judgment. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc.,
740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987); WM Barnes
Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56,
59 (Utah 1981); Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156. It
matters not that the evidence on one side may
appear to be strong or even compelling. Spor, 740
P.2d at 1308; Oberhansly, 751 P.2d at 1156. One
sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to
dispute the averments on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding
the entry of summary judgment. W.M. Barnes, 627
P.2d at 59; Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1975).
ORDER GRANTING EASEMENT
[5] After an independent review, in a light most
favorable to Lucky, we cannot conclude, as a matter
of law, that the language of the stipulated court
order granting the easement clearly and
unambiguously requires that the dike and reservoir
be preserved and the area used for irrigation
purposes. The determinative paragraphs of the
stipulation and order are paragraphs 3 and 6 which
provide with our emphasis:
3. Plaintiff Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation and
its successors and assigns (hereinafter "Plaintiff)
shall have an exclusive and perpetual easement to
use, maintain and operate the reservoir and dyke
arefa] which are described in paragraph 2 above
for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of
animals and agricultural purposes, together with
the obligation that plaintiff shall maintain the
fences enclosing the area hereinabove described.
** *
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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6. In the event the reservoir and Dyke [sic] area
described in paragraph 2 above were to fall into
non-use for a period of Ten (10) consecutive
years, the easement granted in paragraph 3 above
would expire automatically without notice.
The stipulation and order create an easement to
use, maintain and operate the reservoir and dike
area for irrigation, stock watering, corralling of
animals and agricultural purposes. The language
creates an easement which terminates only if the
property falls into non-use, for a period of 10
consecutive years. For the trial court's entry of
summary judgment to be correct, this court must
read the stipulation as unambiguously providing
that all uses of the *753 easement must continue or
the easement is terminated or that the failure of
Lucky to maintain the reservoir and dike located on
the land terminated the easement. We agree with
the trial court that this order is ambiguous. It is
ambiguous as to what is meant by "maintain" and
whether the uses of the easement are alternative.
This is further confused by the language that, in any
event, any non-use must continue for 10 years
before the easement expires.
AMBIGUITY OF SETTLEMENT ORDER
[6] [7] An ambiguous judgment is subject to
construction according to the rules that apply to all
written contracts. Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign
Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). If the
judgment is ambiguous, and if there are disputed
issues of fact as to what the parties intended,
summary judgment is inappropriate. Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983);
Amjacs Interwest Inc. v. Design Assoc, 635 P.2d
53, 55 (Utah 1981). [FN1] Extrinsic evidence as to
the intent of the parties must be received and
considered in an effort to glean what the parties
actually agreed to. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 748
P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
FN1. The trial judge seemed to rely on his
independent
recollection
of
the
pre-settlement hearing to interpret the
ambiguity in the settlement order. This is
clearly inappropriate. See Carr v.
Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah 2d 415,
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

464 P.2d 580, 581 (1970).
In the instant case, the facts as to what the parties
intended are vigorously disputed. There was
competent evidence before the court that the parties
intended alternative uses for the dike and reservoir
area and that the reservoir was not required to be
preserved.
Lucky's president filed a sworn
affidavit stating that he understood the stipulated
order to provide alternative uses for the property
and that the water pipe line installed eliminated the
need for a reservoir. Clark filed a conflicting
affidavit stating the removal of the dike and
reservoir destroyed the intended purpose of the
easement.
Thus,
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate and the trial court must hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine the scope and
purpose of the easement.
ABANDONMENT
[8] [9] The trial court determined that Lucky
abandoned the easement by its removal of the dike
and reservoir. Abandonment means the intentional
relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and
in order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear
and unequivocal showing of such abandonment.
Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d
481, 484 (Utah 1975). When there is dispute as to
whether abandonment has occurred, it is usually a
question of fact to be determined from all the facts
and circumstances of the particular case, including
the expressions of intent and other actions of the
parties. Id.; Thermo-Kinetic Corp. v. Allen, 16
Ariz.App. 341, 493 P.2d 508, 512 (1972).
[10] Based on the record before us, we cannot say
what the intended purpose of the easement was, and
thus cannot find, as a matter of law, that Lucky's
removal of the dike and reservoir resulted in an
abandonment of the easement, particularly in light
of the 10 year non-use provision delineated for
termination of the easement.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand for a hearing in conformance with our
opinion.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Supreme Court of Utah.
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Leo W. HARDY, M.D., Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20000501.
Aug. 30, 2002.
Doctor brought action against county hospital after
hospital's board of trustees voided contract under
which doctor was to provide pathological services
to hospital. The District Court, Eighth District,
Duchesne County, John R. Anderson, J., granted
hospital's motion for summary judgment. Doctor
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate
C.J., held that: (1) contract involved a proprietary
function and therefore was enforceable against
successor boards of trustees if of a reasonable
duration; (2) issue of whether contract was of a
reasonable duration required remand; and (3) term
of length could not be read into contract.
Remanded with instructions.
Russon, J., concurred in part and dissented in part
with opinion in which Howe, J., concurred.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error €=>863
30k863 Most Cited Cases
In deciding whether the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme
Court gives no deference to the trial court's view of
the law; it is reviewed for correctness.

[2] Municipal Corporations €==>232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Government contracts that extend beyond the term
of the governing body that originally entered into
the contract represent a public policy concern, as
such contracts, if enforced, potentially allow a
former governing body to perpetuate its policies
beyond its term and thereby limit a successor
governing body's ability to respond to the public's
changing needs.
[3] Municipal Corporations €==>232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Under the governmental/proprietary test to
determine whether a government contract should be
enforced against a successor governing body, a
contract is (1) unenforceable against successor
governing bodies if it involves a governmental
power or function, but (2) enforceable against
successor governing bodies if it involves a
proprietary power or function and is of a reasonable
duration.
[4] Municipal Corporations 4^*7 I1
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court declined to repudiate the
governmental/proprietary test, used to determine
whether a government contract should be enforced
against a successor government body.
[5] Counties €=^114
104kl 14 Most Cited Cases
Contract for pathology services between doctor and
county hospital involved a proprietary function and
therefore was enforceable against successor boards
of trustees if it was of a reasonable duration;
services provided were not indispensable to the
proper functioning of government, and doctor
merely recommended policies related to hospital's
pathology laboratory, while the board of trustees
retained ultimate decision making authority.
[6] Appeal and Error €=^172(1)

© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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30k 172(1) Most Cited Cases
Doctor failed to raise argument in trial court that the
county hospital's successor board of trustees was
precluded from terminating his personal services
contract with hospital because the board earlier
ratified it, and thus Supreme Court declined to hear
argument on appeal.
[7] Appeal and Error €=>1178(1)
30k 1178(1) Most Cited Cases
Issue of whether contract between doctor and
county hospital for doctor to provide pathological
services was of a reasonable duration at the time
they entered into the contract, and thus whether
contract was an enforceable
proprietary
contract
under
the
governmental/proprietary test, required remand.
[8] Municipal Corporations €=^232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Whether a contract's duration is reasonable for
purposes of governmental/proprietary test to
determine whether a government contract is binding
on successor governing bodies depends on the
circumstances of each case.
[9] Municipal Corporations €=^232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Depending on the circumstances, a lengthy or
indefinite contractual duration is not necessarily an
unreasonable
duration
under
the
governmental/proprietary test for a public contract
to exist.
[10] Counties €==>126
104k 126 Most Cited Cases
Term of length could not be read into personal
services contract between doctor and county
hospital; contract did not specify a duration,
contract provided for termination for "just cause,"
parties agreed in their appellate briefs that the
contract was of indefinite length, and term was not
necessary to determine prospective damages for
breach of the contract.
[11] Contracts €=>9(3)
95k9(3) Most Cited Cases
Parties have the right to enter into indefinite length
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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contracts terminable for cause.
[12] Labor and Employment C=?47
23 lHk47 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant)
[12] Reformation of Instruments €==>16
328k 16 Most Cited Cases
When a contract for employment or personal
services does not recite a fixed term, the law does
not call for the judicial reformation of the contract
to impose a term, especially when neither party
disputes the contract was of indefinite duration.
*1166 Blaine J. Bernard, Eric G. Maxfield,
Christine T. Greenwood, E. Blaine Rawson, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.
John P. Harrington, Joni J. Jones, Melissa H. Bailey
, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
INTRODUCTION
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
**1 This appeal concerns the voidability of certain
government contracts. Specifically, we consider
the question of when a contract entered into by a
predecessor governing body is voidable by a
successor governing body.
Throughout the
country, substantial case law has developed to
distinguish between those government contracts that
may be voided and those that may not be voided by
a successor governing body. Various common law
tests have been articulated, all designed to balance
the tension between the right of a successor
governing body to implement its own policies and
not be bound by those of a former body, and the
interest in providing some certainty to parties who
contract with governing bodies. Utah courts have
relied on the governmental/proprietary test, a test
under which contracts involving proprietary
functions and having reasonable durations are
enforceable against successor governing bodies.
**2 In this case, the district court granted
summary judgment to a county hospital on the
theory that the particular contract at issue, a
contract for the provision of pathological services to
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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the hospital by a doctor, was voidable by the
hospital's governing body-its board of trustees
The district court held that the contract had been
entered into by a predecessor board and thus was
voidable by successor boards
**3 Because we conclude that the contract for
pathological services involves a proprietary
function, we remand with instructions that the
district court determine whether the contract's
duration was reasonable

BACKGROUND
**4 The following facts are undisputed
On
November 29, 1994, Dr Leo Hardy entered into a
contract with Uintah Basin Medical *1167 Center
("UBMC"), a hospital owned by Duchesne County
and operated by a board of trustees Under the
terms of the contract, Dr Hardy received $400 per
month for providmg UBMC pathological services
on a part-time basis and serving as the director of its
pathology laboratory The contract did not recite a
termination date, but provided that either party
could terminate the contract for "just cause"
following ninety days' notice
**5 Although Dr Hardy performed his contractual
obligations
satisfactorily
and
received
no
complaints from UBMC or its medical staff, on July
18, 1996, the UBMC board of trustees voted to give
Dr Hardy ninety days' notice and invite another
doctor to join its medical staff as a pathologist and
emergency room physician
When Dr Hardy's
termination became effective, UBMC sought a
declaratory judgment that it had "just cause" to
terminate the contract Dr Hardy counterclaimed,
contending that UBMC materially breached the
contract by terminating him because UBMC did not
have "just cause" The district court initially
denied the parties' respective motions for summary
judgment, ruling that the jury would decide whether
UBMC had "just cause"
**6 Following this ruling, the district court
accepted supplemental briefing from the parties on
an issue UBMC had raised for the first time in its
answer to Dr Hardy's counterclaim whether the
contract violated common law rules against
© 2006 Thomson/West No

government contracts that bind successor governing
bodies After hearing from the parties, the court
granted UBMC summary judgment on the ground
that the contract was voidable even without " 'just
cause' simply because it could not bind successor
Boards" In reachmg this conclusion, the district
court explained, "Due to the rapid advance of
science, medicme [sic] changes and needs of
patients there should be no reason for such an
agreement to continue into the future or be binding
on successor [b]oards where the governing [b]oard
is a governmental entity" Dr Hardy appeals
Section 78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code gives us
appellate jurisdiction over this case Utah Code
Ann § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp 2001)
AINAL¥S1S
I STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] **7 "In decidmg whether the trial court
correctly granted [summary] judgment as a matter
of law, 'we give no deference to the trial court's
view of the law, we review it for correctness' "
SME Indus, Inc v Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback
& Assocs, 2001 UT 54, f 9, 28 P 3d 669 (quoting
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, lnc v
Blomquist, 173 P 2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989))
II RATIONALE BEHIND COMMON LAW
RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS THAT BIND
SUCCESSOR GOVERNING BODIES
**8 Before addressing Dr Hardy's specific claims
on appeal, we briefly discuss the rationale behind
the common law rules regarding contracts that bind
successor governing bodies
[2] **9 Government contracts raise public policy
concerns beyond those involved with private
contracts See, eg, Mitchell v Chester Hous
Auth, 389 Pa 314, 132 A 2d 873, 876 (1957)
One such concern involves contracts that extend
beyond the term of the governing body that
originally entered into the contract Such contracts,
if enforced, potentially allow a former governing
body to perpetuate its policies beyond its term and
thereby limit a successor governing body's ability to
respond to the public's changing needs
See
generally Figuly v City of Douglas, 853 F Supp
i to Ong U S Govt Works
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**10 While such concerns militate against
enforcing a predecessor governing body's contracts
against its successors, the common law also
recognizes
a
countervailing
concern: that
permitting
successor
governing
bodies
to
indiscriminately terminate government contracts
may make private parties hesitant to contract with
government entities, thereby reducing the viability
of contracts as a means of solving public
problems. See Plant Food Co. v. City of Charlotte,
214 N.C. 518, 199 S.E. 712, 714 (1938).
[3][4] **11 A desire to accommodate these
competing concerns animates the various common
law tests for determining whether a *1168 contract
should be enforced against a successor governing
body. The test on which Utah courts rely is known
as the governmental/proprietary test. See Bair v.
Layton City Corp., 6 Utah 2d 138, 147-48, 307
P.2d 895, 902 (1957); see also Salt Lake City v.
State, 22 Utah 2d 37, 42, 448 P.2d 350, 354 (1968)
(holding that contract for providing water to state
capitol grounds was enforceable under the
governmental/proprietary test). [FN1] Under the
governmental/proprietary test, a contract is (1)
unenforceable against successor governing bodies if
it involves a governmental power or function, but
(2) enforceable against successor governing bodies
if it involves a proprietary power or function and is
of a reasonable duration. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at
147-48, 307 P.2d at 902.
FN1. Citing various criticisms of the
governmental/proprietary test, both parties
urge us to repudiate it in favor of other
common law tests. However, because the
parties have failed to show that any of their
suggested tests is clearly better than the
governmental/proprietary test, we decline
to repudiate it at this time. See State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994)
(noting that because of stare decisis,
"[t]hose asking us to overturn prior
precedent have a substantial burden of
persuasion").

**12
Having
set
forth
the
governmental/proprietary test, we next apply it to
Dr. Hardy's contract to determine whether the
contract may be validly enforced against successor
hospital boards of trustees.
III. WHETHER DR. HARDY'S CONTRACT IS
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST SUCCESSOR
BOARDS OF
TRUSTEES
[5][6] * *13 Dr. Hardy maintains the district court
erred in concluding that his contract was voidable
because it bound successor boards. [FN2] Relying
on the governmental/proprietary test, Dr. Hardy
argues that his contract for pathological services
involves a proprietary function and therefore was
enforceable against successor boards provided it is
of a reasonable duration. We agree.
FN2. Dr. Hardy also argues that the
rationale behind the common law rules
does not apply (1) to appointed, staggered
boards like the UBMC board of trustees,
or (2) until a majority of the nine voting
members of the board are replaced. These
arguments are without merit. First, the
rationale behind the common law rules
applies to appointed, staggered governing
bodies because preexisting contracts may
also unduly inhibit these bodies in the
performance of their public duties. See
Mitchell, 132 A.2d at 877-78; Piedmont
Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124,
459 S.E.2d 876, 882 (App.1995).
Second, there is inadequate support in the
law for the contention that a majority
turnover in the UBMC board is required
before the board can challenge the
contract. See Mariano & Assocs., P.C v.
Bd of County Comm'rs, 131 P.2d 323, 331
(Wyo.1987) (concluding that precedent did
not support argument that turnover in
board was required before it could
challenge validity of contract).
In addition, Dr. Hardy argues that the
successor UBMC board was precluded
from terminating his contract because the
board earlier ratified it. Since this issue
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was not raised below, we decline to
address it. See Monson v. Carver, 928
P.2dl017, 1022 (Utah 1996).
A. Dr. Hardy's Contract Was Proprietary in
Nature
k
* 14 The factors on which courts have relied to
distinguish between governmental and proprietary
contracts strongly support the conclusion that Dr.
Hardy's contract for pathological services involves a
proprietary function. First, UBMC has not
demonstrated that the services Dr. Hardy provides
under the contract are "indispensable to the proper
functioning of government." County Council v. SHL
Systemhouse Corp., 60 F.Supp.2d 456, 465
(E.D.Pa.1999). To the contrary, consistent with the
view that Dr. Hardy's contract did not involve
functions essential to governance, Duchesne County
conveyed the hospital to a non-profit organization
on July 3, 2000.
**15 Moreover, under the terms of the contract,
Dr. Hardy merely recommended, but did not have
authority to set, policies related to UBMC's
pathology laboratory. The board's retention of this
policymaking discretion weighs heavily in favor of
deeming the contract proprietary. See Rhode
Island Student Loan Auth. v. NELS, Inc., 550 A.2d
624, 627 (R.I. 1988) (concluding contract was
proprietary because contracting party "could neither
exercise discretion nor set policy in performance of
its duties").
**16 Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Hardy's
contract involves a proprietary function.
*1169 B. Whether Dr. Hardy's Contract Was of
Reasonable Duration Depends on
the Scope of the Contract's "Just Cause" Provision
[7][8][9]
**17
Under
the
governmental/proprietary
test,
Dr.
Hardy's
proprietary contract is enforceable if its duration
was reasonable at the time the parties executed the
contract. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at 148, 307 P.2d at 902.
Whether a contract's duration is "reasonable"
depends on the circumstances of each case. See,
e.g., id, 6 Utah 2d at 143, 148, 307 P.2d at 899, 903
(holding that a fifty-year sewage treatment contract
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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was valid because its lengthy duration allowed city
to obtain treatment facilities without undue delay
and expense, and also facilitated long-term
planning). Depending on the circumstances, a
lengthy or indefinite contractual duration is not
necessarily unreasonable. See id.; see also Salt
Lake City, 22 Utah 2d at 42, 448 P.2d at 354
(validating contract that required city to provide
free water to land as long as the land served as the
state capitol grounds, noting that city derives
continuing economic benefit from capitol's
presence).
**18 As the record has been inadequately
developed on the issue of the reasonableness of the
contract's duration, we remand to permit the district
court to allow further development of the record
and to then make this determination. On remand,
as a preliminary matter, the district court should
interpret the intended scope of the contract's "just
cause" provision, [FN3] since the reasonableness of
the contract's duration depends in large part on the
amount of discretion this provision gives to
successor boards. For example, if the "just cause"
provision gives successor boards broad discretion to
terminate Dr. Hardy (e.g., to improve patient care,
for fiscal considerations), the contract is more likely
to be of a reasonable duration than if the "just
cause" provision permitted termination only for
deficient job performance. In evaluating whether
the duration is reasonable, the district court may
also find it useful to compare Dr. Hardy's contract
to the agreements UBMC typically enters into with
medical professionals.
For example, UBMC's
bylaws concerning its medical staff suggest that
UBMC routinely enters into agreements under
which the only practical durational limit is a
liberally-construed "just cause" provision. [FN4]
The extent to which the durational limitations in Dr.
Hardy's contract conform to UBMC's usual
practices in similar situations may factor into the
district court's reasonableness assessment.
FN3. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
2002 UT 6, f 64, 44 P.3d 663 (noting that
determination of scope of contractual
"clause is a question of law for
determination by the district court because
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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it is a matter of contract interpretation").
FN4. Under UBMC's bylaws, although
appointments to the medical staff are
ostensibly limited to two years, staff
members are reappointed unless there is
"just cause." Under the bylaws, "just
cause" appears to have a broad scope: for
instance, the board may terminate a
member of the medical staff for any reason
"reasonably related to the delivery of
quality patient care."
**19 If the district court determines that the
contract's duration is reasonable, the contract is
enforceable. The court should then determine
whether the UBMC board had "just cause" to
terminate Dr. Hardy. On the other hand, if the
district court determines that the contract's duration
is unreasonable, the court should not enforce the
contract.
[10][11] **20 The dissent maintains that a term
should be implied into Dr. Hardy's contract. In
support of its argument, the dissent relies on canons
of construction that have been developed to aid
courts in discerning the parties' intent when a
contract fails to specify a duration. We reject the
dissent's position for several reasons. First, and
most importantly, neither party has argued in their
briefs in favor of implying a term. To the contrary,
both parties maintain that the contract should be
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract whose
duration is limited only by the "just cause"
provision. [FN5] In effect, *1170 then, the parties
have implicitly stipulated that the contract has an
indefinite term. [FN6] Implying a term would
therefore result in a contract that is contrary to the
intent of either party and violate the preeminent
goal of contractual interpretation (i.e., to give effect
to the intent of the parties). Buehner Block Co v.
UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
Accordingly, because the parties agree that the
contract should be treated as an indefinite-length
contract, there is no need to rely on canons of
construction for resolving ambiguities over whether
the parties intended the contract be of indefinite
duration. [FN7]

FN5. Dr. Hardy asserts the following in his
appellate brief:
To entice excellent physicians to move to
and remain in rural areas, hospitals often
add perks to the contracts, including "just
cause" termination provisions, or even
"lifetime"
contracts...
Given
the
necessities of the situation, such contracts
are of reasonable duration. Thus, [Dr.
Hardy's contract | passes the second part of
the Bair test...
Appellant's Br. at 21.
Despite disagreeing with Dr. Hardy on the
ultimate conclusion of whether an
indefinite-length contract with a "just
cause" provision is of reasonable duration,
UBMC clearly agrees that the contract was
of indefinite duration:
The potentially perpetual duration of Dr.
Hardy's contract with UBMC was limited
only by the "just cause" provision.... [Dr.
Hardy's] contract bound Duchesne County
indefinitely....
Appellee's Br. at 28-29.
FN6. The dissent acknowledges that
parties may enter into an indefinite-length
contract.
FN 7. The dissent acknowledges that "both
parties contend that the contract should be
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract
limited only by just cause," yet nonetheless
argues for the imposition of a fixed
duration. The dissent has cited no cases,
nor are we aware of any, in which we
rejected parties' mutual concessions that
are in harmony and clearly expressed.
Given that the goal in interpreting
contracts is to give effect to the intent of
the parties, we should be particularly
reluctant to reject the parties' stipulations
or concessions in this case.
The clear import of the parties' concessions
is that the parties intended the contract to
be of indefinite duration. The imposition
of a fixed duration is therefore
incompatible wilh the parties' concessions.
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Moreover, the law in Utah and numerous
other jurisdictions recognizes the right of
parties to enter into indefinite length
contracts terminable for cause. Johnson v.
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,
1000-01 & n. 9 (Utah 1991); e.g., Shah v.
Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d
489, 491-92 (Ky.1983). In short, the
imposition of a term would contradict the
parties' stated intent, disregard their legal
arguments, and impede their freedom to
contract. This we decline to do.
Significantly,
the
dissent
also
acknowledges that the parties have not
argued in their appellate briefs that a term
should be implied into the contract. In the
absence of adequate briefing, it would be
ill-advised for the court to raise this issue
sua sponte, especially if the dissent is
correct in asserting that this issue presents
a question of first impression. Prince v.
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f
59, 56P.3d 524, 2002 WL 1610562 ("On
myriad occasions, we have held that we
will not address issues inadequately
briefed.").
[12] **21 Second, conspicuously absent from the
dissent's analysis is any citation to Utah precedent
that supports its position. Contrary to the dissent's
position, when a contract for employment or
personal services does not recite a fixed term, the
law in Utah does not call for the judicial
reformation of the contract to impose a term,
especially where, as here, neither party disputes the
contract was of indefinite duration. Indeed, in a
case in which we traced the historical development
of the law associated with employment contracts,
we specifically noted that courts long ago
repudiated a common law rule under which a term
was implied when an employment contract did not
specify a duration. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,
Ill P.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Utah 1989). [FN8] In its
place, courts in Utah and elsewhere adopted the
at-will employment rule, under which employment
contracts that did not specify a duration were
generally presumed to be terminable at will. Id. at
1041. In time, Utah recognized an exception under

which an employee could rebut the at-will
presumption associated with
indefinite-length
contracts by showing the parties intended the
contract be terminable for cause. Johnson, 818 P.2d
at 1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany v. Nordstrom,
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1991). Significantly,
nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or Berube suggests
that a court should sua sponte impose a term on an
indefinite-length employment contract that provides
for termination for cause.
FN8. Although Berube was a plurality
opinion, a majority of the court concurred
in the portion of the opinion that traced the
historical development of the common law
of employment contracts.
**22 Applying Utah precedent It) I)? Hardy's
contract confirms our view that a term should not be
read into the contract. First, because Dr. Hardy's
contract does not specify a duration, under Utah law
we initially presume it is of indefinite duration but
terminable at will. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040-41.
We do not apply the long-since rejected rule *1171
that previously required the implication of a term.
Id. Second, we consider whether any of the
exceptions to the at-will rule applies. In this
regard, we note that the parties expressly provided
the contract was terminable for "just cause." We
further note that the parties agree in their appellate
briefs that the contract is of indefinite length and
terminable only for "just cause." Accordingly, we
conclude that the at-will presumption has been
rebutted and Dr. Hardy's indefinite-length contract
is terminable for "just cause." Johnson, 818 P.2d at
1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany, 812 P.2d at 54.
[FN9]
FN9. The cases cited by the dissent are (1)
from other jurisdictions and therefore not
binding and (2) are either distinguishable
from, or inapposite to, the present case.
In reaching its conclusion, the dissent
relies heavily on cases not involving
employment contracts. This reliance is
tenuous given the fact that courts have
developed a unique set of rules for
employment
and
personal
service
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contracts. See generally Berube, 111 P.2d
at 1040-41; Consol Theatres, Inc. v.
Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local
16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447
P.2d 325, 335 & n. 12 (1968) (noting that
due to special policy considerations
associated with employment contracts,
such contracts are exempt from rule
applicable to other contracts under which
courts imply a term when a contract is
silent as to duration).
For
example,
the
dissent
cites
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's
Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544, 549
(Ky.1970) in support of its position. That
case did not involve an employment
contract, however, and, moreover, when
faced with an employment contract, the
relevant jurisdiction (Kentucky) relies on
rules of interpretation specifically tailored
to employment contracts. Shah v. Am.
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489,
491-92 (Ky.1983) (confirming parties'
right to enter into contracts under which
person is employed for an indefinite period
of time and may be terminated only for
cause). Accordingly, the more pertinent
case from the cited jurisdiction is
consistent with the view that when an
employment contract is silent as to
duration, courts generally do not imply a
fixed term of years. See id. Instead, as in
Johnson, Kentucky courts presume such a
contract is terminable at will unless the
parties clearly express another criterion for
termination (e.g., for cause). Id.
The cases cited by the dissent that involve
employment
contracts
provide
little
support for its conclusion that a term must
be imposed on Dr. Hardy's contract. For
example,
when
faced
with
an
indefinite-length employment contract, ihQ
court in Paisley v. Lucas did not impose a
term but rather applied rules of
construction specific
to employment
contracts. 346 Mo. 827, 143 S.W.2d 262,
271 (1940).
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

**23 Finally, we disagree with the dissent's
contention that the imposition of a term is justified
as a means of easing the calculation of prospective
damages. [FN 10] The dissent itself concedes that
parties can contract for an indefinite term. In
making this concession, the dissent implicitly
acknowledges that, to give effect to the parties'
intent, courts inevitably and routinely need to
determine damages associated with a breach of an
indefinite employment contract. In making such
determinations, courts have relied on various factors
in addressing the kinds of concerns raised by the
dissent:
FN 10. The dissent asks the following:
[If hospital breached the contract], how
would
Dr.
Hardy's
damages
be
calculated? Would Dr. Hardy be entitled
to all of his loss of earnings under the
indefinite contract? [W]ould he be entitled
to compensation ... to the date of his
death? To the date of his retirement? To
the date of his inability to perform his job
responsibilities .. ?
While a district court has considerable experience
in calculating future earnings, some basis must
appear in the record for such an award. Some of
the factors which district courts have employed to
alleviate the speculative nature of future damage
awards include an employee's duty to mitigate,
"the availability of employment opportunities, the
period within which one by reasonable efforts
may be re-employed, the employee's work and
life expectancy, the discount tables to determine
the present value of future damages and other
factors that are pertinent on prospective damage
awards."
Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., Ill F.2d 1155, 1160
(6th Cir.1985) (quoting Koyen v. Consol. Edison
Co., 560 F.Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y.1983)).
"It is not difficult to determine the ... factors that are
pertinent on prospective damage awards." Koyen,
560 F.Supp. at 1168-69. Regardless, while the
determination of damages presents challenges, so
would the determination of a "reasonable" duration,
especially when both parties on appeal appear
resistant to the imposition of a term.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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CONCLUSION
**24 We conclude that Dr. Hardy's contract for
pathological services is a proprietary *1172
contract, and thus is enforceable against successor
UBMC boards of trustees if it is of a reasonable
duration. Accordingly, we remand to the district
court to permit it to determine whether the
contract's duration is reasonable.
**25 Remanded.
**26 Chief Justice DURHAM and Judge BENCH
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.
RUSSON, Justice,
dissenting in part.

concurring

in

part

and

**27 I concur with the majority opinion that the
contract in question is proprietary in nature and
could therefore bind the successor trustees of the
hospital. However, I differ with the analysis of the
opinion as to how the trial court is to determine the
reasonableness of the duration of the contract on
remand.
**28 Well-settled canons of contract construction
and interpretation dictate that the trial court, when
faced with a contract of employment that is silent as
to its duration, and thus indefinite in length, but
expressly terminable only for just cause, should
determine by implication a reasonable term of
duration under the circumstances and then imply
that reasonable term into the contract as a matter of
law. Once the trial court determines a reasonable
term and implies it into the contract as a matter of
law, the trial court then should evaluate the implied
duration of the contract to determine if the duration
of the contract was reasonable for purposes of
deciding whether the successor trustees of the
hospital are bound by the contract.
**29 The employment contract between Uintah
Basin Medical Center and Dr. Hardy did not
include a specific term of duration and therefore
was of indefinite duration or perpetual in nature. It
did, however, expressly indicate that the contract
could be terminated only for just cause. Corbin on
Contracts provides guidance on how to treat such a
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

contract and indicates what legal effect such a
contract is to be given when it states:
When parties make a contract of employment
without specifying the length of service, but
indicate that it is not terminable at will, the legal
effect is that the parties are bound for a
"reasonable time."
This is based upon
"implication" [i.e., the implication of a reasonable
term of duration].
Catherine M.A. McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts
§ 34.11, at 262 (revised ed.1999) (emphasis added);
see also Consol Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage
Employees Union Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73
Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325, 335 (1968) (en banc);
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp. v. Miller Chem. Co., 137
Neb. 142, 288 N.W. 538, 541 (1939); Tavel v.
Olsson, 91 Nev. 359, 535 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1975);
Smith v. Knutson, 76 N.D. 375, 36 N.W.2d 323,
328 (1949), overruled on other grounds by
Neibauer v. Well, 319 N.W.2d 143 (N.D.1982);
Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1957)
("Now it is doubtless true that, in contracts of the
general type of the instant one [an employment
contract for services], a term of reasonable duration
may be implied, with the result that they are not
void for lack of an essential provision and are not
terminable
at
will.");
Edwards
v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 61 Wash.2d 593, 379 P.2d
735, 738 (1963); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment
Relationship § 38 (1996) (citing Shah v. Am.
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.1983)
). [FN1] *1173 This is precisely the situation
presented in the instant case.
FN1. The majority opinion criticizes this
dissent for its citation to applicable,
persuasive authority from the highest
courts of our kindred states and dismisses
that authority as nonbinding. Where this
court has not addressed a particular
question of law and where authoritative
precedent from our own jurisdiction is
absent, this court has not been reluctant to
seek out the experience, reasoning, and
counsel of the decisions of other high
courts as persuasive guidance in our
deliberations.
The majority opinion also criticizes the
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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dissent for its citation to certain cases
involving contracts other than for the
provision of employment or personal
services However, all of the cases cited
in this paragraph involve contracts ior
employment or personal services
This
dissent
does cite
to
other
nonemployment contract cases later in %
32 for the additional proposition that
courts generally will imply a term of
duration into indefinite-length contracts
The majority opinion mamtains that those
nonemployment cases are inapposite and
that this dissent's reliance on them is
tenuous because the courts have developed
"a unique set of rules for employment and
personal services contracts"
To the
extent that the cases mentioned by the
majority opinion as recognizmg special
and different rules for employment
contracts actually refer to special rules or
policy considerations for employment
contracts, they do so only m reference to
the adoption of the general "at-will"
employment doctrine and its exceptions
Those cases do not recognize special and
different rules with respect to the propriety
of implying a reasonable term into an
employment contract that is silent as to its
duration but outside of the "at-will"
employment doctrine because of the
explicit inclusion of an express "just
cause" provision, such as the contract at
issue here In this regard, the majority
opinion misreads Berube v Fashion
Centre, Ltd, 771 P2d 1033 (Utah 1989),
Consolidated Theatres, Inc, Shah, and
Paisley v Lucas, 346 Mo 827, 143
SW2d 262 (1940)
The cases cited
herein otherwise stand for the proposition
for which they are cited and support the
implication of duration for a reasonable
period
**30 The determination of what constitutes a
"reasonable
time"
of
duration
of
the
indefinite-length employment contract that is not
terminable at will is either "(1) the time that seems

reasonable in the light of the circumstances existing
when the contract was made [or] (2) the time that
seems reasonable m light of the circumstances as
they occur during the course of performance"
McCauhff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34 11, at 262
The reasonableness of an implied duration term is a
question of fact and is determined in reference to
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the
situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the
contract See William B Tanner Co v Sparta
Tomah-Broad Co, 716 F2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th
Cirl983), Metal Assocs, lnc v E Side Metal
Spinning & Stamping Corp, 165 F 2d 163, 165 (2d
Cirl947), Consol Theatres, Inc, 73 Cal Rptr
213, 447 P2d at 335, Brown Loan & Abstract Co
v Willis, 150 Ga 122, 102 SE 814, 815 (1920),
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp, 288 NW at 541, Tavel,
535 P2d at 1288, Borough of W Caldwell v
Borough oj Caldwell, 26 N J 9, 138 A 2d 402, 412
(1958), Hall, 308 S W 2d at 16-17, 17B C J S
Contracts § 440 (1999), Margaret N Kniffm, 5
Corbin on Contracts § 24 29 (revised ed 1998)
**31 Corbm on Contracts ' suggested treatment of
contracts of this nature is based upon and supported
by well-settled principles and rules of contract
construction and interpretation In the instant case,
the employment contract was silent as to its
duration
and
therefore
indefinite
or
perpetual Contracts of perpetual duration are
generally disfavored by the law See Paisley v
Lucas, 346 Mo 827, 143 SW2d 262, 270 (1940)
("The courts are prone to hold against the theory
that a contract confers a perpetuity of right or
imposes a perpetuity of obligation" (quotation
omitted)), see also Borough of W Caldwell, 138
A 2d at 412, Farley v Salow, 67 Wis 2d 393, 227
N W 2d 76, 82 (1975) Interpretations which avoid
construing a contract to have an indefinite duration
are preferable See Borough of W Caldwell 138
A 2d at 412-13, Farley, 227 N W 2d at 82,
Kovachik v Am Auto Ass'n, 5 Wis 2d 188, 92
N W 2 d 254, 256 (1958)
Because the law
disfavors contracts of perpetual performance or
duration, courts will interpret a contract as bemg of
indefinite duration only where the parties to the
contract have clearly and unambiguously indicated
their intentions to create a contract of indefinite
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duration through the use of express and positive
language to that effect m the contract [FN2] See
*1174Wilham B Tanner Co, 716 F 2d at 1159
("Courts are reluctant to interpret contracts
providing for some perpetual or unlimited
contractual right unless the contract clearly states
that that is the intention of the parties"),
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd v Bug's Imps, Inc, 453
S W 2 d 544, 549 (Ky 1970) ("The general rule is
that a construction conferring a right in perpetuity
will be avoided unless compelled by the
unequivocal language of the contract"), Paisley,
143 SW2d at 271 ("A contract [for employment]
for life will be upheld only where the intention, that
the contract's duration is for life, is clearly
expressed in unequivocal terms"), Borough of W
Caldwell, 138 A 2d at 412-13 ("[A] construction
affirming a [contractual performance] right in
perpetuity is to be avoided unless given in clear and
peremptory terms," and "[i]t is not often that a
promise will properly be interpreted as calling for
perpetual
performance"
(internal
quotations
omitted)), 17B C J S Contracts § 439 (1999) ("[A]
construction conferring a right in perpetuity will be
avoided unless compelled by the unequivocal
language of the contract [and] a contract which
purports to run in perpetuity must be adamantly
clear that that is the parties' intent, m order to be
enforceable")
Likewise, employment contracts
that do not explicitly express the parties' intentions
that the contract be for lifetime or permanent
employment have been held to be unenforceable or
merely terminable at the will of either party See
Chastain v Kelly-Springfield Tire Co, 733 F2d
1479, 1482, 1484 (11th Cir 1984), Littell v
Evening Star Newspaper Co, 120 F2d 36, 37
(D C Cir 1941), 30 C J S Employer-Employee
Relationship § 23 (1992)
FN2 The majority opinion notes that the
parties have not argued m their appellate
briefs that a term should be implied into
the contract and that both parties contend
that the contract should be evaluated as an
indefinite-length contract limited only by
the just cause provision This incorrectly
elevates the parties' arguments m the briefs
to the level of an agreement between the

parties on this point and treats it as a
stipulation Nothing in the record or the
briefs indicates that the parties have
stipulated m the manner the majority
opinion claims The parties do not deny
that they did not include an explicit
provision in the contract expressing their
mtentions
purposely
to
create an
indefinite-length contract If the parties to
a
contract
intend
to
create
an
indefinite-length
contract, they must
express their intentions to do so through
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal
language in the contract The parties'
questionable "concession" in this regard in
their briefs on appeal obviously fails to
meet this standard and is contrary to the
rule of law stated in the cited authority
Both Johnson and Shah may recognize the
rights
of
parties
to
enter
into
indefinite-length contracts, but they do not
dispute or contradict the requirement that
the parties do so using explicit language in
their contract
In any event, under normal circumstances,
we will treat particular facts or issues as
stipulated to by the parties only where such
a stipulation is clear and expressed
Rarely, if ever, do we find a stipulation of
this nature by implication The notion of
an implied stipulation is contrary to the
very nature of a stipulation as a clear,
definite, and certain agreement by the
parties as to the truth or validity of a
particular fact
Finally, the majority
opinion also
admonishes the dissent that "[i]n the
absence of adequate briefing, it would be
ill-advised for the court to raise [the issue
of implying a reasonable term] sua sponte,
especially [where] this issue presents a
question of first impression"
This,
however, ignores our settled position that
this court has inherent authority to
consider arguments and issues that the
parties have not raised or recognized if it is
necessary to a proper decision and to avoid
bad law See Kaiserman Assocs, Inc v
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Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah
1998) ("[A]n overlooked or abandoned
argument should not compel an erroneous
result [and][w]e should not be forced to
ignore the law just because the parties have
not
raised
or
pursued
obvious
arguments."). Simply because the parties
did not recognize the issue on appeal or
because they are in supposed agreement in
their argumentative position, erroneous as
it may be, on appeal, we will not ignore a
genuine legal issue or acquiesce in the
parties' error and apply incorrect legal
principles.
**32 Where a contract is of indefinite or perpetual
duration because of the lack of an explicit term, the
law will imply into the contract a term that is
reasonable
under
the
circumstances.
See
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262;
see also Metal Assocs., Inc., 165 F.2d at 165;
Consol Theatres, Inc., 13 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d
at 335; Brown Loan & Abstract Co., 102 S.E. at
815; Anne Arundel County v. Crofton Corp., 286
Md. 666, 410 A.2d 228, 232 (1980);
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp., 288 N.W. at 541; Tavel,
535 P.2d at 1288; Borough of W. Caldwell, 138
A.2d at 412- 13; Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co.,
185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706, 713-14 (1923); Harris
v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502, 505
(1897); Hall, 308 S.W.2d at 15; Farley, 227
N.W.2d at 82; 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 546
(1991); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment Relationship §
38 (1996) (citing Shah, 655 S.W.2d 489); 17B
C.J.S. Contracts § 421 (1999); Kniffin, 5 Corbin
on Contracts § 24.29.
**33 The majority opinion criticizes this dissent
for its lack of citation to Utah precedent in support
of determining and implying a reasonable term of
duration into the contract. This is empty criticism
given that this case presents an issue of first
impression in this jurisdiction.
**34 The majority opinion incorrectly relies on
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033
(Utah 1989), Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d
49 (Utah 1991), and Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), as binding Utah
authority that purportedly rejects the dissent's
approach in this case. While the majority is correct
in noting "that nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or
Berube suggests that a court should sua sponte
impose a term on an indefinite-length employment
contract that provides for termination for cause,"
nothing in those decisions *1175 would prohibit the
implication of a reasonable term into the contract
either. Those cases simply do not go as far as
articulating a governing rule applicable to the case
at hand and are focused on a separate and discrete
issue not present in the instant case.
**35 Specifically, the majority opinion's assertion
that in Berube we noted (and purportedly endorsed)
the notion that "courts long ago repudiated a
common law rule under which a term was implied
when an employment contract did not specify a
duration" is not entirely correct and overstates
Berube. The central issue in Berube was whether
the termination-related provisions of an employer's
employee handbook could be implied into the
employment contract as implied-in-fact contract
terms between the employer and employee such that
the original indefinite-length employment contract
would escape application of the "at-will"
employment
doctrine
that
provides
an
indefinite-length employment contract is terminable
by either party for good cause, cause, or no cause at
all.
**36 In the "historical development" portion of
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in Berube, to
which the majority opinion in this case cites, Justice
Durham merely traced the historical development
and adoption of the "at-will" employment doctrine
in the United States.
**37 In any event, that section of Berube does not
stand for the proposition offered by the majority
opinion. The historical review section of the
Berube plurality opinion simply described the
nineteenth century English common law rule stating
that English courts, when faced with employment
contracts of indefinite duration, would imply an
arbitrary one-year term into the contract. Berube,
111 P.2d at 1040-41; see also McCauliff, 8 Corbin
i to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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on Contracts § 3 4.11, at 257. Berube 's historical
review merely noted that American courts rejected
the arbitrary one-year term implied by English
courts in favor of the "at-will" employment
doctrine. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040- 41. Berube
simply acknowledged the historical rejection of the
implication of a term of duration in an "at-will"
employment contract. See id. It does not, as the
majority opinion claims, reject the notion that a
reasonable term could or should be implied into an
employment contract that is by its own terms
outside the "at-will" employment doctrine because
of a just cause provision such that the parties are
bound for a "reasonable time." See McCauliff, 8
Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262. In fact,
Justice Durham's opinion in Berube notes that the
rejection of the English common law implied
one-year term and the adoption of the "at-will"
employment doctrine in the United States was
"adopted by many jurisdictions without careful or
thorough examination." Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040.
Thus, the most Berube can be cited for in this
regard is the proposition that American courts
uncritically rejected the arbitrary one-year implied
term rule used by the English courts, but not the
apparently unconsidered, yet supportable, notion
that a reasonable term could or should be implied
into an indefinite-length employment contract that
by its own terms is not terminable at will. See
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262.
Therefore, the majority opinion's statement in
applying purportedly controlling Utah precedent to
this case that "[w]e do not apply the long-since
rejected rule that previously required the
implication of a term" is based on a
misinterpretation of Berube 's historical review.
Regardless, this portion of the plurality Berube
opinion, despite being joined by a majority of the
court, was at best dicta in that it was historical
exposition. Berube and its progeny simply do not
prohibit the implication of a reasonable term into
the contract at hand and are not binding precedent
that govern whether a term of duration should be
implied into the contract at issue.
**38 Finally, Johnson and Brehany likewise do
not govern the present case or bar the imposition of
an implied reasonable term of duration into the
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

contract. Brehany and Johnson, like Berube, were
employee handbook or implied-in-fact contract term
cases but go no further than Berube in their
holdings and no more state an on-point or
governing rule applicable in this case than does
Berube.
**39 Berube, Brehany, and Johnson all involved
indefinite-length employment contracts and claims
of wrongful termination. *1176 However, these
cases merely explore and set rules for determining
whether a plaintiff employee's claim for wrongful
termination can escape the general "at-will"
employment doctrine. In other words, in those
cases, this court was asked to determine whether an
implied-in-fact term existed which would remove
the contract from the general "at-will" employment
doctrine under which a plaintiff employee could not
sustain a wrongful termination action. If such an
implied-in-fact term was found to exist, for example
where an employer's employee handbook specified
exclusive reasons for termination of its employees,
then those provisions of the employment handbook
were treated as implied-in-fact contract terms,
removing the employment contract from the
"at-will" employment doctrine rules and preventing
the employer from terminating the contract for any
or no cause.
**40 The
case
at
hand
involves
an
indefinite-length contract which contained an
express "just cause" provision. Because that
provision was expressed, the analysis and rules in
Berube, Brehany, and Johnson are not
applicable; we already know that the express "just
cause" provision takes us out of the general
"at-will" employment doctrine rule. The issue here
is how the trial court is to determine whether the
duration of the contract is reasonable and how it is
to arrive at such a reasonable duration. This is a
question not previously addressed to this court and
to which Berube, Brehany, and Johnson are not
instructive. The legal propositions and rules of
contract construction and interpretation presented in
this dissent are more appropriate for use by the trial
court in adjudicating this controversy on remand.
**41

Once

the

trial
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reasonable term under the circumstances and that
term is implied by law into the contract, the contract
will necessarily be enforceable against the
succeeding board under the second prong of the Bair
test articulated in the majority opinion because (1)
the activity contracted for is proprietary and (2) the
term or duration that was implied into the contract
is de facto reasonable under the circumstances.
**42 Having determined the reasonable duration
of the contract, and therefore its enforceability, the
trial court must then determine if the hospital
breached the contract when it terminated Dr.
Hardy.
It could terminate him before the
expiration of the implied term only for "just
cause." If the trial court determines that the
hospital had just cause to terminate the contract
with Dr. Hardy, the hospital did not breach the
contract and Dr. Hardy is not entitled to damages.
If the trial court determines that the hospital did not
have just cause to terminate the contract with Dr.
Hardy, then the hospital breached the contract and
Dr. Hardy is entitled to damages calculated
consistent with the reasonable employment duration
term implied into the contract. See Bad Wound v
Lakota Cmty. Homes, Inc., 1999 SD 165, \ 11,
603 N.W.2d 723, 726.
**43 Under the majority opinion's analysis, Dr.
Hardy's damages, assuming the hospital is liable to
Dr. Hardy for terminating him without just cause,
would be speculative, at best, and undeterminable,
at worst, absent a finite term of duration in the
contract. See Benham v. World Airways, Inc., 432
F.2d 359, 360, 361-62 (9th Cir.1970); Sterling
Drug, lnc v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d
380, 386-87 (1988). It is for this reason that the
law disfavors contracts of perpetual duration and
why, when faced with contracts of indefinite
duration, courts will imply a reasonable term of
duration. If on remand the perpetual contract is
held to be enforceable and the trial court determines
that the hospital did not have just cause to terminate
the contract, how would Dr. Hardy's damages be
calculated? Would Dr. Hardy be entitled to all of
his loss of earnings under the indefinite contract?
In other words, would he be entitled to
compensation under the contract from the date of
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

termination to the date of his death? To the date of
his retirement? To the date of his inability to
perform his job responsibilities, whenever that
might be? Determining a reasonable term for the
contract under the circumstances and implying it
into the contract would avoid the possibility of
speculative or undeterminable damages.
*1177 **44 The majority opinion disagrees that
imposition of a definite term is justified and argues
that the trial court would face similar "challenges"
in determining a reasonable term of duration under
the circumstances as it would in determining Dr.
Hardy's speculative damages.
The approach
advocated in this dissent would focus the trial
court's attention and efforts on the discrete task of
discerning a reasonable term for the contract under
the circumstances, thus centering the inquiry on the
parties' intentions, the nature of the parties'
relationship, and the overall circumstances
surrounding the formation of the contract at issue.
See McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at
262.
The majority opinion's suggestion for
determining Dr. Hardy's potential damages would
take the trial court's attention away from the
contract itself and the context in which it was
formulated and focus on myriad distant and less
related factors, all of which remain at least to some
extent speculative in nature. I would not send the
trial court into the majority opinion's briar patch of
thorny factors. In this case, [FN3] it would be far
less complicated and less speculative for the trial
court to determine Dr. Hardy's potential damages in
relation to an implied reasonable term.
FN3. The majority opinion also argues that
under the dissent's analysis courts will
"inevitably and routinely need to determine
damages associated with a breach of an
indefinite employment contract." This is
incorrect. The vast majority of cases
involving issues of termination under
indefinite-length
employment
contracts
will be governed by the "at-will"
employment doctrine. In those instances,
the issue of damages would not arise
because the employment relationship
would be terminable by either party for
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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any reason. The problematic issue of
damages arises only in the very rare and
unique case, such as the one at hand, where
an expressed or implied "just cause" term
is a part of the indefinite duration contract,
thus removing the case from the
application
of the usual
"at-will"
employment doctrine rule.
**45 I would remand to the trial court but with
instructions consistent with this concurring opinion.
**46 Justice HOWE concurs in Justice RUSSON's
concurring and dissenting opinion.
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Affirmed.
Supreme Court of Utah.
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY, INC., Plaintiff, Appellee, and
CrossAppellant,
v.
Steven L. KEIL and Brody Chemical Company,
Inc., Defendants, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees.
No. 20000468.
March 19, 2002.
Rehearing Denied May 3, 2002.
Company alleged misappropriation of trade secrets
by its former water treatment chemical salesman
and sought preliminary injunction to enjoin
employee and his new employer from disclosing
trade secrets. The Second District Court,
Farmington Department, Rodney S. Page, J.,
granted the preliminary injunction. Salesman's
petition for interlocutory appeal was granted. The
Supreme Court, 974 P.2d 821, reversed. On
remand, the District Court, Rodney S. Page, J.,
entered jury verdict in company's favor on both its
intentional interference with business relations and
misappropriation of trade secrets claims, awarding
it $188,675 for damages in lost profits and unearned
salary and benefits that had been paid to the
salesman. Salesman and his new employer
appealed, and the company cross-appealed. The
Supreme Court, Russon, Associate C.J., held that:
(1) salesman failed to meet his burden of
marshaling all the evidence supporting jury's
verdict, and thus, evidence would be assumed to
have adequately supported finding that the
company's price lists were misappropriated, and (2)
the company was not limited to award of damages
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error €==>930(1)
30k930(l) Most Cited Cases
On appeal from a jury verdict, the Supreme Court
will view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to that
verdict.
[2] Appeal and Error €==>1079
30k 1079 Most Cited Cases
Water treatment chemical salesman's argument that
jury's finding that his former employer's price lists
were confidential was not supported by the
evidence, because the salesman committed them to
memory and his new employer could have obtained
the prices by other means, as well as salesman's
contention that the his actions could not have
injured the employer, because its customer contracts
were not adhesive or exclusive, were not adequately
briefed and, therefore, would not be addressed on
appeal before the Supreme Court.
[3] Appeal and Error €=^757(3)
30k757(3) Most Cited Cases
[3] Appeal and Error €^937(1)
30k937(l) Most Cited Cases
Former water treatment chemical salesman failed to
marshal all the evidence supporting jury's verdict,
and thus, evidence would be assumed to have
adequately supported finding that his former
employer's price lists were misappropriated by him,
where the salesman's supposed marshaling only
constituted a reargument of the factual case
presented below, in which evidence was construed
in light most favorable to the salesman rather than
his employer; although the salesman maintained he
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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"took no documents with him that set forth pricing"
when he departed from his employer, and that
pricing was not the "key" issue affecting employer's
loss of business, president of the employer testified
that the salesman never returned pricing sheets for a
number of its clients that were in salesman's
possession, and evidence was introduced at trial
deeming pricing as "important."
[4] Appeal and Error €=^893(1)
30k893(l) Most Cited Cases
[4] Appeal and Error €==>930(1)
30k930(l) Most Cited Cases
[4] Appeal and Error €^1001(1)
30kl001(l) Most Cited Cases
When an appellant contends that the evidence
presented at trial is insufficient to support a jury's
factual findings, the Supreme Court does not weigh
the evidence de novo; rather, the Supreme Court
will follow one standard of review, and will reverse
only if, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, the appellant
demonstrates that the findings lack substantial
evidentiary support, after the appellant has
marshalled all the evidence supporting the verdict
and then showed that such evidence cannot support
the verdict.
[5] Appeal and Error €=^937(1)
30k937(l) Most Cited Cases
When the appealing party does not meet its burden
of marshaling all the evidence supporting the
verdict, the Supreme Court will assume that the
evidence adequately supported the findings, and the
complaining party's assertion of insufficiency must
therefore fail.

[7] Statutes €=^188
361kl88 Most Cited Cases
When interpreting a legislative enactment, the
Supreme Court looks first to the plain language of
the act to determine its meaning.
[8] Appeal and Error C=>1079
30k 1079 Most Cited Cases
Former employer's argument that it was entitled to
double damages and attorney fees due to its former
water treatment chemical salesman's malicious and
willful misuse of the employer's trade secrets, and to
additional damages derived from the employee's
interference with one of its business accounts, was
inadequately briefed and, thus, would not be
addressed by the Supreme Court on appeal;
employer did not offer even a single statutory
citation, judicial decision, or procedural rule nor
refer to even one location in the record to show that
evidence existed in support of its claim. Rules
App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9).
[9] Appeal and Error €^756
30k756 Most Cited Cases
[9] Appeal and Error C=>761
30k761 Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court will not become simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump
the burden of argument and research. Rules
App.Proc, Rule 24.
*890 Joseph C. Rust, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
John T. Caine, Ogden, for Keil.
Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for Brody
Chemical.
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice.

[6] Damages €=>40(1)
115k40(l) Most Cited Cases
Former employer was not limited to award for
damages based on the unjust enrichment of its
former water treatment chemical salesman and his
new employer from misappropriation of the former
employer's pricing lists, but could recover its lost
profits caused by defendants' conduct. U.C.A.1953,
13-24-4(1).
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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**1 Steven L. Keil and Brody Chemical Company
appeal from a trial court judgment awarding Water
& Energy Systems Technology, Inc., $188,675 in
damages for its claims of (1) intentional
interference with existing and prospective business
relations and (2) misappropriation of trade secrets
pursuant to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 to - 9 (1999). We affirm.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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BACKGROUND
[1] * *2 "On appeal from a jury verdict, we view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to that
verdict." Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 787
(Utah 1994); see also Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, 2001 UT 107, If 2, 37 P.3d 1130.
**3 Steven Keil ("Keil") began working for Water
& Energy Systems Technology, Inc. ("WEST"), as
a water treatment chemical sales representative in
1986. During his tenure at WEST, Keil spent the
majority of his time managing and servicing certain
of the company's industrial sales accounts, including
those for Alliant Techsystems ("Alliant"), Cargill
Flour Milling ("Cargill"), Magnesium Corporation
of America ("MagCorp"), and Utah State University
("USU"). As part of his duties related to these
accounts, Keil had access to the formulae WEST
used to create its chemicals, as well as to WEST'S
confidential, customer-specific pricing lists for
those chemicals. [FN1]
FN1. WEST attempted to ensure the
confidentiality of its customer-specific
price lists in a number of ways. The
company provided prices to its sales
representatives only on a "need to know
basis." Likewise, WEST instructed its
sales personnel to always inform customers
that any pricing information they received
was confidential.
Finally, all written
disclosures of WEST prices to the
company's customers was accompanied by
language that read in substance, "This
material is proprietary and confidential.
We honor your commitment to maintain it
as such."
**4
Subsequently,
in
September
1997,
representatives of Brody Chemical Company
("BCC") approached Keil about the possibility of
his leaving WEST to work for BCC. Keil initially
declined this invitation, deciding instead to stay
with WEST. After further discussions, however,
Keil agreed in late 1997 to begin selling for BCC
water treatment chemicals similar to those he was
marketing for WEST.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

**5 In preparation for his departure from WEST,
Keil began meeting with various employees of
BCC, including the company's owner, Jon
Liddiard. The purpose of these meetings was to
ensure that BCC carried an inventory of treatment
chemicals comparable to those marketed by WEST,
and to establish a pricing scheme for the chemicals
that would be "competitive" with WEST'S pricing.
Accordingly, the discussions at Keil's meetings with
BCC
centered
around
the
necessary
"[fjormulations" for the chemicals, how and "where
to obtain [the] raw materials" required by the
formulae, and possible "pricing" for the ultimate
products. Specifically, BCC and Keil worked to
create products that would be "equivalent" to
WEST'S but that would be sold for "ten percent
less" than the confidential prices charged by WEST
to each respective customer.
**6 Following these preparatory meetings, on
February 18, 1998, Keil drafted on BCC stationery
six substantively identical letters to the various
clients he had been servicing for WEST, including
Alliant, Cargill, MagCorp, and USU. In the letters,
Keil explained that he had begun working for BCC
and that because of this change in employment, he
could now offer "essentially the same" chemicals he
had provided before but at "substantially lower"
prices. In support of this contention, Keil's letters
to Alliant, Cargill, and USU each included a table
that juxtaposed the proposed prices of BCC's *891
treatment chemicals with the prices of WEST'S
"corresponding" chemicals. The prices listed for
BCC's chemicals represented approximately a ten
percent discount from WESTs prices.
**7 Shortly thereafter, on March 2, 1998, Keil
voluntarily terminated his employment with WEST.
The next day, Keil began delivering the letters he
had written to the clients he serviced while at
WEST. Within two weeks of the delivery of these
letters, Alliant, Cargill, and MagCorp all ceased
ordering water treatment chemicals from WEST
despite the fact that WEST had serviced each
company continuously for the previous four years
and WEST "had every expectation" of maintaining
those relationships. Moreover, two of these
companies, Alliant and Cargill, immediately began
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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purchasing their water treatment chemicals from
BCC. Similarly, MagCorp reported to WEST that it
was terminating their relationship based in part on
"problems with [its service] representative," Keil.
**8 On March 9, 1998, WEST sued BCC and Keil
(collectively, "defendants") in the Second District
Court for Davis County, alleging among other
things that Keil had intentionally interfered with
WEST's "existing and future business relationships
for improper purposes," and had misappropriated
WEST's confidential prices by sharing them with
BCC in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (1999). On
March 26, 1998, the district court granted WEST a
preliminary injunction against BCC and Keil, which
we reversed on interlocutory appeal in Water &
Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT
16,974P.2d821("toz7/").
**9 Following our decision in Keil I, defendants
moved for summary judgment, asserting in part that
Keil had not misappropriated WEST's price lists as
a matter of law. The district court, however,
denied the motion on this issue in an order dated
September 1, 1999. The court reasoned:
There is sufficient evidence from which the trier
of fact could conclude that the ... price lists of
[WEST] were confidential.... [Therefore,] [t]here
remains a question of fact as to the
misappropriation of [WEST]'s price lists and as
to whether [WESTJ's price lists were used by
[BCC and Keil] in establishing [BCC]'s prices.
Accordingly, the case proceeded to trial.
**10 At trial, defendants again urged the district
court to enter judgment in their favor, moving for a
directed verdict at the conclusion of WESTs case in
chief on a number of grounds, including (1) that
insufficient evidence had been introduced to
establish WEST's claim for misappropriation of its
price lists, (2) that insufficient evidence had been
introduced to substantiate WEST's claim for
intentional interference with its business relations
for improper purposes, and (3) that WEST had
failed to prove Keil's actions caused the company
damages in regard to its contractual relationship
with USU. Concluding that the jury could
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

reasonably find in WEST's favor on the issue of
misappropriation if it "chose to believe everything
... presented by way of [WEST]'s case"~and that a
jury finding of misappropriation would satisfy the
challenged "improper purpose" element of WEST's
intentional interference with business relations
claim—the district court denied defendants' motion
on these two issues but granted the motion on
WEST's claim for damages related to its USU
account. The court stated, "[On] the element of
damage having to do with USU[,] the Court finds
that there is insufficient evidence to go to the jury ...
and therefore will allow [WEST to proceed] only
[on] those issues relative to the claim from Alliant,
from MagCorp, [and] from Cargill."
**11 At the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a
verdict in WEST's favor on both its intentional
interference
with
business
relations
and
misappropriation of trade secrets claims, awarding
the company $188,675 of damages in lost profits
and unearned salary and benefits that had been paid
to Keil. Specifically, the jury found that WEST's
price lists were confidential; that Keil had
misappropriated WEST'S price lists; that Keil
intentionally interfered with WEST's business
relationships with Alliant, Cargill, and MagCorp;
that Keil's actions damaged WEST; and that Keil
engaged in these actions as an agent of BCC.
*892 **12 Subsequently, on March 10, 2000,
defendants moved for a new trial and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, contending among
other things that insufficient evidence had been
introduced at trial to establish WEST's claim for
misappropriation of its trade secrets, and that an
incorrect standard for calculating damages had been
used in the case. WEST responded, and on May
31, 2000, the trial court denied defendants'
motions. Finding that sufficient evidence had been
introduced at trial to prove Keil had disclosed
WEST's respective price lists for Alliant, Cargill,
and MagCorp in an effort to transfer that business to
BCC, the court ruled that the "damages awarded by
the jury were fair and reasonable." Defendants
now appeal the judgment of the trial court.
ANALYSIS
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[2] **13 On appeal, BCC and Keil raise two
arguments: (1) that the trial court erred by failing to
direct or set aside the jury verdict because, as
defendants allege, WEST presented "insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict" for its claim
of misappropriation of trade secrets; and (2) that
the trial court erred by refusing to set aside the
damages awarded to WEST as an improper
assessment of damages under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.
[FN2] In
addition,
WEST
cross-appeals, claiming that the trial court
inappropriately disallowed the company from
seeking additional damages beyond those ultimately
awarded by the jury. We address each issue in turn.
FN2. Apparently, defendants also argue
that the jury's finding concerning the
confidentiality of WEST'S price lists was
not supported by the evidence because
Keil committed them to memory and
because BCC could have obtained the
prices by asking WEST'S customers what
they paid for their chemicals. Likewise,
defendants contend that Keil's actions in
this case could not have injured WEST
because WEST'S contracts with Alliant,
Cargill, and MagCorp "were not adhesion
or exclusive contracts and [the companies]
were free to purchase other products and
services at any time." These arguments,
however,
fail
for
at least three
reasons. First,
defendants
have
not
adequately briefed these contentions, and
we therefore will not address them. E.g.,
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988); Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9); see also
infra ffl[ 20-21. In addition, defendants
do not even attempt to meet their
marshaling burden on these arguments, and
thus, we assume that the record supports
the jury's findings in favor of WEST on
these issues. E.g., State v. Hopkins, 1999
UT 98, f 16, 989 P.2d 1065; Young v.
Young, 1999 UT 38, K 30, 979 P.2d 338.
Finally, even a cursory review of the
record reveals that ample evidence was
presented at trial for the jury to find that
WEST'S price lists were confidential and

expected their employees to keep them as
such, that water treatment chemical prices
are treated as confidential and proprietary
within the industry as a general practice,
and that WEST reasonably expected to
continue its relationships with Alliant,
Cargill, and MagCorp despite the
nonexclusive nature of their contracts.
I. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[3] **14 BCC and Keil first contend that the trial
court erred by denying their motions for directed
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict because WEST failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish a misappropriation of WEST'S
price lists. Specifically, defendants argue that the
evidence presented at trial "did not purponderate
[sic]" the jury's finding of either (1) Keil's
disclosure of WEST'S price lists or (2) "a nexus
between the any [sic] activity of Keil [and] damage
to WEST."
[4][5] **15 When an appellant contends that the
evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support
a jury's factual findings, "we do not weigh the
evidence de novo." In re Estate of Bartell, 776
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Rather, we follow one
standard of review: We reverse only if, taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the appellant demonstrates that the
findings lack substantial evidentiary support. Id;
see also Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886
P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1994); Heslop v. Bank of Utah,
839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992); Gustaveson v.
Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982).
Specifically, this standard obligates the appealing
party to marshal all the evidence supporting the
verdict and then show that such evidence "cannot
support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d
14, 18 (Utah 1988); see also, e.g., Brewer v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77, fl
33-36, 31 P.3d 557; Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d
1361, 1363 (Utah 1996); *893 Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991).
Indeed, we employ this standard in light of our
general deference toward the jury's role as
fact-finder and our repeated recognition of trial
courts' "advantaged position to evaluate the
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evidence and determine the facts" Utah Med
Prods, Inc v Searcy, 958 P2d 228, 232 (Utah
1998), see also, eg, Willey v Willey, 951 P2d
226, 230 (Utah 1997) Accordmgly, when the
appealmg party does not meet its marshaling
burden, we "assume that the evidence adequately
supported the finding[s]," and the complaining
party's assertion of insufficiency must therefore fail
Young v Young, 1999 UT 38, \ 30, 979 P2d 338,
see also, eg, State v Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, % 16,
989 P2d 1065, Searcy, 958 P2d at 233, Interwest
Constr v Palmer, 923 P2d 1350, 1360 (Utah 1996)
, Hall v Process Instruments & Control, Inc, 890
P2d 1024, 1028 (Utah 1995), Saunders v Sharp,
806 P 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)
**16 In this case, defendants' brief contains a
lengthy section purporting to marshal the evidence
m favor of the jury verdict However, although
BCC and Keil do cite some evidence that supports
the jury's findings, even a cursory review of the tiial
record reveals that defendants "frequently omit[ ]
crucial and incriminating evidence" that weighs m
favor of the jury's verdict Aha Indus Ltd v Hurst,
846 P2d 1282, 1287 (Utah 1993) For example,
defendants admit that Keil repeatedly met with
employees of BCC prior to his departure from
WEST, but they fail to address what occurred at
those meetings that BCC and Keil openly
discussed prices in a jomt effort to develop a plan to
offer chemicals equivalent to WEST'S at a ten
percent discount from that company's prices
Similarly, defendants assert that when he departed
from WEST, Keil "took no documents with him that
set forth pricing," even though WEST'S president
specifically testified at trial that Keil never returned
pricing sheets for a number of WEST'S clients,
mcludmg Alhant and MagCorp, that were in his
possession when he left WEST Further, defendants
maintain that pricing was not the "key" issue
affectmg WEST'S loss of business as a result of
Keil's actions, despite the fact that evidence was
introduced
at
trial
deeming
pricing
"important", that Alhant, Cargill, and MagCorp all
ceased purchasmg chemicals from WEST following
BCC's offers to provide equivalent chemicals at a
ten percent discount, and that following such offers
Alhant and Cargill immediately began purchasmg
© 2006 Thomson/West No
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their water treatment chemicals from BCC Indeed,
defendants' supposed marshalmg of the evidence m
reality only constitutes a reargument of the factual
case they presented below, with the evidence
construed in a light most favorable to BCC and Keil
rather than to WEST See In re Estate of Bartell,
776 P 2d at 886 By its very nature, such a tactic
does not carry defendants' "heavy" marshaling
burden, and we consequently will not disturb the
jury's findings rendered in favor of WEST Aha
Indus, 846 P2d at 1286, see also Young, 1999 UT
38 at f 30, 979 P2d 338, Searcy, 958 P2d at 232,
In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P 2d at 886, Scharf v
BMG Corp, 700 P2d 1068, 1069-70 (Utah 1985)
[FN3]
FN3 We further note that, under other
conditions, the jury's finding m favor of
WEST on the company's claim for
intentional mlerference with business
relations would constitute independent
grounds for affirmance See Crookston v
Fire Ins Exch, 817 P2d 789, 797-98
(Utah 1991) However because the trial
court explicitly hinged the viability of this
claim on WEST'S misappropriation claim,
we address defendants' insufficiency of the
evidence argument on appeal regardless
II MEASURE OF DAMAGES
[6] **17 Defendants' second argument on appeal
is that the trial court erred by refusing to set aside
the damages awarded to WEST Specifically,
defendants argue that rather than allowing WEST to
recover its lost profits caused by Keil's disclosure of
its price lists, the trial court should have limited
WEST'S damages to the "benefit" BCC and Keil
received as a result of misappropriation
We
disagree
[7] **18 Section 13-24-4 of the Utah Code
governs the amount of damages that may be
awarded for the misappropriation of a trade secret
This provision states that damages available under
the Act
*894 can include both the actual loss caused by
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into
toOng U S Govt Works
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account in computing actual loss.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4(1) (1999). When
interpreting a legislative enactment, "we look first
to the plain language of the act to determine its
meaning." City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \
36, 28 P.3d 697; see also, e.g., State ex rel. Div. of
Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County,
2002 UT 8, t 10, 44 P.3d 680; Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Bd. Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT
112, K 27, 38 P.3d 291; Hall v. Utah State Dep't
ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, f 15, 24 P.3d 958; Jensen
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903,
906 (Utah 1984). In this case, the plain language
of section 13-24-4 is entirely antithetical to the
position advanced by BCC and Keil. Rather than
restricting damages in misappropriation cases to the
windfall obtained by the defendant, section 13-24-4
unambiguously states that such damages "can
include both the actual loss caused by
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss." Utah Code Ann. § 1324-4(1) (emphasis added). Indeed, this language
specifically
contemplates—in
two
separate
places—that
a
successful
plaintiff
in
a
misappropriation case may obtain the losses it
suffers due to the disclosure of its trade secret. See
id. Accordingly, we reject defendants' argument
that damages for the misappropriation of a trade
secret must be restricted to the unjust enrichment
such disclosure renders, and thus, hold that the trial
court did not err in this case by allowing WEST to
recover its lost profits caused by BCC and Keil. See
id.
III. ADDITIONAL DAMAGE CLAIMS
[8] **19 Finally, WEST contends on cross-appeal
that the trial court erred by disallowing the company
from seeking additional damages beyond those
ultimately awarded by the jury.
Specifically,
WEST asserts that it is "entitle[d]M to "double
damages and attorney[ ] fees" for Keil's "malicious
and willful ... misuse of WEST'S trade secrets," and
to "additional damages [derived from] Keil's
interference with WESTs USU account." In
making this assertion, however, WEST fails to
adequately set forth an argument as required by rule
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

**20 This court has repeatedly held that appealing
parties must " 'clearly define[ ]' " the issues
presented on appeal " 'with pertinent authority
cited.' " State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 Ill.App.3d
1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)
). Likewise, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24
unequivocally requires, "[Appellant's brief] shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including ...
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9).
Consequently, "[i]t is well established that a
reviewing court will not address arguments that are
not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 304 (Utah 1998); see also, e.g., Ellis v.
Swensen, 2000 UT 101, \ 17, 16 P.3d 1233;
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 7, 17 P.3d
1122.
[9] **21 In this case, WEST has entirely failed to
adequately brief its assertion that it is "entitled" to
additional damages. WEST does not offer even a
single statutory citation, judicial decision, or
procedural rule in support of its claim for further
damages. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v.
Bd. Oil, Gas, & Mining, 2001 UT 112, \ 37, 38
P.3d 291; State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, n. 5, 37 P.3d
1073; Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, n.
11, 34 P.3d 194. Indeed, WEST baldly asserts it is
"clear from trial court testimony" that the company
is due additional damages, but WEST fails to refer
us to even one location in the record where such
evidence exists. Moreover, WEST utterly neglects
to discuss, let alone construe or apply, the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act's provisions on damages and
attorney fees—statutory language that would
certainly be determinative, if not dispositive, of
whether WEST qualifies for the damages it seeks.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-4 to -5. Such an
approach is neither adequate under the Utah Rules
of
Appellate
Procedure
nor
acceptable.
Accordingly, because WEST has *895 not
sufficiently presented its claim for additional
damages, we will not address the argument. E.g.,
Ellis, 2000 UT 101 at f 17, 16 P.3d 1233;
Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at | 7, 17 P.3d 1122;
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304. As we have all too often
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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[FN4] had occasion to explain, this court will not
become " 'simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument
and research.' " Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450 (quoting
Opsahl, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d at 784). We
once again refuse to accept that role.
FN4. See Associated Gen. Contractors,
2001 UT 112 at U 37 & n. 8, 38 P.3d 291
(listing twenty-three cases in which a party
inadequately
briefed
an
argument);
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 948 n. 9
(Utah 1998) (giving examples of the
"disconcertingly
legion"
number
of
inadequately briefed cases); see also
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, \ 42, 20
P.3d 332; Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at f 7,
17P.3d 1122.
CONCLUSION
**22 In view of the foregoing, we conclude that
the trial court did not err by (1) refusing to set aside
the jury's verdict based on defendants' claims of
insufficiency of the evidence and inappropriately
assessed damages or by (2) disallowing WEST from
seeking additional damages beyond those awarded
by the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court as entered below.
**23 Chief Justice HOWE, Justice DURHAM,
Justice DURRANT, and Justice WILKINS concur
in Associate Chief Justice RUSSON'S opinion.
48 P.3d 888, 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2002 UT 32
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Boyd A. WARD, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 18431.
Aug. 16, 1984.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1986.
Terminated city chief of police brought action
seeking to be reinstated and recover damages. The
Sixth District Court, Sevier County, Don V. Tibbs,
J., granted city's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, and chief appealed. The Supreme
Court, Howe, J., held that statute which deals with
appointment of chief of police in third-class cities
does not make removal of chief of police in such
cities free from all judicial oversight, in light of
statutes dealing with removal of chief of police
from first and second class cities, which expressly
make such removal free from judicial review, and
thus, trial court had jurisdiction to review action of
city counsel of third class city in firing chief of
police.
Order set aside and case remanded with directions.
West Headnotes
[1] Municipal Corporations €==>182
268kl82 Most Cited Cases
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-909 to
10-3-911, which
respectively, require cities of first and second class
to create police departments, vest board of
commissioners with authority
to prescribe
administration of police department and to appoint
head of department, and provide that chief of police
department may be removed by board of
commissioners without hearing or review by courts,
by their references to authority of board of

commissioners over police department, are limited
to first and second class cities, in which board of
commissioners exist; such statutes do not apply to
police departments in third-class cities.
[2] Statutes €=^212.6
361k212.6 Most Cited Cases
Statute is construed on assumption that each term is
used advisedly and that intent of legislature is
revealed in use of term in context and structure in
which it is placed.
[3] Municipal Corporations €=^182
268k 182 Most Cited Cases
U.C.A.1953,
10-3-918,
which
deals
with
appointment of chief of police in third-class cities,
does not make removal of chief of police in such
cities free from judicial oversight, in light of
statutes dealing with removal of chief of police
from first and second class cities, which expressly
make such removal unreviewable, and thus, trial
court had jurisdiction to review action of city
counsel of third class city in firing chief of police.
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-911.
*265 George E. Brown, Jr., Midvale, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for defendants and
respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiff Boyd A. Ward appeals from an order
granting defendant Richfield City's motion to
dismiss his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
On April 2, 1981, Ward was terminated as chief of
police of the city of Richfield, a third-class city,
when the city council went into a closed meeting to
consider "other business."
According to a
stipulation made by counsel for both sides, that
action was entered in the minutes after the closed
session concluded. On June 7, 1981, Ward brought
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this action to be reinstated and to recover damages
alleging that the closed meeting of the council had
violated U.C.A., 1953, § 52-4-1, et seq., commonly
known as the Open and Public Meetings Act. He
also obtained a temporary restraining order against
Richfield City, restraining it from taking any further
action on the termination until the legality of its
action could be decided by the district
court. Nevertheless, on June 8 the council in an
open meeting ratified its action of April 2. At a
*266 hearing for a preliminary injunction, Richfield
City made a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. The court determined that
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 1 0-3- 911, it had no
jurisdiction to review the act of the city council in
firing the chief of police and granted the motion.
That order is the sole issue before us for review.
Section 10-3-911 provides in pertinent part:
The chief of the police or fire department of the
cities may at any time be removed, without a trial,
hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the board
of commissioners whenever in its opinion the
good of the service will be served thereby. Its
action in removing the chief of either department
shall be final and conclusive and shall not be
received or called in question before any court.
[Emphasis added.]
Section 10-3-911 is preceded by § 10-3-909
mandating cities of the first and second class to
create police departments and by § 10-3-910
vesting the board of commissioners with authority
to prescribe the administration of the police
departments by ordinance and to appoint the head
of that department. Under § 10-l-104(2)(a), the
governing body for cities of the first and second
class is a city commission composed of a mayor and
four or two commissioners, § 1 0-3-103 and 104.
Under § 10-l-104(2)(b), the governing body for
cities of the third class is the city council composed
of a mayor and five councilmen, § 10-3-105.
[1][2][3] It is readily apparent that §§ 10-3-909,
910 and 911 with their references to the authority
of the board of commissioners over police
departments unmistakably refer to and are limited to
first and second-class cities where boards of
commissioners exist. These sections were not
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

intended by the Legislature to apply to police
departments in third-class cities such as Richfield.
Police departments in third-class cities and towns
are dealt with separately in § 10-3-918, which
provided at the time this case arose:
In cities of the third class and in towns, the
governing body may aippoint a chief of police or
marshal who shall exercise and perform such
duties as may be prescribed by the governing
body. The chief of police or marshal shall be
under the direction, control and supervision of the
mayor. The chief of police or marshal may, with
the consent of the mayor, appoint assistants to the
chief of police or marshal.
Conspicuously absent from this statute is the
provision contained in § 10- 3-911 making the
removal of a chief of police free from all judicial
oversight. "It probably is not wholly inaccurate to
suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing
they do not mean something else." 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.01, as cited
in Hansen v. Wilkinson, Utah, 658 P.2d 1216 (1983)
. We construe a statute on the assumption that each
term is used advisedly and that the intent of the
Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the
context and structure in which it is placed.
Richfield City relies on several cases to bolster its
argument that stare decisis supports a rinding of no
jurisdiction. It also cites us to § 1 0-1-110 which
directs that statutes such as § 10-3-911 which were
enacted in 1977 as part of the "Utah Municipal
Code" should be construed as the continuation of
prior statutes so long as the provisions are the same
or substantially the same. In Taylor v. Gunderson,
107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944) we held that a
town marshall of a third-class city could be
removed without cause. However, the statute then in
force (U.C.A., 1943, § 15-6-32) was repealed by the
enactment of the 1977 Municipal Code and §
10-3-911 is in no wise substantially the same. In
Sheen v. Browning, 32 Utah 164, 89 P. 642 (1907)
the statutes specifically made actions of the mayor
and city council in removing heads of police and
fire departments final and nonreviewable. Sec. 8,
p. 46, Act 1899. In State v. Stavar, Utah, 578 P.2d
847 (1978) we did not reach the issue presented in
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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the instant case.
here.

None of these cases is helpful

*267 The order dismissing plaintiffs complaint for
lack of jurisdiction was in error and is set aside.
The case is remanded to the trial court with
directions to allow plaintiff to proceed on the merits
of his case. Costs are awarded to appellant.

"governing body" is consistently used (over
seventy-five times) when reference is made to cities
generally, that is, of all three classes.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
ZIMMERMAN, J., did not participate herein.
716P.2d265

HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ.,
concur.

END OF DOCUMENT

ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate herein.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Richfield City has petitioned for rehearing pointing
out that the court's opinion did not cite nor rely
upon Jolley v. Lindon City, Utah, 684 P.2d 47
(1984). We acknowledge our oversight. That
case, too, involved the firing of the chief of police
in a third class city. However, the contention there
made by the appellant chief of police was that
U.C.A., 1953, § 1 0-3-911 could not apply to him
because he was discharged for investigating a city
councilman in his official duties. The contention
was not there made, as in the instant case, that
section 10-3-911 does not in any instance apply to
chiefs of police in third class cities. In a per
curiam opinion, we held that since section 10-3-911
contained no exceptions, it was inconsequential why
the chief was dismissed. We also found lacking
merit the appellant's contention that the city council
had not formally dismissed him. Again, no
contention was made that the city council lacked
that statutory power.
After careful consideration of the appellant's
petition for rehearing, we deny it and overrule
Jolley v. Lindon City, supra, insofar as our decision
in that case conflicts with our opinion in the instant
case. Furthermore, we have carefully examined
Chapter 3 of Title 10 and have found that in each
instance when the term "Board of Commissioners"
is used, it refers only to the governing body of cities
of the first and second class. We can find no
instance in which that term was used to refer to the
governing body of cities generally, including a city
council in a third class city. In Chapter 3, the term
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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